Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Social Rights Obligations—The Link Between Human Rights Law and International Development Law

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Social Rights and International Development

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Law ((BRIEFSLAW))

  • 680 Accesses

Abstract

The question of which concrete obligations arise from the protection of social rights leads in two directions: On the one hand, the content of the respective norms needs to be clarified—in which the specific content of individual rights (which will be discussed further under Sect. 3.4.) can be distinguished from general dimensions of obligations, which apply to all social rights in the same or similar manner (Sect. 3.1)—, on the other, the question of who is actually under an obligation to protect social rights. It is clear that States are committed by international law to comply with these laws, but it is more difficult to determine the status of obligation with respect to other actors: It is especially unclear if—and if it is the case, to which extent—multinational companies (Sect. 3.2) and international organizations working in the field of development cooperation are bound to comply with social rights (Sect. 3.4). Moreover, several questions still remain unanswered regarding the extraterritorial obligations of the States Parties to the ICESCR (Sect. 3.3). Since these extraterritorial obligations represent the link between Human Rights Law and International Development Law, they are (or at least should be) of special interest for those engaged in drafting the Post 2015-Development Agenda.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Shue 1996, pp. 52–53.

  2. 2.

    Eide 1984, p. 154; van Hoof 1984, pp. 106–108; for a discussion of the different approaches see Sepúlveda 2003, pp. 161–173.

  3. 3.

    Eide 2001, p. 23; cf. also Ssenyonjo 2009, pp. 23–26; De Schutter 2010, pp. 242–256.

  4. 4.

    For this and the following cf. CESCR 1999a, Paras 15–20; Ziegler et al. 2011, pp. 18–20.

  5. 5.

    Article 14 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22.–26.1.1997, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html.—All websites cited in this chapter have been last accessed 3 September 2014.

  6. 6.

    Article 15 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

  7. 7.

    Provisions of national legislation and their control by constitutional courts are not subject of this study. On the enforcement of social rights in individual legal systems of the Global South cf. Coomans 2006; Gauri and Brinks 2008; Langford 2008; Bonilla Maldonado 2013; in particular on Latin American countries see Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003; Courtis 2006; Ely Yamin 2006; Schilling-Vacaflor and Barrera 2011; on sub-Sahara Africa e.g. Mubangizi 2006; Ibe 2010; for an analysis of the comprehensive social rights jurisprudence particularly in South Africa see Bilchitz 2007, pp. 135–237; Mbazira 2009; Liebenberg 2010; Trilsch 2012, pp. 207–246 and passim; O’Connell 2012, pp. 48–77; Wilson and Dugard 2013; for the social rights jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India see Kothari 2007; Shankar and Mehta 2008; O’Connell 2012, pp. 78–107; cf. in this context also, generally, Tushnet 2008; Landau 2012.

  8. 8.

    See also Article 8 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: “… State practice and the application of legal norms to concrete cases and situations by international treaty monitoring bodies as well as by domestic courts have contributed to the development of universal minimum standards and the common understanding of the scope, nature and limitation of economic, social and cultural rights.”

  9. 9.

    See for the debate on the justiciability of social rights the references supra Sect. 2.1, footnote 13.

  10. 10.

    Most of the authors who have dealt in more detail with this provision also require, inter alia, that restrictions of social rights should be subject to a proportionality assessment; e.g. Müller 2009, pp. 583–584; Ssenyonjo 2009, p. 101; see also CESCR 2000, Para 29. Sometimes the provision is also interpreted in a way that restrictions cannot be justified by a lack of available resources; see McBeth et al. 2011, p. 164, Kradolfer 2012, p. 279; cf. on the relationship between Article 2(1) and Article 4 ICESCR also Alston and Quinn 1987, pp. 205–206.

  11. 11.

    Article 2(1) ICESCR; see for an analysis of this principle Klee 2000, pp. 113–137; Sepúlveda 2003, pp. 174–184.

  12. 12.

    CESCR 1990.

  13. 13.

    CESCR 2007.

  14. 14.

    CESCR 1990, Para 9. For details of the prohibition of taking deliberately retrogressive measures see Sepúlveda 2003, pp. 323–332.

  15. 15.

    CESCR 1990, Para 8.

  16. 16.

    CESCR 1990, Para 4.

  17. 17.

    See, generally, on the problem of lack of resources Alston and Goodman 2013, pp. 315–330.

  18. 18.

    CESCR 2007, Para 4.

  19. 19.

    CESCR 2007, Para 10. For an analysis of the term “maximum of available resources” see also Dowell-Jones 2004, pp. 44–51; Saul et al. 2014, pp. 143–151.

  20. 20.

    CESCR 1990, Para 2: “… (W)hile the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned Such steps should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant.”

  21. 21.

    CESCR 1990, Para 10. On the concept of (minimum) core obligations cf. also Brand and Russell 2002; Scheinin 2013.

  22. 22.

    CESCR 1990, Para 11; cf. also CESCR 2001, Para 18: “… (B)ecause core obligations are non-derogable, they continue to exist in situations of conflict, emergency and natural disaster.”

  23. 23.

    CESCR 1992, Para 12; CESCR 1999a, Paras 21–23; CESCR 2003, Para 37(f); CESCR 2008, Para 59(d).

  24. 24.

    CESCR 1992, Para 13; CESCR 1999a, Para 31; CESCR 2000, Para 43(f); CESCR 2003, Para 37(g); CESCR 2008, Para 59(f); cf. Ssenyonjo 2009, pp. 68–69.

  25. 25.

    CESCR 1999a, Paras 18, 26; CESCR 2000, Para 43(a); CESCR 2003, Para 37(b); CESCR 2008, Para 59(b). On the relevance of the non-discrimination principle for the implementation of social rights obligations see CESCR 2009; Sepúlveda 2003, pp. 379–419; Ssenyonjo 2009, pp. 60, 85–97.

  26. 26.

    See Sepúlveda 2003, p. 367: “Once it is established that states must guarantee a minimum essential level of each right, the question is to determine what constitutes the ‘essential level’ or ‘core content’ of each right. Over the years the Committee has struggled to identify the core content of each right, but has not met with much success. This is not to say that the Committee is to blame, because identifying the minimum entitlements without which a right loses its substance is a complex task and the results tend to be rather theoretical or abstract.”

  27. 27.

    Bantekas and Oette 2013, p. 378, rightly note that “… what remains unanswered is whether the minimalist approach associated with minimum core obligations presupposes differentiated standards between developed and developing countries.” Some authors try to face this problem by supporting a country-specific minimum threshold approach; see, for example, Andreassen et al. 1988; for an examination of this issue in more depth see Bilchitz 2003; Young 2008.

  28. 28.

    Cf. Bilchitz 2003, p. 12.

  29. 29.

    According to CESCR 2003, Para 37(a) and (c), the obligation “(t)o ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that is sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease” and “(t)o ensure physical access to water facilities or services that provide sufficient, safe and regular water” belongs to the minimum core obligations with relation to the right to water. These clauses—which can also be found in comparable form in other General Comments—include several indeterminate legal terms that can be interpreted differently depending on the respective regional and cultural context.

  30. 30.

    For an overview on the application of indicators with regard to social human rights see Welling 2008; cf. also Manning 2009; Hunt and MacNaughton 2007; De Schutter 2010, pp. 479–512; Windfuhr 2013, pp. 362–363, 365–369; and, generally, Riegner 2014; on the special problems of measuring State compliance with the obligation to devote the “maximum of (their) available resources” (Article 2 [1] ICESCR) see Khalfan 2013, pp. 324–330; Sepúlveda 2003, pp. 316–319; Apodaca 2007; Corkery and Way 2012.

  31. 31.

    New York Times, 24.4.2013 “Building Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves Scores Dead”; http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/bangladesh-building-collapse.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A15%22%7D.

  32. 32.

    28 USC § 1350.

  33. 33.

    Seibert-Fohr and Wolfrum 2005, pp. 166–177.

  34. 34.

    Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), HLR 123 (2010), p. 768.

  35. 35.

    Sinaltrainal v. The Coca-Cola Co., No. 06-15851, 2009 WL 2431463 (11th Cir. 2009); HLR 123 (2009), p. 580.

  36. 36.

    Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=542&invol=692.

  37. 37.

    See e.g. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013); HLR 127 (2013), p. 308.

  38. 38.

    The following sections are based on Kaltenborn and Norpoth 2014.

  39. 39.

    http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2006/106B09_303_engl.pdf. See Krajewski 2011, pp. 60–61; Rudolph 2005.

  40. 40.

    http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/; see Tully 2001; Krajewski 2011, p. 56; Utz 2011; Huarte Melgar et al. 2011.

  41. 41.

    OECD-Guidelines, Commentary on Human Rights, https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/2011HumanRights.pdf, Para 39: “In all cases and irrespective of the country or specific context of enterprises’ operations, reference should be made at a minimum to the internationally recognised human rights expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the main instruments through which it has been codified: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and to the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the 1998 International Labour Organisation Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.”

  42. 42.

    http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/.

  43. 43.

    See Germanwatch and Misereor 2014, pp. 111–115; Robinson 2014, pp. 71–75.

  44. 44.

    UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26.8.2003, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html; see Weissbrodt and Kruger 2003; Vagts 2003; Nowrot 2003; Emmerich-Fritsche 2007, pp. 546–547.

  45. 45.

    For an overview on this discussion see Ssenyonjo 2009, pp. 142–144; De Schutter 2014, pp. 195–217; see also, generally, Köster 2010, pp. 129–130. Although the UN Norms have not gone beyond draft status, they have heavily influenced both the academic and political debates on the responsibilities of companies under international law.

  46. 46.

    The UN Global Compact is an important example for such a CSR standard; see https://www.unglobalcompact.org/index.html.

  47. 47.

    The terminology is inconsistent on this question; also the terms “transnational”, “transboundary”, “international”, “global” or “third state obligations” are used; cf. Gibney 2013.

  48. 48.

    Article 2(1) ICCPR; for problems related to the interpretation of this clause, cf. Kälin and Künzli 2009, pp. 132–133.

  49. 49.

    For such an interpretation of the clause see, for example, von Bernstorff 2011, p. 52.

  50. 50.

    Vandenhole 2003, pp. 445–446; Skogly and Gibney 2002, pp. 790–791; De Schutter 2010, p. 163; Papp 2013, p. 119; similarly Skogly 2006, pp. 57–72; for a different view see Kälin and Künzli 2009, pp. 141–142.

  51. 51.

    For an overview of the discussion see von Bernstorff 2011, pp. 55–56; den Heijer and Lawson 2013, pp. 186–190; Papp 2013, pp. 121–122.

  52. 52.

    Bantekas and Oette 2013, pp. 70–71; Goldmann 2014, p. 428. According to van Genugten 1992, p. 19, social rights that have been recognized for a long time are also part of those main human rights that unfold an erga omnes-obligation. The Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 31 (Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26.5.2004, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/419/56/PDF/G0441956.pdf?OpenElement, Para 2, even goes further: According to it, all human rights imply an erga omnes-effect.

  53. 53.

    De Schutter et al. 2012, p. 1142. : “The erga omnes character of human rights may justify allowing the exercise by states of extraterritorial jurisdiction, even in conditions that might otherwise not be permissible, where such exercise seeks to promote such rights. Similarly, the realization of the MDGs is of interest to all states. Therefore, extraterritorial jurisdiction seeking to promote human rights, or the achievement of the MDGs, is not a case where one state seeks to impose its values on another state, as in other cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction.”—In detail on the term of jurisdiction in international human rights protection and in general international law den Heijer and Lawson 2013, pp. 158–182.

  54. 54.

    http://www.etoconsortium.org/en/library/maastricht-principles/; see for an overview Coomans 2012.

  55. 55.

    The even stricter standard of Principle 12 applies to companies that are partly owned or controlled by the state: “State responsibility extends to: (a) acts and omissions of non-State actors acting on the instructions or under the direction or control of the State; and (b) acts and omissions of persons or entities which are not organs of the State, such as corporations and other business enterprises, where they are empowered by the State to exercise elements of governmental authority, provided those persons or entities are acting in that capacity in the particular instance.”

  56. 56.

    In their comment on the Maastricht Principles De Schutter et al. 2012, p. 1141, give examples where a relation between a State and a transnationally operating company can be established via Princ. 25(d): “Examples of instances where a state should take action to protect rights under Principle 25(d) … include situations where a non-state actor accused of human rights abuse in another country has assets that can be seized in order to implement the judgment of a competent court where there may be relevant evidence or witnesses, where relevant officials accused of criminal liability may be present, or where the non-state actor may have carried out part of the operations that resulted in the abuse.”

  57. 57.

    Principle 26 Maastricht Principles. See in this context Germanwatch and Misereor 2014, pp. 35–69 (This report offers—by using the example of the Federal Republic of Germany—an informative overview of instruments available for states to influence activities of companies outside their own state territory in order to prevent human rights violations.), and, generally, also Ryngart 2013, pp. 204–207.

  58. 58.

    See, for example, Künnemann 2004, pp. 219–220; Sepúlveda Carmona 2009, p. 91.

  59. 59.

    Human rights beyond borders: UN experts call on world governments to be guided by the Maastricht Principles, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13792&LangID=E.: “28 September 2011 was a significant moment in the development of international human rights law … The Maastricht Principles filled a critical gap in the international legal framework, allowing human rights to effectively respond to the negative impacts of globalisation that cannot be regulated by one State alone.” Cf. also the Final draft of the guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights, submitted by the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/39, 18.7.2012, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/154/60/PDF/G1215460.pdf?OpenElement, Paras 92, 93.

  60. 60.

    CESCR 2003, Para 33. A similar wording can be found in the Statement of the CESCR on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2011/1, 20.5.2011, Para 5: “States Parties should also take steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations which have their main seat under their jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of the host States under the Covenant.”

  61. 61.

    CESCR 2008, Para 53.

  62. 62.

    CESCR 2008, Para 54. The UN Special Representative John Ruggie, however, assumes that this is merely a recommendation, see Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (“Business and human rights: Towards operationalizing the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework”), UN-Doc. A/HRC/11/13, 22.04.2009, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf, Para 15.

  63. 63.

    Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21.3.2011, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf; see for a detailed discussion of the UN Guiding Principles Jägers 2011; Mares 2012; Windfuhr 2012, pp. 106–113; von Bernstorff 2012b; de la Vega et al. 2011; Massoud 2013; Tietje 2013, pp. 277–280; Germanwatch and Misereor 2014, pp. 29–32.

  64. 64.

    Cf. International Organisation of Employers/International Chamber of Commerce, Joint views of the IOE and ICC on the draft “Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights”, March 2004, http://198.170.85.29/IOE-ICC-views-UN-norms-March-2004.doc.

  65. 65.

    Companies are expected to avoid human rights violations and infringements of core labor rights norms and to adapt their corporate policy accordingly; applicable tools are, inter alia, public policy commitments and the realization of human rights due diligence procedures; see in detail UN Guiding Principles, Paras 11–24.

  66. 66.

    Paras 1–10 UN Guiding Principles.

  67. 67.

    Para 2 UN Guiding Principles.

  68. 68.

    Ibid.

  69. 69.

    http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nr/land_tenure/pdf/VG_en_Final_March_2012.pdf; see von Bernstorff 2012a; Seufert 2014.

  70. 70.

    See infra Sect. 4.1.

  71. 71.

    Para 3.2 FAO Guidelines.

  72. 72.

    Ibid.

  73. 73.

    Para 12.5 FAO Guidelines.

  74. 74.

    von Bernstorff 2012a, pp. 40–41.

  75. 75.

    Article 55 lit. c UN.

  76. 76.

    Article 56 UN.

  77. 77.

    Cf. Dann 2010.

  78. 78.

    See supra Sect. 2.3.

  79. 79.

    Principle 29 Maastricht Principles; cf. also Salomon 2013, pp. 262–263.

  80. 80.

    Principle 33 Maastricht Principles.

  81. 81.

    In their commentary on the Maastricht Principles, De Schutter et al. 2012, p. 1157, rightly point out that this provision is to be understood widely, i.e. covering also other supporting benefits in addition to ODA transfers: “International assistance may, and depending on the circumstances must, comprise other measures, including provision of information to people in other countries, or cooperation with their state, for example, to trace stolen public funds or to cooperate in the adoption of measures to prevent human trafficking”.

  82. 82.

    See, for example, Alston and Quinn 1987, pp. 186–192.

  83. 83.

    Sepúlveda 2006, p. 288; Gondek 2009, p. 363; Coomans 2011, p. 27; Dann 2012, pp. 253–254.

  84. 84.

    See supra Sect. 3.2 . See in this context also den Heijer and Lawson 2013, p. 184, who point out that the general duties of international cooperation which are laid down in the ICESCR “are obviously (and deliberately) formulated in broad and general terms, and their very nature would appear to oppose an interpretation that they should be made dependent upon specific conduct or involvements of a State—other than, perhaps, the resources the State has at its disposal. We would uphold the proposition that those duties should accordingly not be made on the existence of a specific ‘jurisdictional link’ between the State and a particular individual or group of individuals present in a foreign territory. … The omission of a general jurisdiction clause in the ICESCR underscores that the duty of international cooperation and assistance does not necessarily depend upon a prior ‘jurisdictional link’.”

  85. 85.

    For a similar opinion see Hennessy 2002, pp. 86–88; Skogly 2006, p. 193; Ssenyonjo 2009, pp. 69–81; Ziegler et al. 2011, p. 83; cf. furthermore Craven 1995, p. 149; very clearly also Pogge 2005, p. 741: “Given that the present global institutional order is foreseeably associated with such massive incidence of avoidable severe poverty, its (uncompensated) imposition manifests an ongoing human rights violation—arguably the largest such violation ever committed in human history. … The continuing imposition of this global order, essentially unmodified, constitutes a massive violation of the human right to basic necessities—a violation for which the governments and electorates of the more powerful countries bear primary responsibility.”; for a more skeptical view see Dann 2012, p. 208 (with further references).

  86. 86.

    Cf. CESCR 1990, Para 14; CESCR 2000, Para 39; CESCR 2003, Para 38; CESCR 2001, Para 17.

  87. 87.

    Principle 31 Maastricht Principles.

  88. 88.

    Principle 34 Maastricht Principles.

  89. 89.

    Vandenhole and Benedek 2013, p. 335; Salomon 2013, p. 278.

  90. 90.

    Salomon 2013, p. 279.

  91. 91.

    For an analysis of causation problems in this context see Skogly 2013; Salomon 2013; cf. also Dann 2012, pp. 239–242, who makes convincing arguments in favor of an application of the rules on complicity to substantiate the development aid donor’s responsibility for human rights violations in the recipient State.

    For a slightly different approach see also Coomans 2011, p. 27.

  92. 92.

    Principle 31, 2 Maastricht Principles. The CESCR has pointed out that the extent of legally required international assistance follows, according to the extent of territorial obligations, maximum return; see CESCR 1990, Para 3: “The Committee notes that the phrase ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ was intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both the resources existing within a State and those available from the international community through international cooperation and assistance.” Salomon (2007, p. 101) has rightly criticized that “the very approach enshrined in the Covenant presents a perverse (albeit predictable) logic; it is concerned what a state can afford to do by its own estimation rather than what needs to be done to secure the minimum essential levels of economic, social and cultural rights globally.”; in this context, cf. also Donati and Vidar 2008, p. 65.

  93. 93.

    Khalfan 2013, pp. 324–328; Vandenhole and Benedek 2013, pp. 340–350.

  94. 94.

    In the past, individual industrialized countries have repeatedly made clear that they consider themselves morally committed to development cooperation, but do not recognize corresponding legal obligations; cf. the Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Consider Options regarding the Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its second session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/52, 10.2.2005, Para 76; see also Gondek 2009, pp. 328–333.

  95. 95.

    See Ssenyonjo 2009, p. 79 (with references in Fn. 202–206). For the discussion on the calculation of financial means which are needed to reach the MDGs see, for example, Sachs 2005, pp. 353–374.

  96. 96.

    The target of 0,7 % of GNP to be allocated to development cooperation by each State has been formulated for the first time by the UN General Assembly in 1970 (UN Doc. A/RES/25/2626 [XXV], 24.10.1970, Para 43) and since then has been affirmed several times; cf. for more details Vandenhole and Benedek 2013, p. 347.

  97. 97.

    De Schutter et al. 2012, pp. 1149–1150. See also generally on the procedural approach in the law of development cooperation Salomon 2007, p. 102: “International cooperation favours obligations of conduct: process over outcome, conduct over result, assurances of best effort over guarantees of success. … Political commitments towards international cooperation have been recently articulated as ‘global partnerships for development’, provided for in the 8th Millennium Development Goal.”

  98. 98.

    Principle 32 Maastricht Principles; see also Kämpf and Winkler 2012, pp. 78–80.

  99. 99.

    Cf. Craven 1995, p. 150.

  100. 100.

    Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, UN Doc. A/AC.257/32, 22.3.2002, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf; Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: Outcome document of the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, annexed to GA res. 63/239, UN Doc. A/RES/63/239, 2.12.2008, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/documents/Doha_Declaration_FFD.pdf.

  101. 101.

    http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf; http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf.

  102. 102.

    See infra Sect. 5.2.

  103. 103.

    For a discussion of the human rights obligations of the World Bank and other international financial institutions see Skogly 2001; Darrow 2003, van Genugten et al. 2003; Ghazi 2005; Fujita 2013.

  104. 104.

    See Janik 2012, pp. 120–121, 128–131 with further references.

  105. 105.

    A prominent critic of IMF is Jean Ziegler, who considers this organization—alongside with WTO—to the “most crucial enemies of economic, social and cultural human rights, especially of the right to food” (2011, p. 158; own translation).

  106. 106.

    Cf. Darrow 2003, pp. 150–152.

  107. 107.

    Darrow 2003, pp. 104–105; Goldmann 2014, pp. 428–429; Janik 2012, pp. 123–128.

  108. 108.

    On this issue see also Krajewski 2014, pp. 273–274; Qureshi 2009.

  109. 109.

    Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20.11.2001, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. Krajewski (2014, pp. 260–261), however, attributes a primarily “rhetoric relevance” to the term “development” in the Doha Round (with reference to Jawara and Kwa 2003, p. 266; Qureshi 2009, p. 173); critically also Feyder 2010, p. 181; on the current state of the negotiations see Elsig and Dupont 2012; Erixon 2014; cf. also the 11th revised draft report of the ILA-International Trade Law Committee (ITLC), http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/24, Paras 5–8.

  110. 110.

    This has been emphasized, for example, in the Preliminary report “Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights”, submitted to the UN Human Rights Commission, Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13, 15.6.2000, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/140/14/PDF/G0014014.pdf?OpenElement, Para 15: “(F)or certain sectors of humanity—particularly the developing countries of the South—the WTO is a veritable nightmare”; for a similar appreciation cf. Ziegler 2011, pp. 167–177. On the relevance of human rights for world trade law see, generally, Cottier et al. 2005; Hilf and Hörmann 2005; Harrison 2007; Hilpold 2007; Joseph et al. 2009; Joseph 2011; Brown 2012; Hestermeyer 2014; Drache and Jacobs 2014.

  111. 111.

    Cf. the reports by the Special Rapporteurs on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/58, 10.1.2002, http://www.righttofood.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/ECN.4200258.pdf, Paras 111–114; and Olivier De Schutter, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/5/Add.2, 4.2.2009, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/106/39/PDF/G0910639.pdf?OpenElement, Paras 11–13, 16. For further references on this subject see infra Sect. 4.1.1.

  112. 112.

    On the outcome of the 9th WTO-Ministerial Conference in Bali 2013 see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/brief_agneg_e.htm#exportsubsidies; see also Felbermayr et al. 2014; Schmucker 2014.

  113. 113.

    A concise introduction to this topic and a compilation of new international legal developments can be found at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharmpatent_e.htm; see, generally, on the TRIPS-pharmaceuticals debate WHO 2006; cf. also Correa 2003; Cullet 2003; Stoll 2005; Hestermeyer 2007; Dreyfuss 2010; Yamane 2011, pp. 261–344; Xiong 2012.

  114. 114.

    Hilf and Hörmann 2005, p. 429; see also Howse and Teitel 2009, pp. 62–64; Joseph 2011, pp. 226–230.

  115. 115.

    See Report of the High Commissioner, Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Liberalization of Trade in Services and Human Rights, UN-Dok. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25.6.2002; furthermore Türk and Krajewski 2004; Hilf and Hörmann 2005, pp. 439–441; McBeth 2010, 150–158; Shawkat et al. 2011, and infra Sect. 4.1.2.

  116. 116.

    On the question whether financial institutions are guilty of assisting human rights violations by the debtor State due to their more or less „dictated“ conditions of loan granting, cf. Janik 2012, pp. 118–119 (with further references). Sometimes it is also argued that a certain core list of human rights has developed an erga omnes-effect in the meanwhile, so that they have to be considered in all legal relationships and that they are therewith also binding for international financial institutions; see supra Sect. 3.2 and Buergenthal and Thürer 2009, p. 162.

  117. 117.

    See supra Sect. 2.3.

  118. 118.

    See in detail Dann, pp. 246–247; sometimes an (indirect) human rights obligation of the World Bank and IMF arising out of Article 103 UN is assumed; see, for example, Ssenyonjo 2009, pp. 131–132.

  119. 119.

    Article I IBRD Articles of Agreement, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215526322295/IBRDArticlesOfAgreement_English.pdf; see also Roos 2007, p. 356.

  120. 120.

    The same applies for other international financial institutions, see Buergenthal and Thürer 2009, p. 157.

  121. 121.

    Shihata 1995, p. 574.

  122. 122.

    The IMF Articles of Agreement (http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/) do not contain such a ban on political activity, however the IMF is even more reluctant than the IBRD to recognize the human rights relevance of its operation; see Janik 2012, p. 297.

  123. 123.

    Darrow 2003, p. 192, Oberleitner 2007, pp. 131–132; Janik 2012, pp. 359–387; see also Herdegen 2014, § 192, Para 130.

  124. 124.

    Janik 2012, pp. 274–279.

  125. 125.

    Buergenthal and Thürer 2009, p. 160; Ssenyonjo 2009, p. 133. In the draft of the Bank’s new Environmental and Social Framework (“Setting Standards for Sustainable Development”; see http://consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/consultation-template/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies/en/materials/first_draft_framework_july_30_2014.pdf) only few indications on a changed perspective on human rights can be found (e.g. in p. 5 Para 3 “… the Bank’s operations are supportive of human rights and will encourage respect for them in a manner consistent with the Bank’s Articles of Agreement.”); on the review of the World Bank Safeguard Policies see also http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTSAFEPOL/0,,contentMDK:23277451~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:584435,00.html; furthermore von Bernstorff and Dann 2013; Scheper 2013.

  126. 126.

    World Bank 1998, p. 3: “The Bank contributes directly to the fulfillment of many rights articulated in the Universal Declaration. Through its support of primary education, health care and nutrition, sanitation, housing, and the environment, the Bank has helped hundreds of millions of people attain crucial economic and social rights. In other areas, the Bank’s contributions are necessarily less direct, but perhaps equally significant. By helping to fight corruption, improve transparency and accountability in governance, strengthen judicial systems, and modernize financial sectors, the Bank contributes to building environments in which people are better able to pursue a broader range of human rights.” and p. 30: “For the World Bank, protecting and advancing human rights means helping the world’s poorest people escape poverty.”

  127. 127.

    In the “Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank” of 27.1.2006, authored by the World Bank General Counsel Roberto Danino (see for excerpts of the text McBeth et al. 2011, pp. 644–645), a direct legal obligation of the Bank to comply with human rights has not been recognized; however the document makes clear that the Bank is aware of the importance of human rights for its work: “(T)he Bank has a significant role in helping member countries in the substantive realization of their human rights obligations in areas that fall within the remit of its mandate and where development activities and human rights are deeply interrelated. This is particularly important in cases where countries request such an assistance, or where they frame questions or strategies related to poverty reduction or development in human rights terms. It is therefore legitimate for the Bank to take human rights into consideration as part of its economic decision-making process.” See also World Bank, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework (A Discussion Draft), 1999, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTWEBARCHIVES/0,,MDK:22201409~menuPK:64654237~pagePK:64660187~piPK:64660385~theSitePK:2564958,00.html, Part 1 A. 2.: “Without the protection of human and property rights, and a comprehensive framework of laws, no equitable development is possible. A government must ensure that it has an effective system of property, contract, labor, bankruptcy, commercial codes, personal rights laws and other elements of a comprehensive legal system that is effectively, impartially and cleanly administered by a well-functioning, impartial and honest judicial and legal system.” For an analysis of the new World Bank approach cf. Janik 2012, pp. 264–297.

  128. 128.

    Buergenthal and Thürer 2009, p. 158; World Bank 1998, pp. 11–12.

  129. 129.

    See Gentilini et al . 2014.

  130. 130.

    World Bank 1998, pp. 5–6; cf. also Oberleitner 2007, p. 131.

  131. 131.

    http://wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. The preamble requests WTO Member States to make sure that “their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living”, the human rights context of this provision is not addressed, however.

  132. 132.

    In the Agreement on Agriculture (http://wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf) several provision take into account issues of food security, and the GATT (http://wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt.pdf) in its Article XX lit.(b) offers WTO Members the possibility to implement trade restrictions to protect human life and human health, but again the reference to relevant social rights is lacking.

  133. 133.

    Para 8 Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20.11.2001, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. On the debate, both in international trade politics as well as in academic literature, whether or not social and labor standards are to be integrated in the international trade framework, see, for example, Spelten 2005; Kaufmann 2007; Nadakavukaren 2010, pp. 99–315; Scherrer and Hänlein 2012.

  134. 134.

    Para 13 Ministerial Declaration.

  135. 135.

    WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20.11.2001, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.

  136. 136.

    WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.5, 28.10.2010, see, for example, Para 7: “A significant reduction in tariffs and the expansion of tariff quotas, particularly in developed country markets, is being sought by many developing countries. … At the same time, many developing countries are concerned about the likely impact of tariff reductions on rural livelihood, and consequently on their food security concerns, in particular should domestic support levels remain high in some other countries.”, and Para 25: “Issues of interest to developing countries … include … (a)ppropriate S&D (special and differential treatment) for developing countries, including the flexibility to designate an appropriate number of products as Special Products guided by indicators based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs, and the establishment of a Special Safeguard Mechanism.”

  137. 137.

    Cf. in this context also the dispute between the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter and the former WTO General Secretary Pascal Lamy on “The World Trade Organization and the Post-Global Food Crisis Agenda. Putting Food Security First in the International Trade System”, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/deschutter_2011_e.pdf; https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/aGeneral Comment No.om_14dec11_e.htm; on this complex see also the statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food on “Trade negotiations need to reflect the new global consensus on hunger”, 2.12.2009, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9656&LangID=E; furthermore the report on his mission to the World Trade Organization, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/5/Add.2, 4.2.2009, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/106/39/PDF/G0910639.pdf?OpenElement.

  138. 138.

    Cf. the Ministerial Decisions on General Services (WT/MIN(13)/37—WT/L/912) and on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes (WT/MIN(13)/38—WT/L/913); for more information see https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/mc9sum_07dec13_e.htm#agriculture and https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/brief_agneg_e.htm#stockholding.

  139. 139.

    In particular MDG 8 (global partnership for development) is highlighted in this context, but the WTO secretariat also refers to the importance of the global trade system for other MDGs; cf. WTO, The WTO and the Millennium Development Goals, http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/mdg_e/mdg_e.htm, p. 11: “WTO activities are also having a fundamental impact on MDG 1, which aims to eradicate poverty and hunger. While the relationship between open trade and growth is quite complex, it is widely recognized that the WTO’s work is having an impact on achieving MDG 1 because open trade, accompanied by sound domestic and international policies, can lead to enhanced levels of growth and poverty reduction. Attaining MDG 1 will thus support countries in meeting their social objectives and in achieving all the MDGs.” See also Bender 2007, pp. 11–25.

  140. 140.

    On the question to what extent WTO dispute settlement bodies have to take into account human rights obligations of WTO members in their decisions, see Marceau 2002; Weiß 2007, Para 1108; Hörmann 2010, Para 12; Joseph 2011, pp. 50–53; Hestermeyer 2014, pp. 268–275; cf. in this context the ILA resolution 5/2008 (“Rio de Janeiro Declaration”) which explicitly declares that “WTO members and bodies are legally required to interpret and apply WTO rules in conformity with the human rights obligations of WTO members under international law”; see also 8th report of the ILA-International Trade Law Committee (ITLC), Paras 35–42 (both documents are available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/24) and Petersmann 2014.

  141. 141.

    See, for the World Bank, Head 2008, p. 204, and, for the WTO, Feyder 2010, p. 186 (supporting stronger attention to the right to food in the WTO-Agreement on Agriculture). On further proposals containing a stronger linking of the WTO to human rights standards, cf. Hilf and Hörmann 2005, pp. 458–463; Orford 2006, pp. 159–192; Konstantinov 2009; Joseph 2011, pp. 265–284; cf. in this context also the debate between Petersmann 2002, 2008, Alston 2002, and Howse 2002, 2008.

  142. 142.

    Cogen 1992, p. 387; Dann 2012, pp. 244–245; Narula 2013, pp. 131–135; Hestermeyer 2014, pp. 264–265.

  143. 143.

    Hörmann 2010, Para 10.

  144. 144.

    CESCR 2008, Para 58. Similar wordings can be found for example in CESCR 2000, Para 39; cf. also CESCR 1999b, Para 8: “The Committee urges WTO members to ensure that their international human rights obligations are considered as a matter of priority in their negotiations which will be an important testing ground for the commitment of States to the full range of their international obligations. The Committee would welcome the opportunity to collaborate with WTO on these matters and thereby be active partners towards the realization of all the rights set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”

  145. 145.

    CESCR 2008, Para 82.

  146. 146.

    CESCR 2008, Para 83.

  147. 147.

    Principe 15 Maastricht Principles; cf. in this context also Principle 29 Maastricht Principles.

  148. 148.

    Principle 16 Maastricht Principles.

  149. 149.

    See supra Sect. 3.3.

References

  • Alston Ph (2002) Resisting the merger and acquisition of human rights by trade law. A reply to Petersmann. EJIL 13:815–844

    Google Scholar 

  • Alston Ph (2005) Ships Passing in the Night. The Current State of The Human Rights and Development Debate seen through the lens of the Millennium Development Goals. HRQ 25:755–829

    Google Scholar 

  • Alston Ph, Goodman R (2013) International human rights, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Alston Ph, Quinn G (1987) The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. HRQ 9:156–229

    Google Scholar 

  • Andreassen B et al (1988) Human Rights Performance in Developing Countries. The Case for a Minimal Threshold Approach. In: Andreassen B et al (eds) Human Rights in Developing Countries. Akademisk Forlag, Copenhague, pp 333–356

    Google Scholar 

  • Apodaca C (2007) Measuring the Progressive Realization of Economic and Social Rights. In: Hertel Sh, Minkler L (eds) Economic rights. Conceptual, measurement, and policy issues. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 165–181

    Google Scholar 

  • Bantekas I, Oette L (2013) International Human Rights Law and Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Bender D (2007) WTO und Millennium Development Goals. Wirkt Handelsliberalisierung armutsmindernd? In: Meyer G (ed) Entwicklung durch Handel? Die Dritte Welt in der Globalisierung. Interdisziplinärer Arbeitskreis Dritte Welt, Mainz, pp 11–25

    Google Scholar 

  • Bilchitz D (2003) Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core. Laying the foundations for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence. S Afr J Hum Rights 19:1–26

    Google Scholar 

  • Bilchitz D (2007) Poverty and fundamental rights. The justification and enforcement of socio-economic rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonilla Maldonado D (ed) (2013) Constitutionalism of the Global South. The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Buergenthal Th, Thürer D (2009) Menschenrechte. Ideale, Instrumente, Institutionen. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Brand D, Russell S (eds) (2002) Core obligations: building a framework for economic, social and cultural rights. Intersentia, Antwerp

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown DK (2012) Labour standards and Human Rights. In: Narlikar A et al (eds) The Oxford handbook on the World Trade Organization. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 697–718

    Google Scholar 

  • Cogen M (1992) Human rights, prohibition of political activities and the lending-policies of World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In: Chowdhury S et al (eds) The right to development in international law. Nijhoff, Dordrecht, pp 379–396

    Google Scholar 

  • Coomans F (2006) Justiciability of economic and social rights. Experiences from domestic systems. Intersentia, Antwerp

    Google Scholar 

  • Coomans F (2007) Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Framework of International Organizations, Max Planck Yearb United Nations Law 11:369–390

    Google Scholar 

  • Coomans F (2011) The extraterritorial scope of the international convenant on economic, social and cultural rights in the work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. HRLR 11:1–35

    Google Scholar 

  • Coomans F (2012) Die Verortung der Maastrichter Prinzipien zu den extraterritorialen Staatenpflichten im Bereich der wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Rechte. Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte 6:27–47

    Google Scholar 

  • Corkery A, Way SA (2012) Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Tools to Monitor the Obligation to Fulfil Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: the OPERA Framework. Nord J Hum Rights 30:324–349

    Google Scholar 

  • Correa C (2003) TRIPS and Access to Drugs: Toward a Solution for Developing Countries without Manufacturing Capacity? Emory Int Law Rev 17:389–406

    Google Scholar 

  • Cottier Th et al (eds) (2005) Human Rights and International Trade. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Courtis Ch (2006) Judicial enforcement of social rights. Perspectives from Latin America. In: Gargarella R et al (eds) Courts and social transformation in new democracies. Ashgate, Aldershot, pp 169–184

    Google Scholar 

  • Craven MCR (1995) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—A Perspective on its Development. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Cullet Ph (2003) Patents and Medicines. The Relationship between TRIPS and the Human Right to Health. Int Aff 79:139–160

    Google Scholar 

  • Dann Ph (2010) Solidarity and the Law of Development Cooperation. In: Wolfrum R, Kojima Ch (eds) Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 55–78

    Google Scholar 

  • Dann Ph (2012) Entwicklungsverwaltungsrecht. Theorie und Dogmatik des Rechts der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, untersucht am Beispiel der Weltbank, der EU und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (English version 2013: the law of development cooperation. A comparative analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)

    Google Scholar 

  • Darrow M (2003) Between Light and Shadow. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • De Schutter O (2010) International Human Rights Law. Cases, Materials, Commentary. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • de la Vega C et al (2011) Holding Businesses Accountable for Human Rights Violations. Recent Developments and Next Steps, FES International Policy Analysis. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08264.pdf

  • De Schutter O et al (2012) Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. HRQ 34:1084–1169

    Google Scholar 

  • De Schutter O (2014) Corporations and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. In: Riedel et al (eds) Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Contemporary Issues and Challenges. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 193–224

    Google Scholar 

  • den Heijer M, Lawson R (2013) Extraterritorial Human Rights and the Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’. In: Langford M et al (eds) Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 153–191

    Google Scholar 

  • Donati F, Vidar M (2008) International Legal Dimensions of the Right to Food. In: Kent G (ed) Global obligation for the right to food. Rowman & Littlefield Publ, Plymouth, pp 47–88

    Google Scholar 

  • Dowell-Jones M (2004) Contextualising the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Assessing the Economic Deficit. Nijhoff, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Drache D, Jacobs LA (eds) (2014) Linking Global Trade and Human Rights. New Policy Space in Hard Economic Times. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreyfuss RC (2010) TRIPS and Essential Medicines. Must one size fit all? Making the WTO responsive to the global health crisis. In: Pogge Th et al (eds) Incentives for Global Public Health: Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 35–55

    Google Scholar 

  • Eckstein SE, Wickham-Crowley TP (eds) (2003) Struggles for social rights in Latin America. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Eide A (1984) The International Human Rights System. In: Eide A et al (eds) Food as a human right. United Nations University, Tokyo, pp 152–161

    Google Scholar 

  • Eide A (2000) Universalization of human rights versus globalization of economic power. In: Coomans F et al (eds) Rendering justice to the vulnerable. Liber amicorum in honour of Theo van Boven. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp 99–119

    Google Scholar 

  • Eide A (2001) Economic, social and cultural rights as human rights. In: Eide A et al (eds) Economic, social and cultural rights. A textbook, 2nd edn. Nijhoff, Dordrecht, pp 9–28

    Google Scholar 

  • Elsig M, Dupont C (2012) Persistent deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations: the case of Doha. In: Narlikar A et al (eds) The Oxford handbook on the World Trade Organization. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 587–606

    Google Scholar 

  • Ely Yamin A (2006) Derechos económicos, sociales y culturales en América Latina. Del invento a la herramienta. Plaza y Valdés, México

    Google Scholar 

  • Emmerich-Fritsche A (2007) Zur Verbindlichkeit der Menschenrechte für transnationale Unternehmen. AVR 45:541–565

    Google Scholar 

  • Erixon F (2014) After the Bali agreement. Lessons from the Doha Round for the WTO’s post-Bali agenda. ECIPE (European Centre for international Political Economy) 2/2014. http://www.ecipe.org/publications/after-bali-agreement-lessons-doha-round-wtos-post-bali-agenda/

  • Felbermayr G et al (2014) Bali-Abkommen: Wer gewinnt, und wer trägt die Kosten? Ifo-Schnelldienst 67/3:3–34

    Google Scholar 

  • Feyder J (2010) Mordshunger. Wer profitiert vom Elend der armen Länder? Westend, Frankfurt a.M.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fujita S (2013) The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and human rights. Developing standards of transparency, participation and accountability. Elgar, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Gauri V, Brinks DM (eds) (2008) Courting social justice. Judicial enforcement of social and economic rights in the developing world. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Gentilini U et al (2014) The state of social safety nets 2014. World Bank Group, Washinton, D.C. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/12/000350881_20140512111223/Rendered/PDF/879840WP0FINAL00Box385208B00PUBLIC0.pdf

  • Germanwatch, Misereor (eds) (2014) Globales Wirtschaften und Menschenrechte. Deutschland auf dem Prüfstand. https://germanwatch.org/de/download/8864.pdf

  • Ghazi B (2005) The IMF, the World Bank group and the question of human rights. Transnational Publ, Ardsley

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibney M (2013) On Terminology: Extraterritorial Obligations. In: Langford M et al (eds) Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 32–47

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldmann M (2014) Staatsverschuldung und Entwicklung. In: Dann Ph et al (eds) Entwicklung und Recht. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 377–431

    Google Scholar 

  • Gondek M (2009) The reach of human rights in a globalizing world. Extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. Intersentia, Antwerp

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrison J (2007) The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrison J (2013) Establishing a Meaningful Human Rights Due Diligence Process for Corporations. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, pp 107–117. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14615517.2013.774718

  • Head JW (2008) Losing the global development war. A contemporary critique of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. Nijhoff, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Hennessy R (2002) Defining States’ International Legal Obligations to Cooperate for Achievement of Human Development. Human Rights in Development Yearbook 8:71–98

    Google Scholar 

  • Herdegen M (2014) Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, 10th edn. Beck, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Hestermeyer H (2007) Human Rights and the WTO, The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hestermeyer H (2014) Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the World Trade Organization: Legal Aspects and Practice. In: Riedel et al (eds) Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Contemporary Issues and Challenges. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 260–285

    Google Scholar 

  • Hilf M, Hörmann S (2005) Die WTO—eine Gefahr für die Verwirklichung von Menschenrechten? AVR 43:397–465

    Google Scholar 

  • Hilpold P (2007) Human rights and WTO law. From conflict to coordination. AVR 45:484–516

    Google Scholar 

  • Hörmann S (2010) WTO und Menschenrechte. In: Hilf M, Oeter St (eds) WTO-Recht. Rechtsordnung des Welthandels, 2nd edn. Nomos, Baden-Baden, § 27

    Google Scholar 

  • Howse R (2002) Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann. EJIL 13:651–659

    Google Scholar 

  • Howse R (2008) Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Justice: A Reply. EJIL 19:945–953

    Google Scholar 

  • Howse R, Teitel RG (2009) Beyond the divide: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights and the World Trade Organization. In: Joseph S et al (eds) The World Trade Organization and Human Rights. Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Edward Elgar Publ, Cheltenham, pp 39–68

    Google Scholar 

  • Huarte Melgar B et al (2011) The 2011 update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Balanced Outcome or an Opportunity Missed?, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, vol 112, Halle. http://telc.jura.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/BeitraegeTWR/Heft112_0.pdf

  • Hunt P, MacNaughton G (2007) A human rights-based approach to health indicators. In: Baderin MA, McCorquodale R (eds) Economic, social and cultural rights in action. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 303–330

    Google Scholar 

  • Ibe S (2010) Implementing economic, social and cultural rights in Nigeria: Challenges and opportunities. Afr Hum Rights Law J 10:197–211

    Google Scholar 

  • Jägers N (2011) UN guiding principles on business and human rights. Making headway towards real corporate accountability? NQHR 29:159–163

    Google Scholar 

  • Janik C (2012) Die Bindung internationaler Organisationen an internationale Menschenrechtsstandards. Eine rechtsquellentheoretische Untersuchung am Beispiel der Vereinten Nationen, der Weltbank und des Internationalen Währungsfonds. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Jawara F, Kwa A (2003) Behind the Scenes at the WTO. The real world of international trade negotiations. Zed Books, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Joseph S et al (2009) The World Trade Organization and Human Rights. Interdisciplinary perspectives. Edward Elgar Publ, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Joseph S (2011) Blame it on the WTO? A Human Rights Critique. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Kälin W, Künzli J (2009) The Law of International Human Rights Protection. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Kämpf A, Winkler I (2012) Zwischen Menschenrechtsförderung und Duldung von Men-schenrechtsverletzunge? Anforderungen an die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus der Perspektive der extraterritorialen Staatenpflichten. Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte 6:63–94

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaltenborn M, Norpoth J (2014) Globale Standards für soziale Unternehmensverantwortung—Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)-Leitlinien als neue Regelungsebene des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts. Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 60:402–410

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaufmann Ch (2007) Globalisation and labour rights. The conflict between core labour rights and international economic law. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Khalfan A (2013) Division of Responsibility amongst States. In: Langford M et al (eds) Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 299–331

    Google Scholar 

  • Klee K (2000) Die progressive Verwirklichung wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und kultureller Menschenrechte. Eine Interpretation von Article 2 Abs. 1 des Internationalen Pakts für wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Rechte. Boorberg, Stuttgart

    Google Scholar 

  • Konstantinov B (2009) Human Rights and the WTO: Are They Really Oil and Water? JWT 43:317–338

    Google Scholar 

  • Köster C (2010) Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit privater (multinationaler) Unternehmen für Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Kothari J (2007) Social Rights Litigation in India. Developments of the last Decade. In: Barak-Erez D, Gross AM (eds) Exploring social rights. Between theory and practice. Hart, Oxford, pp 172–192

    Google Scholar 

  • Kradolfer M (2012) Verpflichtungsgrad sozialer Menschenrechte. Handlungsspielräume der nationalen Sozialpolitik vor dem Hintergrund von Article 9 UNO-Pakt I. AVR 50:255–284

    Google Scholar 

  • Krajewski M (2011) Rechtliche Steuerung transnationaler Unternehmen. In: Giegerich Th (ed) Internationales Wirtschafts- und Finanzrecht in der Krise. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, pp 35–70

    Google Scholar 

  • Krajewski M (2014) Handel und Entwicklung. In: Dann Ph et al (eds) Entwicklung und Recht. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 247–285

    Google Scholar 

  • Künnemann R (2004) Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In: Coomans A, Kaminga M (eds) Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties. Intersentia, Antwerp, pp 201–232

    Google Scholar 

  • Künzli J (2001) Zwischen Rigidität und Flexibilität: Der Verpflichtungsgrad internationaler Menschenrechte. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Landau D (2012) The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement. HILJ 53:189–247

    Google Scholar 

  • Langford M (ed) (2008) Social Rights Jurisprudence. Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Langford M et al eds (2013) Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Liebenberg S (2010) Socio-Economic Rights. Adjudication under a transformative constitution. Juta, Claremont

    Google Scholar 

  • Manning R (2009) Using indicators to encourage development. Lessons from the millennium development goals, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhague. http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009-1_Using_indicators_to_encourage_development.pdf

  • Marceau G (2002) WTO dispute settlement and human rights. EJIL 13:753–814

    Google Scholar 

  • Mares R (2012) The UN guiding principles on business and human rights. Foundations and implementation. Nijhoff, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Massoud S (2013) Die Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Eine absehbar begrenzte UN-Agenda. Kritische Justiz 46:7–17

    Google Scholar 

  • Matsushita M et al (2006) The World Trade Organization. Law, Practice, and Policy, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Mbazira Ch (2009) Litigating socio-economic rights in South Africa. A choice between corrective and distributive justice. University of Pretoria Law Press, Pretoria

    Google Scholar 

  • McBeth A (2010) International economic actors and human rights. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • McBeth A et al (2011) The International Law of Human Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Mubangizi JC (2006) The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic Rights in Selected African Countries. A Comparative Evaluation. Afr J Legal Stud 2:1–19

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller A (2009) Limitations to and derogations from economic, social and cultural rights. HRLR 9:557–601

    Google Scholar 

  • Nadakavukaren SC (2010) Social regulation in the WTO. Trade policy and international legal development, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Narula S (2013) International Financial Institutions, Transnational Corporations and Duties of States, in: Langford M et al (eds) Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 114–149

    Google Scholar 

  • Nowrot K (2003) Die UN-Norms on the responsibility of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights. Gelungener Beitrag zur transnationalen Rechtsverwirklichung oder das Ende des Global Compact?, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, vol. 21, Halle; http: http://www.telc.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft21.pdf

  • Oberleitner G (2007) Global human rights institutions. Between remedy and ritual. Polity Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connell P (2012) Vindicating socio-economic rights. International standards and comparative experiences, Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Orford A (2006) Trade, human rights and the economy of sacrifice. In: Orford A (ed) International law and its others. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 156–196

    Google Scholar 

  • Papp A (2013) Extraterritoriale Schutzpflichten. Völkerrechtlicher Menschenrechtsschutz und die deutsche Außenwirtschaftsförderung. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Petersmann E-U (2002) Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration. EJIL 13:621–650

    Google Scholar 

  • Petersmann E-U (2008) Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Justice: A Rejoinder. EJIL 19:955–960

    Google Scholar 

  • Petersmann E-U (2014) International Trade Law and Human Rights: The ILA’s 2008 “Rio de Janeiro Declaration. In: Bhuiyan Sh et al (eds) International law and developing countries: Essays in honour of Kamal Hossain. Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 83–102

    Google Scholar 

  • Pogge Th (2005) Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor. LJIL 18:717–745

    Google Scholar 

  • Qureshi AH (2009) International Trade for Development: The WTO as a Development Institution? JWT 43:173–188

    Google Scholar 

  • Riegner M (2014) Entwicklungsmessung und Recht. In: Dann Ph et al (eds) Entwicklung und Recht. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 117–149

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson S (2014) International Obligations, State Responsibility and Judicial Review under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Regime. Utrecht J Int Eur Law 30:68–81

    Google Scholar 

  • Roos SR (2007) Der internationale Menschenrechtsschutz vor entwicklungsbedingten Zwangs-umsiedlungen und seine Sicherstellung durch Recht und Praxis der Weltbank. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Rudolph Ph H (2005) The Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises. In: Mullerat R (ed) Corporate Social Responsibility. The Corporate Governance of the 21st Century. Kluwer, The Hague, pp 217–220

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryngart C (2013) Jurisdiction: Towards a Reasonableness Test. In: Langford M et al (eds) Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 192–211

    Google Scholar 

  • Sachs J D (2005) Das Ende der Armut. Ein ökonomisches Programm für eine gerechtere Welt. 2nd edn. Siedler Verlag, Munich (original version 2005: The end of poverty. How we can make it happen in our lifetime. Penguin Books, London)

    Google Scholar 

  • Salomon ME (2007) Global Responsibility for Human Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Salomon ME (2013) Deprivation, Causation and the Law of International Cooperation. In: Langford M et al (eds) Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 259–296

    Google Scholar 

  • Saul B et al (2014) The International Covenant on Economic. Commentary, Cases and Materials. Oxford University Press, Oxford, Social and Cultural Rights

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheinin M (2013) Core rights and obligations. In: Shelton D (ed) The Oxford handbook of International Human Rights Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 527–540

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheper Ch (2013) The World Bank: Quo Vadis? Environmental and social safeguards under review. Global Spotlight 8/2013. http://www.sef-bonn.org/fileadmin/Die_SEF/Publikationen/GG-Spotlight/GGS_2013-08_en.pdf

  • Scherrer Ch, Hänlein A eds (2012) Sozialkapitel in Handelsabkommen. Begründungen und Vorschläge aus juristischer, ökonomischer und politologischer Sicht. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Schilling-Vacaflor A, Barrera A (2011) Lateinamerikas neue Verfassungen: Triebfedern für direkte Demokratie und soziale Rechte? GIGA-Focus Nr. 2; http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_lateinamerika_1102.pdf

  • Schmucker C (2014) Doha Still the Silver Bullet. WTO’s Bali agreement important development toward resolution. IP Journal April 2014. https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/doha-still-silver-bullet

  • Seibert-Fohr A, Wolfrum R (2005) Die einzelstaatliche Durchsetzung völkerrechtlicher Mindeststandards gegenüber transnationalen Unternehmen. AVR 43:153–186

    Google Scholar 

  • Sepúlveda M (2003) The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights, Intersentia, Antwerp

    Google Scholar 

  • Sepúlveda M (2006) Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. NQHR 24:271–304

    Google Scholar 

  • Sepúlveda Carmona M (2009) The obligation of ‘international assistance and cooperation’ under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—a possible entry point to a human rights based approach to Millennium Development Goal 8. Int J Hum Rights 13:86–109

    Google Scholar 

  • Seufert Ph (2014) The FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests. In: Margulis ME et al (eds) Land Grabbing and Global Governance. Routledge, London, pp 181–186

    Google Scholar 

  • Shankar S, Mehta PB (2008) Courts and Socioeconomic Rights in India. In: Gauri V, Brinks DM (eds) Courting social justice. Judicial enforcement of social and economic rights in the developing world. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 146–182

    Google Scholar 

  • Shawkat A et al (2011) The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), water, and human rights from the perspective of developing countries. NILR 58:43–75

    Google Scholar 

  • Shihata I (1995) The World Bank in a Changing World. Selected essays and lectures, vol II. Nijhoff, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Shue H (1996) Basic Rights. Subsistence, affluence and U.S. foreign policy. 2nd edn, Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Skogly SI (2001) The human rights obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Cavendish, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Skogly SI (2006) Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation. Intersentia, Antwerp

    Google Scholar 

  • Skogly SI (2013) Causality and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations. In: Langford M et al (eds) Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 233–258

    Google Scholar 

  • Skogly SI, Gibney M (2002) Transnational Human Rights Obligations. HRQ 24:781–798

    Google Scholar 

  • Spelten W (2005) WTO und nationale Sozialordnungen. Ethische, ökonomische und institutionelle Dimensionen der Integration einer Sozialklausel in das Welthandelsrecht. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2005

    Google Scholar 

  • Ssenyonjo M (2009) Economic. Social and Cultural Rights in International Law. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Stoll PT (2005) Der Zugang zu Medizin—soziale Menschenrechte und Welthandelsordnung. In: Dicke K et al (eds) Weltinnenrecht, Liber amicorum Jost Delbrück. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, pp 739–752

    Google Scholar 

  • Tietje Ch (2009) Begriff, Geschichte und Grundlagen des Internationalen Wirtschaftssystems und Wirtschaftsrechts. In: Tietje Ch (ed) Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht. De Gruyter, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Tietje Ch (2013) Individualrechte im Menschenrechts- und Investitionsschutzbereich—Kohärenz von Staaten- und Unternehmensverantwortung. In: Hanschel D et al (eds) Mensch und Recht. Festschrift für Eibe Riedel. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, pp 271–288

    Google Scholar 

  • Trilsch MA (2012) Die Justiziabilität wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und kultureller Menschenrechte im innerstaatlichen Recht. Springer, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Tully St (2001) The 2000 Review of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations. ICLQ 50:394–403

    Google Scholar 

  • Türk E, Krajewski M (2004) Right to water and trade in services. Assessing the impact of GATS on water regulation. In: Hein W, Voegeli W (eds) GATS und globale Politik. Hamburg, Deutsches Übersee-Institut, pp 107–124

    Google Scholar 

  • Tushnet M (2008) Weak courts, strong rights. Judicial review and social welfare rights in comparative constitutional law. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Utz B (2011) Update oder Upgrade? Eine Bilanz zur Revision der OECD-Leitsätze für multinationale Unternehmen, FES Internationale Politikanalyse. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08232.pdf

  • Vagts DF (2003) The UN Norms for Transnational Corporations. LJIL 16:795–802

    Google Scholar 

  • Vandenhole W (2003) Completing the UN Complaint Mechanisms for Human Rights Violations Step by Step: Towards a Complaints Procedure to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. NQHR 21:423–465

    Google Scholar 

  • Vandenhole W, Benedek W (2013) Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide. In: Langford M et al (eds) Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 332–363

    Google Scholar 

  • van Genugten WJM (1992) Mensenrechten in ontwikkeling: het `goede’ doel voorbij. Catholic University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen

    Google Scholar 

  • van Genugten WJM et al (eds) (2003) World Bank, IMF and human rights. Including the tilburg guiding principles on World Bank, IMF and human rights. Wolf Legal Productions, Nijmegen

    Google Scholar 

  • van Hoof GJH (1984) The legal nature of economic, social and cultural rights. A rebuttal of some traditional views. In: Alston P, Tomasevski K (eds) The right to food. Nijhoff, Utrecht, pp 97–110

    Google Scholar 

  • von Bernstorff J (2011) Extraterritoriale menschenrechtliche Staatenpflichten und Corporate Social Responsibility. AVR 49:34–63

    Google Scholar 

  • von Bernstorff J (2012a) ‘Land Grabbing’ und Menschenrechte: Die FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure. INEF Forschungsreihe Menschenrechte, Unternehmensverantwortung und Nachhaltige Entwicklung 11/2012. http://www.humanrights-business.org/files/landgrabbing_final_1.pdf

  • von Bernstorff J (2012b) Die UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Ein Kommentar aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht. http://www.unesco.de/7390.html

  • von Bernstorff J, Dann Ph (2013) Reforming the World Bank’s Safeguards. A Comparative Legal Analysis. GIZ, Eschborn. http://star-www.giz.de/starweb/giz/pub/servlet.starweb

  • Weiß W (2007) Welthandelsrecht, Menschenrechte und Sozialstandards, in: Herrmann Ch et al, Welthandelsrecht. 2nd edn. Beck, Munich, § 24

    Google Scholar 

  • Weissbrodt D, Kruger M (2003) Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights. AJIL 97:901–922

    Google Scholar 

  • Welling JW (2008) International indicators and economic, social, and cultural rights. HRQ 30:933–958

    Google Scholar 

  • WHO (2006) Public health, innovation and intellectual property rights. Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, World Health Organization, Geneva. http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf?ua=1

  • Wilson St., Dugard J (2013) Constitutional Jurisprudence. The First and Second Waves. In: Langford M et al (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa. Symbols or Substance? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 35–62

    Google Scholar 

  • Windfuhr M (2012) Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte als Anwendungsfall extraterritorialer Staatenpflichten. Zeitschrift für Menschenrechte 6:95–119

    Google Scholar 

  • Windfuhr M (2013) Monitoring der Umsetzung von wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Menschenrechten. In: Hanschel D et al (eds) Mensch und Recht. Festschrift für Eibe Riedel. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, pp 351–370

    Google Scholar 

  • World Bank (1998) Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank. World Bank, Washington. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/3817166-1185895645304/4044168-1186409169154/08DHR.pdf

  • Xiong P (2012) An international law perspective on the protection of human rights in the TRIPS agreement. An interpretation of the TRIPS agreement in relation to the right to health. Nijhoff, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Yamane H (2011) Interpreting TRIPS. Globalisation of intellectual property rights and access to medicines. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Young KE (2008) The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content. Yale J Int Law 33:113–176

    Google Scholar 

  • Ziegler J (2011) Wir lassen sie verhungern. Die Massenvernichtung in der Dritten Welt, C. Bertelsmann, Munich (original version 2011: Déstruction massive. Géopolitique de la faim. Éditions du Seuil, Paris)

    Google Scholar 

  • Ziegler J et al (2011) The Fight for the Right to Food. Lessons Learned, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

    Google Scholar 

Documents of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

    Markus Kaltenborn

Authors
  1. Markus Kaltenborn
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Markus Kaltenborn .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Kaltenborn, M. (2015). Social Rights Obligations—The Link Between Human Rights Law and International Development Law. In: Social Rights and International Development. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45352-0_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation