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Encryption Schemes Secure Against Profiling Adversaries

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Book cover E-Business and Telecommunications (ICETE 2012)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 455))

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Abstract

A profiling adversary is an adversary which aims to classify messages into pre-defined profiles and thus gain useful information regarding the sender or receiver of such messages. User profiling has gained lot of importance today, this activity supports the big business of online advertising at the cost of user privacy. Usual chosen-plaintext secure encryption schemes are capable of securing information from profilers, but these schemes provide more security than required for this purpose. In this paper we study the requirements for an encryption algorithm to be secure only against profilers and finally give a precise notion of security for such schemes. We also present a full protocol for secure (against profiling adversaries) communication, which neither requires a key exchange nor a public key infrastructure. Our protocol guarantees security against non-human profilers and is constructed using CAPTCHAs and secret sharing schemes. The security notions developed in this paper are also further used to analyze an existing scheme meant for providing security against profilers.

Sandra Díaz-Santiago is on academic leave from Escuela Superior de Cómputo (ESCOM-IPN), Av. Juan de Dios Bátiz, Col. Lindavista, México D.F. 07738, México.

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank Francisco Rodríguez Henríquez for his comments on an early draft of this paper. Debrup Chakraborty acknowledge the support from CONACYT project 166763.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, CINVESTAV IPN, Av. Instituto Politécnico Nacional No. 2508, Col. San Pedro Zacatenco, 07360, Mexico, D.F., Mexico

    Sandra Díaz-Santiago & Debrup Chakraborty

Authors
  1. Sandra Díaz-Santiago
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  2. Debrup Chakraborty
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Correspondence to Sandra Díaz-Santiago .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey, USA

    Mohammad S. Obaidat

  2. Polytechnic Institute of Setúbal, INSTICC, Setubal, Portugal

    Joaquim Filipe

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Díaz-Santiago, S., Chakraborty, D. (2014). Encryption Schemes Secure Against Profiling Adversaries. In: Obaidat, M., Filipe, J. (eds) E-Business and Telecommunications. ICETE 2012. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 455. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44791-8_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44791-8_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-44790-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-44791-8

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