The Complexity of Approximating a Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium of a Multi-player Game in Strategic Form

  • Kousha Etessami
  • Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
  • Peter Bro Miltersen
  • Troels Bjerre Sørensen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8768)


We consider the task of computing an approximation of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium for an n-player game in strategic form, n ≥ 3. We show that this task is complete for the complexity class FIXP a . In particular, the task is polynomial time equivalent to the task of computing an approximation of a Nash equilibrium in strategic form games with three (or more) players.


Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy Sorting Network Strategic Form 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kousha Etessami
    • 1
  • Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
    • 2
  • Peter Bro Miltersen
    • 2
  • Troels Bjerre Sørensen
    • 3
  1. 1.University of EdinburghUK
  2. 2.Aarhus UniversityDenmark
  3. 3.IT-University of CopenhagenDenmark

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