Concluding Remarks

Abstract

The political opening of the Caspian region after the collapse of the Soviet Union brought the use of the rich oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea to the fore of regional and global politics. As a result of the dissolution of the USSR, five instead of two coastal countries emerged in the Caspian region. Moreover, their state borders were not settled. The revenue prospects from the use of the natural resources of the Caspian Sea supported the economic recovery of the riparian states. On the other hand, it hardened the states’ negotiating positions and their lack of willingness to compromise regarding demarcating borders, as well as defining the legal regime in the Caspian Sea. The potential for conflict that arises from the growing demand of coastal states for fossil fuels, sharpened by the uncertainty of the legal situation in the Caspian region, met with the divergent interests of global players such as the US, the EU, and China, which tried to gain access to Caspian resources. There is plain danger in the fact that the slow progress in multilateral negotiations on access to transboundary energy fields could replace the search for legal compromise with expanded armament of the Caspian’s littoral states. This in turn could lead to a paralysis of regional cooperation and economic development—as well as to a weakening of regional security.