Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations

  • Ioannis Caragiannis
  • Alexandros A. Voudouris
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8768)


According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource – such as bandwidth – by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource that is proportional to her bid and collects an amount equal to her bid as payment. Since users act as utility-maximizers, this naturally defines a proportional allocation game. Recently, Syrgkanis and Tardos (STOC 2013) quantified the inefficiency of equilibria in this game with respect to the social welfare and presented a lower bound of 26.8% on the price of anarchy over coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria in the full and incomplete information settings, respectively. In this paper, we improve this bound to 50% over both equilibrium concepts. Our analysis is simpler and, furthermore, we argue that it cannot be improved by arguments that do not take the equilibrium structure into account. We also extend it to settings with budget constraints where we show the first constant bound (between 36% and 50%) on the price of anarchy of the corresponding game with respect to an effective welfare benchmark that takes budgets into account.


Nash Equilibrium Social Welfare Valuation Function Combinatorial Auction Proportional Allocation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ioannis Caragiannis
    • 1
  • Alexandros A. Voudouris
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Technology Institute and Press “Diophantus” & Department of Computer Engineering and InformaticsUniversity of PatrasRioGreece

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