Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes

  • Shahar Dobzinski
  • Amir Ronen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8768)


We study scenarios in which consumers have several alternatives for using a shared resource. We investigate whether rewards can be used to motivate effective usage of the resource. Our goal is to design reward schemes that, in equilibrium, minimize the cost to society and the total sum of rewards. We introduce a generic scheme which does not use any knowledge about the valuations of the consumers, yet its cost in equilibrium is always close to the cost of the optimal scheme that has complete knowledge of the consumers’ valuations. We show that our scheme is essentially optimal in some settings while in others no good schemes exist.


Competitive Ratio Coordination Mechanism Payment Scheme Congestion Game Cheap Alternative 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shahar Dobzinski
    • 1
  • Amir Ronen
    • 2
  1. 1.Weizmann Institute of ScienceIsrael
  2. 2.IBM ResarchHaifaIsrael

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