Abstract
China’s encounter with the West in mid-nineteenth century set off changes that had “not been seen for three thousands years”. These changes, including the Opium War, and later, the First Sino-Japanese War, jolted the Qing dynasty onto a course of modernization and ushered in China’s near-modern history. China’s defeats in the wars set the tone for the period of history, which to this day is still remembered with much bitterness. But imperialism and colonialism were not all the enemies that China faced; a stronger foe was feudalism from its own past. Together, the two forces defined the objectives of China’s modernization: national survival, people’s liberation and individual wellbeing. In comparison, the West, which experienced the same process centuries before, shared similar yet different objectives in their own modernization: individual liberty, nation state and citizen’s wellbeing.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See Teng and Fairbank, China’s response to the west: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 1.
- 2.
American scholar Paul A. Cohen criticizes this “challenge – response” diagram overlooks China’s spontaneous reform impulse. See his Discovering history in China: American historical writing on the recent Chinese past, Trans Li Rongtai and others. Linking Books, 1991, p. 1.
- 3.
More on Hundred Days Reform, see Tang Degang’s 70 Years of Late Qing Dynasty, vol 3, Shanghai Social Science Academy Publishing House 2003; Mao Haijian’s Wuxu Reform Historical Facts, Shenghuo-Dushu-Xinzhi Joint Publishing 2005; Huang Zhangjian’s Wuxu Reform History Study (two volumes), Shanghai Book Store 2007.
- 4.
Ibid., p. 634.
- 5.
See The Reform Movement in Modern China: Constitutional Reform and Modernization, ed. by Institute of Modern History of Academia Sinica in Taipei, 1982, p. 36.
- 6.
See Xiao, Gongqin. 1995. Re-reflection on Hundred Days Reform – On cultural roots of early political radicalism. Strategy and Management, Beijing, issue 4.
- 7.
Ibid. p. 63.
- 8.
See Xiao Gongqin: Re-reflection on Hundred Days Reform – on cultural roots of early political radicalism, Strategy and Management, issue 4, 1995.
- 9.
See Yu Yingshi: Wuxu Reform Rereading, 21st Century, issue 2, 1998.
- 10.
See Zhang Pengyuan: Constitutionalists and Xinhai Revolution (preface), Jilin Press Group Ltd. p. 1.
- 11.
Ibid.
- 12.
See Gao Quanxi, The Constitutional Moment: On the Imperial Edict of the Manchu Emperor`s Abdication, Guangxi Normal University Press, 2011.
- 13.
Ibid., p. 176.
- 14.
See Chen Xiqi’s Sun Yat-sen Chronology, Zhonghua Books, 1991 p. 80.
- 15.
See Jiang Yongjing’s Revolutionary Party’s Criticism of the Late Qing Constitutionalist Movement – Min Pao and Xin Min Cong Pao’s Analysis of Constitutionalism Debate, published as part of the anthology Chinese near modern reform, Central Research Institute Near Modern History Institute, 1982, Pp. 125–133.
- 16.
See Ma Yong’s Transcend Revolution and Reform, Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 2001, p. 67.
- 17.
After Revive China Society was established, Yang Xianyun, Sun Yat-sen were increasingly enamored of American political institutions. In what appeared to be an imitation of the US government, they introduced “building a federal government” as one of the objectives. They two even had a quarrel over who should be the “President”. When the Eight Power Coalition force conquered Beijing, the emperor and dowager empress went on fight incognito, the governors of Southeastern provinces intended to form an American-style Republican government and elect Li Hongzhang to be the President. Li agreed. The plan was aborted after the emperor made a public appearance in Xi’an. In 1903, revolutionary Zou Rong wrote in his Revolutionary Army, in which he suggested that the new China should be called Republic of China, and suggested that China should have a central government to handle all state affairs, and that every province should elect a senator and the senators who would elect a provisional president and a vice president - this also shows the influence of the American political model. In 1905, when multiple revolutionary parties formed China Alliance Committee, the organization borrowed the American’s separation of three powers design– Sun was the Prime Minister, Deng Jiayan was the Judicial System leader and Wang Zhaoming was the Parliament leader. See Tang Degang’s Late Qing 70 years: Yuan Shikai, Sun Yat-sen and Xinhai Revolution, Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd. 2004 Pp. 156–157. However, in actuality, this model was not observed strictly. According to Tian Tong, who was secretary of China Alliance Committee’s enforcement department: “For a clandestine organization, over-complicated procedures were the last thing that we wanted … due to the difficulty, some comrades suggest the three department to hold a joint-conference together. Since then all important matters were decided by the joint-conference and the judicial department and supervision department never exercised independent power again.” In March 1907, Sun Yat-sen left Japan after taking Japanese funding. For such a significant event, it is surprising that no meeting was held. See Tian Tong’s China Alliance Committee’s Foundation, quoted from Tang Degang’s Late Qing Dynasty 70 years – Yuan Shikai, Sun Yat-sen and Xinhai Revolution, Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd. 2004 Pp. 219–220.
- 18.
See Ma Yong: Transcend Revolution and Reform, Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 2001, p. 78.
- 19.
Wang Rongzu: On Hundred Days Reform’s failure and thought elements, published as part of the anthology Chinese near modern reform Central Research Institute Near Modern History Institute 1982, p. 34.
- 20.
Sun Yat-sen: State-building Strategy, Sun Yat-sen Anthology, People’s Publishing House 1956, p. 208.
- 21.
Ma Yong believes that “Revolutionaries had fallen into a trap typical of revolutions – they were convinced that only revolution can save China and disregarded all alternative solutions; on the other hand, the Qing government had been in a very passive position, and lacked the capacity to lead, or maintain a stable social order and social movements, as a result, the Qing government lost too many opportunities, during the process, disappointed and antagonized the revolutionaries furthermore. As a result, China can only forge ahead along the road of revolution”. See Ma Yong’s Transcend Revolution and Reform, Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 2001, p. 73.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Social Sciences Academic Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gao, Q., Zhang, W., Tian, F. (2015). Inception: From Hundred Days Reform to Xinhai Revolution. In: The Road to the Rule of Law in Modern China. Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45637-8_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45637-8_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-45636-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-45637-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)