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Substantive Merger Control Test

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Chinese Merger Control Law

Part of the book series: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition ((MSIC,volume 2))

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Abstract

This chapter will lay out the policy goals that MOFCOM pursues in its substantive merger control assessment and show whether MOFCOM has hereby succeeded to reconcile the different policy objectives of Chinese merger control. As discussed above in Sect. 5.1.2.2, the main gateways for non-competition objectives to enter MOFCOM’s assessment are Articles 5, 27 No. (5), and 28 sentence 2 of the AML. It has been proposed in Sect. 5.3 that MOFCOM should focus on competition-related goals for the sake of China’s long-term economic development, and it will be assessed below whether MOFCOM’s enforcement practice is consistent with the suggested standard. Moreover, it will be examined whether MOFCOM’s application of the AML provides legal certainty to business operators involved and conforms with to international standards.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Interview with the Director General of the AMB (Shang Ming), The Antitrust Source, February 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/antitrust_law/feb11_shangintrvw2_23f.authcheckdam.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 3.

  2. 2.

    ABA, Section of Antitrust Law (ed.), Report on Antitrust Policy Objectives, 2003, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/report_policyobjectives.authcheckdam.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 21.

  3. 3.

    国务院反垄断委员会关于相关市场界定的指南, see Chinese version at http://fldj.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/j/200907/20090706384131.html, last accessed 12 January 2014, English translation at 23/6 CLP 76–81 (2009).

  4. 4.

    Shi/Wang, W., Concept and Definition of the Relevant Market, 2009, http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=65866 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014. For instance, in the GE China/Shenhua joint venture case, MOFCOM determined the CWS gasification technology licensing market as relevant product market, MOFCOM, GE China/Shenhua, para. 7.

  5. 5.

    Subject to the competition assessment are not only the price differences that exist between certain products in absolute terms but also the (competition-related) price movements of similar products as Article 8(1) No. (3) Market Guidelines clarifies that “under normal circumstances, the prices of relatively highly substitutable products are relatively close, and when prices change, they trend in the same direction”.

  6. 6.

    For instance, the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis lists several factors to be assessed to determine the likelihood of product substitution, which include, inter alia, (i) “the characteristics, prices, functions, and customer usage of the product(s) in question” and (ii) “evidence that customers have shifted or have considered shifting purchases between products in response to relative changes in price or other competitive variables”; see ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section II. C. Comment 4, p. 8.

  7. 7.

    It appears that the InBev/AB decision was based on the Chinese beer market as relevant market, without any differentiation of the different types of beer. MOFCOM however failed to define the relevant market in its decision.

  8. 8.

    The Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite decision indicates that Mitsubishi Rayon and Lucite mainly overlap in the production and selling of methyl methacrylate (MMA). In addition, there are also minor overlaps between the parties with relation to special SpMAs, PMMA pellets, and PMMA boards. As a result, the relevant product markets involved the markets for MMA, SpMAs, PMMA pellets, and PMMA boards; see MOFCOM, Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, para. 5.

  9. 9.

    The GM/Delphi decision indicates that GM is active in the passenger vehicle market and commercial vehicle market, while Delphi is active in 10 different auto parts markets, namely automotive electrical transmission systems market, automotive connection systems market, automotive electrical centres market, automotive thermal systems market, automotive entertainment and communication market, automotive control and safety market, automotive safety systems market, automotive gasoline engine management systems market, automotive diesel engine management systems market, and motor fuel supply market and vehicle evaporative market; see MOFCOM, GM/Delphi, para. 5.

  10. 10.

    In the Pfizer/Wyeth case, MOFCOM ruled that the parties overlap in various product markets relating to human pharmaceuticals, including J1C (broad-spectrum penicillin) and N6A (antidepressant and mood stabilisers) and animal health products, including swine mycoplasma pneumonia vaccine (SMPV), swine pseudorabies vaccine, and combined vaccine for dogs; see MOFCOM, Pfizer/Wyeth, para. 5.

  11. 11.

    The product markets identified in the Panasonic/Sanyo decision are three different battery markets: rechargeable coin-shaped lithium batteries (used as backup power for mobiles, video cameras, and other electrical devices), NiMH batteries for general use (used as main power for power tools and other electrical devices), and NiMH batteries for vehicles (providing battery-driven power for hybrid vehicles or pure electric vehicles); see MOFCOM, Panasonic/Sanyo, para. 6 et seq.

  12. 12.

    In Novartis/Alcon, MOFCOM identified two relevant product markets: ophthalmological anti-inflammatory/anti-infective compounds (used in treating ophthalmological inflammations and infections, in particular those occurring after ophthalmological surgeries) and contact lens care products; see MOFCOM, Novartis/Alcon, para. 6 et seq.

  13. 13.

    In ARM/G&D/Gemalto, MOFCOM determined that the IP licensing business of application processors for household electronic products would be the upstream market of the market for developing and integrating TEEs (trusted execution environments), without however having further elaborated on how it defined these markets; see MOFCOM, ARM/G&D/Gemalto, para. 7.

  14. 14.

    In Glencore/Xstrata, MOFCOM simply noted that Glencore and Xstrata have horizontal overlaps or vertical relationships in a number of markets, specifically including the production, supply, trading, and third party trading markets of chrome ore, zinc concentrate, zinc metal, lead concentrate, lead metal, copper concentrate, secondary copper, refined copper, nickel ore, intermediate cobalt, refined cobalt, seaborne thermal coal, and seaborne coking coal, among others; see MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 8.

  15. 15.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 16.

  16. 16.

    See, however, Sun, J., Implementation of AML, 2009, http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=4951&cid=17, last accessed 12 January 2014 and Yang, D., Report on Symposium on Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, 2009, http://cms40.legaldaily.com.cn:7001/servlet/PagePreviewServlet?siteid=4&nodeid=7574&articleid=1060323&type=1 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014, referring to Wang Xiaoye, who had argued that carbonated soft drinks and juice beverages were highly substitutable.

  17. 17.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 16.

  18. 18.

    Other potash fertilisers include potassium sulphate, potassium nitrate, mono-potassium phosphate, and magnesium potassium sulphate.

  19. 19.

    MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 6.

  20. 20.

    MOFCOM, Alpha V/Savio, para. 7.

  21. 21.

    MOFCOM, GE China/Shenhua, para. 7.

  22. 22.

    MOFCOM further considered to divide the relevant market into sub-markets based on the different application possibilities, namely by enterprises as end consumers or as a component for desktop computers, portable computers, and consumer electronic goods; see MOFCOM, Seagate/Samsung, para. 7, and MOFCOM, Western Digital/Hitachi, para. 7. In its decisions, however, MOFCOM analysed the HDD market as a whole.

  23. 23.

    MOFCOM, Henkel HK/Tiande, para. 6.

  24. 24.

    MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 8 et seq.

  25. 25.

    MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 6.

  26. 26.

    MOFCOM, Wal-Mart/Yihaodian, para. 8. Since MOFCOM, in its competitive analysis, ultimately focused on the online direct sales and value-added telecommunication service markets, it has been questioned whether this may mean that MOFCOM would understand the B2C online retailing market to include both the online direct sales market and the value-added telecommunication service market; see Han, Walmart/Yihaodian, 2012, http://www.freshfields.com/en/knowledge/MOFCOM_Conditionally_Clears_Wal-Mart_Acquisition_of_Yihaodian/?LangId=2057, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 2.

  27. 27.

    MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 10.

  28. 28.

    MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 6.

  29. 29.

    MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 7.

  30. 30.

    See Commission, Decision of 17 July 2009, Case No COMP/M.5476, OJ C 262/1 of 4 November 2009 – Pfizer/Wyeth, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5476_20090717_20212_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 15 et seq., in which the Commission identified a large number of national pharmaceutical markets in relation to human health products and animal health vaccines.

  31. 31.

    See Commission, Decision of 29 September 2009, Case No COMP/M.5421, OJ C 322/13 of 30 December 2009 – Panasonic/Sanyo, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5421_20090929_20212_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, paras. 64 et seq., 93 et seq., 106 et seq., defining as relevant product markets, among others, the market for portable rechargeable NiMH batteries, rechargeable coin-shaped batteries, and rechargeable batteries for automotive applications (with regard to the latter, the precise scope of the relevant product market (i.e., NiMH and/or lithium and/or battery systems) was left open since the transaction did not raise serious concerns under any of the market definition alternatives), and FTC, In the Matter of Panasonic Corporation and Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd (File No. 091-0050), Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment, 24 November 2009, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910050/091124panasanyoanal.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 2, defining the market for portable NiMH batteries as the relevant market; regarding the hybrid electric vehicle (“HEV”) battery market, however, the FTC’s delineation is broader than that of the European Commission and MOFCOM as the FTC’s definition included both NiMH HEV batteries and Li-ion HEV batteries; see FTC, In the Matter of Panasonic Corporation and Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd (File No. 091-0050), News Release, 24 November 2009, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/11/sanyo.shtm, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  32. 32.

    See Commission, Decision of 9 August 2010, Case No COMP/M.5778, OJ C 20/8 of 21 January 2011 – Novartis/Alcon, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5778_20100809_20212_1577344_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 68, defining as one of the relevant markets the national market for ophthalmological anti-inflammatory/anti-infective combinations (ATC3 class S1C). Regarding the market for contact lens care products, however, the Commission’s approach was narrower in that it concluded that multipurpose solutions and saline solutions would constitute separate relevant product markets distinct from other lens care products; see Commission, Decision of 9 August 2010, Case No COMP/M.5778, OJ C 20/8 of 21 January 2011 – Novartis/Alcon, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5778_20100809_20212_1577344_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 239 et seq.

  33. 33.

    See Commission, Decision of 13 February 2012, Case No COMP/M.6381, OJ C 75/1 of 14 March 2012 – Google/Motorola Mobility, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, indicating that “mobile OSs are distinct from PC OSs (…) and mobile OSs for smart mobile devices are distinct from mobile OSs for basic mobile phone devices” (para. 29) and “smart mobile devices are not part of the same product market as other mobile devices (basic and feature phones)” (para. 41). The exact product market definitions for OSs and mobile devices have however been left open by the Commission.

  34. 34.

    See ATC Index at http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index/, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  35. 35.

    See, for instance, Commission, Decision of 17 July 2009, Case No COMP/M.5476, OJ C 262/1 of 4 November 2009 – Pfizer/Wyeth, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5476_20090717_20212_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 15 et seq; see also CFI, Judgment of 1 July 2010, Case T-321/05, AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission, [2010] ECR II-2805, para. 154 et seq.

  36. 36.

    Emch, 32 E.C.L.R. 132, 133 (2011).

  37. 37.

    See, for instance, the GM/Delphi case, in which the Commission indicated that it would generally “distinguish a market for the manufacture and supply of motor vehicles, and a market for the wholesale and retail distribution of these products” and, “concerning the market for the manufacture and supply of passenger cars, (…) [envisage] a further sub-segmentation based on the type of car”; see Commission, Decision of 13 August 2009, Case No COMP/M.5588, OJ C 208/2 of 3 September 2009 – GM/Delphi Steering II, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5588_20090812_20310_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 16, whereas MOFCOM, in contrast, simply defined the relevant markets to be, inter alia, the markets for passenger vehicles and commercial vehicles. In the Novartis/Alcon case, the Commission undertook a sub-segmentation of the contact lens care products by identifying multipurpose solutions and saline solutions as distinct relevant markets, respectively; see Commission, Decision of 9 August 2010, Case No COMP/M.5778, OJ C 20/8 of 21 January 2011 – Novartis/Alcon, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5778_20100809_20212_1577344_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 239 et seq. In the Google/Motorola Mobility decision, the Commission defined the standard essential patents held by Motorola Mobility as separate relevant product markets; see Commission, Decision of 13 February 2012, Case No COMP/M.6381, OJ C 75/1 of 14 March 2012 – Google/Motorola Mobility, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 61. In contrast, MOFCOM did not define a separate product market for Motorola Mobility’s patent portfolio but rather seemed to conclude that any unreasonable licensing of Motorola Mobility’s patents would ultimately result in adverse effects on the market for smart mobile devices; see MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 16.

  38. 38.

    Botta, The Impact of Multi-Jurisdictional Concentrations, 2011, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/cel/events/2011/ascola/papers/Marco_Botta,_paper_ASCOLA_revised_14.6.2011.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 16.

  39. 39.

    See ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section II. C. Comment 2, p. 7.

  40. 40.

    See Dai, Definition of the relevant market, 2010, http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/2260649/Channel/9939/A-great-leap-forward-for-definition-of-the-relevant-market.html, last accessed 12 January 2014. The Cellophane Fallacy refers to a situation where a dominant enterprise charges a price above the competitive level so that customers would switch to other closely substitutable products that would, however, not be close substitutes at a lower, competitive price. This concept is named after the case United States v EI du Pont de Nemours & Co, 351 U.S. 377 (1956), in which the market was so broadly defined due to the supra-competitive prices charged by the sole producer of cellophane, du Pont, that the judges failed to detect the abusive exercise of market power by du Pont.

  41. 41.

    Zhu and Sun (AMB), Interview on 27 October 2011.

  42. 42.

    ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section II. B., p. 5.

  43. 43.

    See, for instance, ABA, Section of Antitrust Law and Section of International Law (eds.), Comments on Draft Guidelines For Definition of Relevant Markets, 2009, http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/leadership/policy/ABAprc%20MOFCOM%20market%20def%20guidelines%20Comments%20final%20combo.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, pp. 9 and 13.

  44. 44.

    It should be noted that the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, which propose the SSNIP test as a general test for market determination, are based on the assumption that the respective enforcement agencies can apply a high level of analysis and the merger review process is conducted under optimal conditions; see Gal/Padilla, 76 Antitrust L. J. 899, 916 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1645188, last accessed 12 January 2014. In reality, however, optimal conditions may not always prevail. This is especially true regarding the Chinese situation, where MOFCOM only disposes of 30 or so AMB officials for reviewing mergers.

  45. 45.

    See Farmer, 18 Tulane J. of Int’l & Comp. Law 1, 45 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411727, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  46. 46.

    In the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, GM/Delphi, Pfizer/Wyeth, GE China/Shenhua, Wal-Mart/Yihaodian, and Marubeni/Gavilon decisions, MOFCOM only assessed the Chinese market.

  47. 47.

    MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 10.

  48. 48.

    See MOFCOM, Panasonic/Sanyo, para. 6 and 10; MOFCOM, Seagate/Samsung, para. 7; MOFCOM, Western Digital/Hitachi, para. 7; MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 6.

  49. 49.

    See MOFCOM, Novartis/Alcon, para. 6 et seq.; MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 6; MOFCOM, Alpha V/Savio, para. 9; MOFCOM, Henkel HK/Tiande, para. 6; MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 9; MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 7; MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 8.

  50. 50.

    See, for instance, MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 7; MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 8.

  51. 51.

    NPC Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission, Office for Economic Law (ed.), Commentary on AML (in Chinese), 2007, p. 62.

  52. 52.

    Shan et al., China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare Standard?, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920885, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 19.

  53. 53.

    Zhang, X./Zhang, V., 6 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 477, 483 et seq. (2010).

  54. 54.

    See OFT’s clearance decision of 18 November 2008, available at http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/mergers_ea02/2008/InBev.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  55. 55.

    See DoJ’s press release of 14 November 2008, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/239430.htm, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  56. 56.

    ABA, Section of Antitrust Law and Section of International Law (eds.), Comments on Draft Guidelines For Definition of Relevant Markets, 2009, http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/leadership/policy/ABAprc%20MOFCOM%20market%20def%20guidelines%20Comments%20final%20combo.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 5 et seq.

  57. 57.

    Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission on 19 August 2010, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  58. 58.

    Stock, New U.S. Merger Guidelines, 2010, http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2010/10/18/new-u-s-merger-guidelines-indicate-greater-scrutiny-of-high-tech-and-pharmaceutical-transactions/, last accessed 12 January 2014. In particular, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2010 indicate that “the Agencies’ analysis need not start with market definition” and “some of the analytical tools used by the Agencies to assess competitive effects do not rely on market definition” (Section 4 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2010). Also, “the purpose of defining the market and measuring market shares is to illuminate the evaluation of competitive effects” (Section 4.1.1 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2010).

  59. 59.

    Kwoka, Merger Control in Emerging Economies, 2011, http://acle.uva.nl/binaries/content/assets/subsites/amsterdam-center-for-law--economics/cr-meetings/2011/papers/kwoka._paper.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 23 et seq. The author argues that the case-by-case approach requires vast resources. In this context, it should be noted that the US antitrust enforcement agencies (namely, the Antitrust Division of the DoJ and the FTC) employ a total of over 1,300 staff people and dispose of a total budget in excess of USD 280 million. Yet the author has come to the conclusion that the US merger control enforcement is subject to substantial and systematic errors even under these favourable circumstances.

  60. 60.

    Emch, 32 E.C.L.R. 132, 138 (2011).

  61. 61.

    Blumenthal, International Convergence After the 2010 Guidelines, 2010, http://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/PDFs/cpi_on_hmgs_blumenthaloct10_2__6009851.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 4; Drauz/Mavroghenis/Ashall, 2/1 J. Eur. Comp. L. & P. 46, 53 (2011).

  62. 62.

    The rate of abandonment by the parties is relatively low and amounts to less than 3 percent; see Interview with the Director General of the AMB (Shang Ming), The Antitrust Source, February 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/antitrust_law/feb11_shangintrvw2_23f.authcheckdam.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 1, and Press Conference on Main Issues of AML Implementation in 2011 hosted by MOFCOM on 27 December 2011, http://www.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/slfw/201112/20111207901483.html (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  63. 63.

    See European Commission Merger Statistics, 21 September 1990 to 31 January 2012, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  64. 64.

    See FTC and DoJ HSR Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2010, available at http://ftc.gov/os/2011/02/1101hsrreport.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 1 et seq.

  65. 65.

    The effects-based approach is used as the prevailing assessment standard in a number of competition jurisdictions, including Germany. Whereas the German merger control regime had been previously based on a dominance test, as set forth in former Section 36(1) German GWB, the 8th amendment to the GWB has introduced the SIEC standard into German merger control law in 2013 (but the dominance criterion has been kept as one example for anticompetitive merger).

  66. 66.

    See Chen, Z., Probleme der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, 2008, p. 369, in an outlook on Chinese competition law.

  67. 67.

    NPC Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission, Office for Economic Law (ed.), Commentary on AML (in Chinese), 2007, p. 175 et seq.; see also Meyer/Chen, Z., RIW 2009, 265, 268.

  68. 68.

    ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section I. A. Comment 1, p. 1, indicating that merger review laws “should focus exclusively on identifying and preventing or remedying anticompetitive mergers” and “should not be used to pursue other goals”.

  69. 69.

    See Press Conference on AML Implementation Issues hosted by MOFCOM on 12 August 2010, http://www.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/201008/20100807078063.html?4245233051=4123207458 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  70. 70.

    See Press Conference on AML Implementation Issues hosted by MOFCOM on 12 August 2010, http://www.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/201008/20100807078063.html?4245233051=4123207458 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  71. 71.

    Wang, X./Su, in: Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, 2012, p. 379, 385.

  72. 72.

    关于评估经营者集中竞争影响的暂行规定, see Chinese version at http://fldj.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/c/201109/20110907723357.html, last accessed 12 January 2014, English translation at 25/8 CLP 54–57 (2011).

  73. 73.

    Healey, AML mergers, 2010, http://www.asiancompetitionforum.org/docman/power-point-slides.html, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 16; Lin, Capacity Building, 2010, http://www.asiancompetitionforum.org/docman/power-point-slides.html, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 16; Zhang, A./Jephcott, 10/11 Competition Law Insight 18, 18 (2011).

  74. 74.

    Emch, 32 E.C.L.R. 132, 135 (2011).

  75. 75.

    See, for instance, the Uralkali/Silvinit case, in which MOFCOM found the post-merger market share of the merged entity to be one-third in the global potassium chloride market and one-fourth in the Chinese market, but the merged entity would be the world’s second-largest exporter of potassium chloride; see MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 7. In the Glencore/Xstrata case, MOFCOM’s investigations revealed that the merged entity would rank as the first- or second-largest player in a large number of the markets assessed; see MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 13 (first in the global and Chinese markets for supply of copper concentrate), para. 26 et seq. (first in the global market for the production of zinc concentrate and in the global and Chinese markets for the supply of zinc concentrate), para. 35 et seq. (first in the global market for the production and supply of lead concentrate, second in the Chinese market for the supply of lead concentrate). Also, the Marubeni/Gavilon case presumably only involved rather low market shares (Marubeni held a 17.98 % share in the China import market for soy bean, and MOFCOM did not make reference to any sales data of Gavilon in the Chinese import market), but, at the same time, MOFCOM pointed out that Marubeni constitutes by far the most important market participant, being the largest exporter of soybean and disposing of significant competitive advantages; see MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 12 et seq.

  76. 76.

    In the Marubeni/Gavilon decision, MOFCOM concluded that combined post-merger market shares of under 8.5 percent would not suffice to trigger any anticompetitive effects if they are combined with a strong market position of competitors in the same relevant market (in the Marubeni/Gavilon case, this applied—according to MOFCOM—to the Chinese import markets for corn, soybean meal, and dried distillers’ grains); see MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 17.

  77. 77.

    Emch, 32 E.C.L.R. 132, 135 (2011).

  78. 78.

    Market shares of China’s major beer companies in 2009, China Beer Industry Data Application Net, 19 March 2010, http://www.beermi.com/gonggongxinxi/shichangzhishu/2010-03-19/35854.html (in Chinese), last accessed 21 April 2011.

  79. 79.

    See Sales ranking of top ten passenger car manufacturers in the first nine months of 2010, China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, 22 October 2010, http://www.caam.org.cn/zhengche/20101022/1405047156.html (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  80. 80.

    See Emch, 32 E.C.L.R. 132, 135 (2011).

  81. 81.

    Sun, J., Implementation of AML, 2009, http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=4951&cid=17, last accessed 12 January 2014 and Wang, X./Su, in: Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, 2012, p. 379, 389. Other sources indicate a lower market share of 8 percent, see Beijing cans Coke’s juice takeover, Financial Times, 20 March 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bbd2f7f4-14d1-11de-8cd1-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1TQadq1yw, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  82. 82.

    Wang, X./Su, in: Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, 2012, p. 379, 389.

  83. 83.

    Nicholson, 6/5 asialaw 42, 45 (2008); Ning et al., Merger Control Review 2009, 2010, http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2010/09/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/merger-control-review-2009-china/, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  84. 84.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 18.

  85. 85.

    See, for instance, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (“Horizontal Merger Guidelines”), OJ C 31/5 of 5 February 2004, para. 27 (“The larger the market share, the more likely a firm is to possess market power. And the larger the addition of market share, the more likely it is that a merger will lead to a significant increase in market power”).

  86. 86.

    It should be noted that the situation in Novartis/Alcon did not concern any newly launched products by Novartis, in which case it would have been possible to argue that Novartis could quickly increase its market share after a preliminary introduction phase by extending its distribution activities.

  87. 87.

    French/Han/Wang, M., MOFCOM imposes conditions on Novartis, 2010, http://www.freshfields.com/en/knowledge/Chinese_Ministry_of_Commerce_imposes_conditions_on_Novartis_for_its_acquisition_of_Alcon/, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 2.

  88. 88.

    Waha/Sun, H., China merger control two years on, 2010, http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/30647/competition-law-developments-in-east-asia, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  89. 89.

    French/Han/Wang, M., MOFCOM imposes conditions on Novartis, 2010, http://www.freshfields.com/en/knowledge/Chinese_Ministry_of_Commerce_imposes_conditions_on_Novartis_for_its_acquisition_of_Alcon/, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 2; Zhao, GRUR Int. 2010, 909, 910.

  90. 90.

    Some have argued that MOFCOM would have, in most cases, considered high market shares equal to market power, Zhang, A./Jephcott, 10/11 Competition Law Insight 18, 18 (2011).

  91. 91.

    The factors to be assessed for the determination of market dominance, however, are broadly consistent with the criteria enlisted in Article 5(2) Interim Assessment Provisions. Article 18 AML stipulates that “dominant market status shall be determined according to the following factors: (1) the market share of a business operator in the relevant market, and the competition situation of the relevant market; (2) the capacity of a business operator to control the sales markets or the raw material procurement market; (3) the financial and technical conditions of the business operator; (4) the degree of dependence of other business operators on the business operator in transactions; (5) the degree of difficulty for other business operators to enter the relevant market; and (6) other factors related to the determination of dominant market position”.

  92. 92.

    See, for instance, MOFCOM, Panasonic/Sanyo, para. 9; MOFCOM, Seagate/Samsung, para. 15.

  93. 93.

    HHI is equal to the sum of the squares of the market shares of each business operator in the relevant market in which the concentration is to occur.

  94. 94.

    CRn is equal to the sum of the market shares of the leading N business operators in the relevant market in which the concentration is to occur.

  95. 95.

    For instance, the high market concentration in the global potassium chloride market, which is only dominated by a few companies worldwide, was one of the decisive factors in the Uralkali/Silvinit case; see MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 7 et seq; in the Alpha V/Savio case, MOFCOM observed that Uster and Loepfe, the subsidiaries of the merging parties, are the only two manufacturers of electronic yarn clearers for automatic winders in the world; see MOFCOM, Alpha V/Savio, para. 9; one of the three main competitive concerns in the GE China/Shenhua case was the fact that the market for the licensing of CWS gasification technology is controlled by three major market players only, among which a subsidiary of GE holds the highest market share; see MOFCOM, GE China/Shenhua, para. 8; in the Seagate/Samsung and Western Digital/Hitachi decisions, MOFCOM concluded that only five manufacturers (Seagate, Western Digital, Hitachi, Toshiba, and Samsung) control the HDD market; see MOFCOM, Seagate/Samsung, para. 8, and MOFCOM, Western Digital/Hitachi, para. 8; in the Google/Motorola Mobility decision, MOFCOM found that the market for smart mobile device OSs is mainly controlled by Google’s Android system, Nokia’s Symbian system, and Apple’s iOS; see MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 12.

  96. 96.

    MOFCOM, Pfizer/Wyeth, para. 8.

  97. 97.

    MOFCOM, Henkel HK/Tiande, para. 8.

  98. 98.

    MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 8.

  99. 99.

    MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 9.

  100. 100.

    MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 9.

  101. 101.

    See Zhu and Sun (AMB), Interview on 27 October 2011, who indicated that they would normally first assess the market shares and concentration levels. If these factors are problematic, they would look at other factors in more depth. MOFCOM’s approach is in line with the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section III. A. Comment 4, p. 13, which sets forth that, “before drawing any conclusions from market share and concentration data, agencies should consider imminent or reasonably certain changes to the market, such as the entry or exit of a firm or the introduction of additional capacity”.

  102. 102.

    NPC Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission, Office for Economic Law (ed.), Commentary on AML (in Chinese), 2007, p. 179.

  103. 103.

    See, for instance, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, OJ C 31/5 of 5 February 2004, para. 68 (“For entry to be considered a sufficient competitive constraint on the merging parties, it must be shown to be likely, timely and sufficient to deter or defeat any potential anticompetitive effects of the merger”); ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section VII. B., p. 28 (“In assessing whether entry and/or expansion would effectively constrain the merged entity, competition agencies should consider whether entry and/or expansion would be: (a) likely, (b) timely, and (c) sufficient in nature, scale and scope”); Section 9 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2010 (“The Agencies examine the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of the entry efforts an entrant might practically employ”).

  104. 104.

    See, for instance, MOFCOM, Pfizer/Wyeth, para. 9; MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 9; MOFCOM, Alpha V/Savio, para. 10; MOFCOM, GE China/Shenhua, para. 10; MOFCOM, Seagate/Samsung, para. 17; MOFCOM, Western Digital/Hitachi, para. 17; MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 18 et seq; MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 10; MOFCOM, ARM/G&D/Gemalto, para. 8; MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 22, 34, 42; MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 14; MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 12; MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 13.

  105. 105.

    Wang, P./Harris/Zhang, Y., AML, 2007, http://jonesday.com/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=4662, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  106. 106.

    MOFCOM, Pfizer/Wyeth, para. 9.

  107. 107.

    MOFCOM, Western Digital/Hitachi, para. 18.

  108. 108.

    MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 14 et seq.

  109. 109.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Press Release, para. 3.

  110. 110.

    MOFCOM, Seagate/Samsung, para. 15 et seq and 18.

  111. 111.

    See, however, Shan et al., China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare Standard?, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920885, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 20 et seq., who argue that MOFCOM would predominantly pursue a consumer surplus standard in its law enforcement.

  112. 112.

    NPC Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission, Office for Economic Law (ed.), Commentary on AML (in Chinese), 2007, p. 179; Zheng, AML: Part 2, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/10/chinas-antimonopoly-lawone-year-down-part-2-chinas-new-merger-review-regime.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  113. 113.

    See, for instance, MOFCOM, Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, para. 8; MOFCOM, GM/Delphi, para. 7 et seq; MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 15 et seq.

  114. 114.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, para. 8.

  115. 115.

    Bernitz/An, 31 E.C.L.R. 248, 257 (2010); see also Tucker, China ban on Coke takeover criticised, Financial Times, 20 March 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/01d70c22-14f0-11de-8cd1-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1VUBzSnHK, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  116. 116.

    Potter/Carnabuci/Han, MOFCOM prohibits Coca-Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan, 2009, http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2009/mar09/25486.pdf, last accessed 19 August 2011, p. 2.

  117. 117.

    Drexl, in: Drexl/Kerber/Podszun (eds.), Competition Policy and the Economic Approach, 2011, p. 312, 326.

  118. 118.

    On 19 July 2010, Nokia Siemens Networks announced its plan to acquire the majority in Motorola’s wireless networks infrastructure assets. Nokia Siemens Networks expected to enter into relationships with more than 50 telecommunication operators and to strengthen its position with China Mobile, Clearwire, KDDI, Sprint, Verizon Wireless, and Vodafone; see Nokia Siemens Networks’ press release of 19 July 2010 at http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/news-events/press-room/press-releases/nokia-siemens-networks-to-acquire-certain-wireless-network-inf, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  119. 119.

    Interestingly, Huawei and Motorola had both been engaged in lawsuits against each other in relation to IP rights. In particular, Huawei had tried to prevent Motorola from transferring certain technologies provided by Huawei to Nokia Siemens Networks; see Raice, Huawei Sues Motorola to Block Asset Sale, The Wall Street Journal, 25 January 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703555804576101893898645486.html, last accessed 12 January 2014. The Nokia Siemens Networks/Motorola transaction was cleared in China only after Huawei and Motorola had entered into settlements, whereby Huawei agreed to the transfer of its technologies in exchange for the payment of fees; see Hille, China clears sale of Motorola unit to NSN, Financial Times, 21 April 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/41956a38-6bed-11e0-b36e-00144feab49a.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  120. 120.

    Hille, China clears sale of Motorola unit to NSN, Financial Times, 21 April 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/41956a38-6bed-11e0-b36e-00144feab49a.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  121. 121.

    Virki, China delays NSN’s $ 1.2 billion buy of Motorola unit, Thomson Reuters, 29 December 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/29/us-nokia-motorola-idUSTRE6BS2OS20101229, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  122. 122.

    Virki, China delays NSN’s $ 1.2 billion buy of Motorola unit, Thomson Reuters, 29 December 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/29/us-nokia-motorola-idUSTRE6BS2OS20101229, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  123. 123.

    See Nokia Siemens Networks’ press release of 9 March 2011 at http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/news-events/press-room/press-releases/nokia-siemens-networks-clarifies-status-on-motorola-transaction, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  124. 124.

    Hille, China clears sale of Motorola unit to NSN, Financial Times, 21 April 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/41956a38-6bed-11e0-b36e-00144feab49a.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  125. 125.

    Deng/Emch/Leonard, A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396968, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 15; see also Interview with Wu Hongwei, Legal Daily, http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2009-03/25/content_1059171.htm?node=192 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  126. 126.

    Farmer, 18 Tulane J. of Int’l & Comp. Law 1, 12 et seq. (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411727, last accessed 12 January 2014; Wang, X., in: Wang, X. (ed.), Wang Xiaoye on the Antitrust Law (in Chinese), 2010, p. 326, 338; Wu, L., 33 World Competition 477, 492 (2010); Zheng, AML: Part 2, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/10/chinas-antimonopoly-lawone-year-down-part-2-chinas-new-merger-review-regime.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  127. 127.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 9.

  128. 128.

    NPC Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission, Office for Economic Law (ed.), Commentary on AML (in Chinese), 2007, p. 180.

  129. 129.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Press Release, para. 2.

  130. 130.

    Mitnick/Chen, Y./Emch, 23/3 Antitrust Magazine 53, 57 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440795&rec=1&srcabs=1439765, last accessed 12 January 2014; Wang, X./Su, in: Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, 2012, p. 379, 388.

  131. 131.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 26.

  132. 132.

    国务院关于印发 国家知识产权战略纲要的通知, see Chinese version at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-06/10/content_1012269.htm, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  133. 133.

    Para. 7 Notice on the Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy.

  134. 134.

    Deng/Emch/Leonard, A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396968, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 14 et seq.

  135. 135.

    Bu, IIC 2010, 202, 208.

  136. 136.

    See also Potter/Carnabuci/Han, MOFCOM prohibits Coca-Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan, 2009, http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2009/mar09/25486.pdf, last accessed 19 August 2011, p. 2, who consider the decision to contain “no suggestion that foreign ownership of a well-known Chinese brand was a consideration that was taken into account”.

  137. 137.

    See, for instance, MOFCOM, Panasonic/Sanyo, para. 9; MOFCOM, Seagate/Samsung, para. 15; MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 15.

  138. 138.

    It has been held that MOFCOM would have assessed efficiencies in the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan decision; see Mitnick/Chen, Y./Emch, 23/3 Antitrust Magazine 53, 57 et seq. (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440795&rec=1&srcabs=1439765, last accessed 12 January 2014 (who also argue that bundling could be pro-competitive as it would result in cost savings in the form of economies of scope in sales). However, MOFCOM did not clearly indicate that it assessed efficiencies. Instead, the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan decision merely specifies that “Coca-Cola failed to provide sufficient evidence that the positive influences of concentration would clearly outweigh its negative influences or accord with public interests”, which is to be read as a reference to the exemption provision in Article 28 sentence 2 AML.

  139. 139.

    Zhu and Sun (AMB), Interview on 27 October 2011. Accordingly, Article 9(1) Interim Assessment Provisions acknowledges that concentrations may enhance economic efficiency, give rise to economies of scale and economies of scope, reduce production costs, and enhance product diversity, which would benefit consumers.

  140. 140.

    ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section VIII. A., p. 30, stipulates that “a merger is not likely to create or enhance market power if one of the merging parties is likely to fail and its assets are likely to exit the market in the imminent future. In cases where the merging parties assert that a merger is unlikely to harm competition because one of the merging firms is failing, agencies should carefully assess the appropriate counterfactual in which to analyse the competitive effects of the merger.”

  141. 141.

    The ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section VIII. B., p. 31, propose a four-step test to assess whether “(a) the firm is unable to meet its financial obligations in the imminent future; (b) there would be no serious prospect of reorganising the business; (c) there would be no credible less anticompetitive alternative outcome than the merger in question; and, (d) the firm and its assets would exit the market in the imminent future absent the merger”.

  142. 142.

    Farmer, 18 Tulane J. of Int’l & Comp. Law 1, 10 et seq. (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411727, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  143. 143.

    ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section I. A., p. 1.

  144. 144.

    See Josef Drexl in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 October 2007, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/konjunktur/jurist-josef-drexl-im-gespraech-eine-unabhaengige-kartellbehoerde-ist-in-china-undenkbar-1492172.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  145. 145.

    Furse, 31 E.C.L.R. 98, 100 (2010); Wang, X., in: Wang, X. (ed.), Wang Xiaoye on the Antitrust Law (in Chinese), 2010, p. 326, 338.

  146. 146.

    Mao/Glass, GRUR Int. 2008, 105, 109.

  147. 147.

    Horizontal mergers constitute the majority of cases reviewed by MOFCOM, accounting for over 60 percent of total cases as of December 2010; see speech delivered by the Director General of the AMB (Shang Ming) at the “Workshop on China's Anti-Monopoly Law and Enforcement” held by ABA Section of Antitrust Law on 1 April 2011, video of speech available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrust_law/events_cle/china_workshop.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  148. 148.

    MOFCOM, Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, para. 7.

  149. 149.

    MOFCOM, Pfizer/Wyeth, para. 7 et seq.

  150. 150.

    Horizontal Merger Guidelines, OJ C 31/5 of 5 February 2004, para. 20.

  151. 151.

    For purposes of comparison, the European Commission also conditioned the approval of the Pfizer/Wyeth merger on the divestment of several businesses, including the SMPV business, in view of the high combined market shares in 15 member states SMPV markets, high concentration levels of the market, and significant entry barriers; see Commission, Decision of 17 July 2009, Case No COMP/M.5476, OJ C 262/1 of 4 November 2009 – Pfizer/Wyeth, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5476_20090717_20212_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 200 et seq. In the same line, the FTC subjected the merger to significant divestitures to preserve competition in multiple US markets for animal pharmaceuticals and vaccines; see FTC, In the Matter of Pfizer Inc. and Wyeth (File No. 091-0053, Docket No. C-4267), Analysis of Proposed Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment, 14 October 2009, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910053/091014pwyethanal.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  152. 152.

    See Commission, Decision of 29 September 2009, Case No COMP/M.5421, OJ C 322/13 of 30 December 2009 – Panasonic/Sanyo, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5421_20090929_20212_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014. The Commission reached the same conclusions in relation to the post-merger market shares (rechargeable coin-shaped batteries, 60–70 percent (para. 100); NiMH batteries for general use, 40–50 percent (para. 70); and PEVE’s market share regarding rechargeable batteries for vehicles, 70–80 percent (para. 122)).

  153. 153.

    Regarding the markets for rechargeable coin-shaped batteries and NiMH batteries for general use, the Commission concluded that the high market shares of the merging parties, the high concentration levels, and the lack of potential new entries would justify an intervention (paras. 70 et seq. and 98 et seq.) and hence conditioned the approval on the divestiture of relevant manufacturing plants located in Japan and China (para. 201 et seq.). In contrast, relating to the market for NiMH batteries for vehicles, the Commission concluded that competition to supply NiMH for automotive applications has essentially ended since switching between different battery suppliers is extremely difficult once an OEM decides on its battery system. Therefore, once chosen, a given supplier will become “an ex-post monopolist supplier for the particular OEM”. As a result, the transaction was considered not to raise any anticompetitive concerns, even though it would create a large market player (para. 122). In its decision, MOFCOM did not include reference to the above-mentioned market conditions but based its intervention only on the high market share of PEVE and the lack of competitors.

  154. 154.

    FTC, In the Matter of Panasonic Corporation and Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd (File No. 091-0050), Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment, 24 November 2009, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910050/091124panasanyoanal.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 2. The parties agreed to divest Sanyo’s portable NiMH battery business, including its Takasaki plant.

  155. 155.

    MOFCOM, Novartis/Alcon, para. 6.

  156. 156.

    French/Han/Wang, M., MOFCOM imposes conditions on Novartis, 2010, http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2010/Aug10/28640.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 1.

  157. 157.

    MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 7 et seq.

  158. 158.

    MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 9.

  159. 159.

    MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 7.

  160. 160.

    MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 8.

  161. 161.

    MOFCOM, Alpha V/Savio, para. 8.

  162. 162.

    See, for instance, Ha/O’Brien/Chang, 8th Conditional Anti-monopoly Clearance, 2011, http://www.mayerbrown.com/de/publications/China-Announces-8th-Conditional-Anti-monopoly-Clearance-11-04-2011/, last accessed 12 January 2014; Wang, P./Evrard/Zhang, Y., New Merger Decisions, 2011, http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--china-publishes-two-new-merger-decisions-under-anti-monopoly-law-11-22-2011/, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  163. 163.

    MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 8.

  164. 164.

    MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 9.

  165. 165.

    Commission, Decision of 26 July 2012, Case No COMP/M.6410 – UTC/Goodrich, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6410_20120726_20600_3206581_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 417 et seq.

  166. 166.

    In contrast to MOFCOM, the European Commission only identified vertical effects in relation to the European markets in this case as it held that the merged entity would have the ability and incentive to raise prices for zinc metal post-merger; see Commission, Decision of 22 November 2012, Case No COMP/M.6541 – Glencore/Xstrata, Press Release IP/12/1252, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1252_en.htm, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  167. 167.

    MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 43.

  168. 168.

    See, for instance, Ha et al., Marubeni/Gavilon, 2013, http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/72a6c518-ad19-4e74-9b18-569f8d253642/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/645e4e9e-cd81-4ee8-8eaf-5d7ae0a33f02/130508-PRC-AntitrustCompetition-MA.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 2 et seq., who have raised similar concerns for the Glencore/Xstrata and Marubeni/Gavilon decisions.

  169. 169.

    MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 11, 15.

  170. 170.

    The decision, however, did not reveal what amounts of soybean Gavilon would export to the Chinese market. Commentators have noted that the figures provided in MOFCOM’s decision would suggest that Gavilon’s market share in the Chinese import market for soybean would be relatively low, which could also mean that MOFCOM was more concerned about the loss of potential competition; see Ha et al., Marubeni/Gavilon, 2013, http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/72a6c518-ad19-4e74-9b18-569f8d253642/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/645e4e9e-cd81-4ee8-8eaf-5d7ae0a33f02/130508-PRC-AntitrustCompetition-MA.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 2.

  171. 171.

    MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 13.

  172. 172.

    MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 14 et seq.

  173. 173.

    MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 9.

  174. 174.

    MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 10.

  175. 175.

    MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 12 et seq.

  176. 176.

    Commission, Decision of 22 July 2013, Case No COMP/M.6851 – Baxter/Gambro, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6851_20130722_20212_3384737_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 432 et seq.

  177. 177.

    MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 14 et seq.

  178. 178.

    MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 17.

  179. 179.

    See ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section V. C. Comment 2, p. 21 et seq.

  180. 180.

    ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section IV. B. Comment 2, p. 17.

  181. 181.

    MOFCOM, Novartis/Alcon, para. 7.

  182. 182.

    MOFCOM, Novartis/Alcon, para. 9.

  183. 183.

    MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 8.

  184. 184.

    Wang, P./Evrard/Zhang, Y., China Approves Merger between Russian Potash Producers, 2011, http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--china-approves-merger-between-russian-potash-producers-but-requires-they-continue-to-supply-the-chinese-market-06-13-2011/, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  185. 185.

    MOFCOM, Alpha V/Savio, para. 9.

  186. 186.

    See Press Conference on Main Issues of AML Implementation in 2011 hosted by MOFCOM on 27 December 2011, http://www.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/slfw/201112/20111207901483.html (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  187. 187.

    See, for instance, Kellerbauer/Gong, 34 E.C.L.R. 119, 127 (2013).

  188. 188.

    See Commission, Decision of 19 October 2011, Case No COMP/M.6214 – Seagate/Samsung, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6214_20111019_20682_2390485_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 548 et seq.

  189. 189.

    Zhang, X./Zhang, V., 6 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 477, 492 (2010).

  190. 190.

    Wang, P./Evrard/Zhang, Y., Seagate/Samsung, 2012, http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--china-conditionally-approves-seagate-acquisition-of-samsung-hard-drive-business-01-03-2012/, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  191. 191.

    See Press Conference on Main Issues of AML Implementation in 2011 hosted by MOFCOM on 27 December 2011, http://www.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/slfw/201112/20111207901483.html (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  192. 192.

    See Commission, Decision of 23 November 2011, Case No COMP/M.6203 – Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6203_20111123_20600_3212692_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 407.

  193. 193.

    MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 11.

  194. 194.

    ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section VI. B., p. 23.

  195. 195.

    Horizontal Merger Guidelines, OJ C 31/5 of 5 February 2004, para. 41. These principles derive from CFI, Judgment of 6 June 2002, Case T-342/99, Airtours v Commission of the European Communities, [2002] ECR II-2585, para. 62.

  196. 196.

    ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section VI. B. Comment 5, p. 25; Horizontal Merger Guidelines, OJ C 31/5 of 5 February 2004, para. 52.

  197. 197.

    Until December 2010, vertical cases constituted 12 percent of all cases reviewed by MOFCOM; see speech delivered by the Director General of the AMB (Shang Ming) at the “Workshop on China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and Enforcement” held by ABA Section of Antitrust Law on 1 April 2011, video of speech available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrust_law/events_cle/china_workshop.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  198. 198.

    MOFCOM, Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, para. 7 et seq.

  199. 199.

    See “Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings” (“Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines”), OJ C 265/6 of 18 October 2008, para. 29 et seq., on the assessment of input foreclosure and customer foreclosure effects; see also ABA Section of Antitrust Law (ed.), Mergers and Acquisitions, 2008, p. 460 et seq., on US Post-Chicago theories of anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers based on input foreclosure and customer foreclosure hypotheses.

  200. 200.

    See, for instance, Eli Lilly & Co., 120 F.T.C. 243, 250 et seq. (1995), in which the FTC conditioned the clearance of pharmaceutical manufacturer Eli Lilly’s acquisition of PCS Health Systems on the grounds that the merged entity shall abstain from giving preference to Eli Lilly products distributed through PCS Health Systems over those of Eli Lilly’s rivals and establish an information firewall between Eli Lilly and PCS Health Systems; Valero L.P., et al., 140 F.T.C. 40, 75 et seq. (2005), in which the FTC conditioned the clearance of the acquisition of Kaneb Services and Kaneb Pipe Line Partners, which own and operate petroleum pipelines and storage and terminaling facilities, by Valeo L.P. and Valero Energy Corp., which engage, inter alia, in the transportation and marketing of petroleum products, on the grounds that Valero L.P. was to maintain nondiscriminatory access to certain terminals (while other terminals were to be divested) and to create firewalls that prevent the transfer of competitively sensitive information between the merged firm and Valero Energy; Commission, Decision of 25 June 2008, Case No COMP/M.5121, OJ C 219/2 of 28 August 2008 – News Corp/Premiere, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5121_20080625_20212_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 104, in which the Commission subjected clearance of the acquisition of German pay-TV operator Premiere by the media company News Corp. to the requirement that rival pay-TV operators would continue to be granted nondiscriminatory access to Premiere’s satellite platforms.

  201. 201.

    MOFCOM, GM/Delphi, para. 6.

  202. 202.

    See Sales ranking of top ten passenger car manufacturers in the first nine months of 2010, China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, 22 October 2010, http://www.caam.org.cn/zhengche/20101022/1405047156.html (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  203. 203.

    Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, OJ C 265/6 of 18 October 2008, para. 25.

  204. 204.

    Commission, Decision of 13 August 2009, Case No COMP/M.5588, OJ C 208/2 of 3 September 2009 – GM/Delphi Steering II, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5588_20090812_20310_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 23 et seq.

  205. 205.

    ABA Section of Antitrust Law (ed.), Mergers and Acquisitions, 2008, p. 455.

  206. 206.

    Cramer, Merger Review under AML, 2010, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1577839, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 34.

  207. 207.

    In effect, the presumed low market shares have led some commentators to take the view that non-competition concerns may have played an important role for the outcome of the case; see Emch, 32 E.C.L.R. 132, 135 (2011).

  208. 208.

    Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, OJ C 265/6 of 18 October 2008, para. 32 and 59. Some commentators have criticised MOFCOM for not having conducted an equivalent test; see Han/French/Carnabuci, MOFCOM conditionally clears two offshore acquisitions, 2009, http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2009/oct09/26807.pdf, last accessed 3 March 2011, p. 2.

  209. 209.

    Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, OJ C 265/6 of 18 October 2008, para. 72.

  210. 210.

    MOFCOM, GM/Delphi, para. 10.

  211. 211.

    MOFCOM, GE China/Shenhua, para. 11.

  212. 212.

    MOFCOM, Henkel HK/Tiande, para. 10.

  213. 213.

    MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 12.

  214. 214.

    MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 13 et seq.

  215. 215.

    MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 15.

  216. 216.

    MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 16.

  217. 217.

    MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 14.

  218. 218.

    Commission, Decision of 13 February 2012, Case No COMP/M.6381, OJ C 75/1 of 14 March 2012 – Google/Motorola Mobility, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 93 et seq.

  219. 219.

    Commission, Decision of 13 February 2012, Case No COMP/M.6381, OJ C 75/1 of 14 March 2012 – Google/Motorola Mobility, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 98.

  220. 220.

    See Google’s sample letter available at http://www.google.com/press/motorola/patents/, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  221. 221.

    Commission, Decision of 13 February 2012, Case No COMP/M.6381, OJ C 75/1 of 14 March 2012 – Google/Motorola Mobility, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 113.

  222. 222.

    Commission, Decision of 13 February 2012, Case No COMP/M.6381, OJ C 75/1 of 14 March 2012 – Google/Motorola Mobility, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 120.

  223. 223.

    Commission, Decision of 13 February 2012, Case No COMP/M.6381, OJ C 75/1 of 14 March 2012 – Google/Motorola Mobility, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 128, 132, 147.

  224. 224.

    Commission, Decision of 13 February 2012, Case No COMP/M.6381, OJ C 75/1 of 14 March 2012 – Google/Motorola Mobility, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 154.

  225. 225.

    See, for instance, Commission, Decision of 13 February 2012, Case No COMP/M.6381, OJ C 75/1 of 14 March 2012 – Google/Motorola Mobility, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 132.

  226. 226.

    TEE is a security solution that offers enhanced security services for applications such as mobile payments running on smartphones and tablets.

  227. 227.

    MOFCOM, ARM/G&D/Gemalto, para. 7.

  228. 228.

    Commission, Decision of 6 November 2012, Case No COMP/M.6564 – ARM/Giesecke&Devrient/Gemalto/JV, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6564_20121106_20212_2779342_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  229. 229.

    MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 43.

  230. 230.

    MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 16 et seq., 31 et seq., 40 et seq.

  231. 231.

    MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 25, 32 et seq., 41.

  232. 232.

    Commission, Decision of 22 November 2012, Case No COMP/M.6541 – Glencore/Xstrata, Press Release IP/12/1252, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1252_en.htm, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  233. 233.

    MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 13.

  234. 234.

    MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 14 et seq.

  235. 235.

    Up to December 2010, conglomerate cases accounted for 24 percent of all cases reviewed by MOFCOM; see speech delivered by the Director General of the AMB (Shang Ming) at the “Workshop on China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and Enforcement” held by ABA Section of Antitrust Law on 1 April 2011, video of speech available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrust_law/events_cle/china_workshop.html, last accessed 12 January 2014. Shang Ming has acknowledged that the number of conglomerate mergers reviewed in China is significantly higher than in the US.

  236. 236.

    See Press Conference on AML Implementation Issues hosted by MOFCOM on 12 August 2010, http://www.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/201008/20100807078063.html?4245233051=4123207458 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  237. 237.

    Some scholars have therefore held that the merger was a horizontal case; see Sun, J., Implementation of AML, 2009, http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=4951&cid=17, last accessed 12 January 2014 and Yang, D., Report on Symposium on Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, 2009, http://cms40.legaldaily.com.cn:7001/servlet/PagePreviewServlet?siteid=4&nodeid=7574&articleid=1060323&type=1 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014, referring to Wang Xiaoye, who consider carbonated soft drinks and fruit juice beverages to be highly substitutable.

  238. 238.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 19.

  239. 239.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 16.

  240. 240.

    See Yang, D., Report on Symposium on Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, 2009, http://cms40.legaldaily.com.cn:7001/servlet/PagePreviewServlet?siteid=4&nodeid=7574&articleid=1060323&type=1 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014, referring to Huang Yong and Shi Jichun; Zhang, X./Zhang, V., 6 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 477, 489 (2010).

  241. 241.

    MOFCOM, Wal-Mart/Yihaodian, para. 8.

  242. 242.

    Commission, Decision of 15 October 1997, Case No IV/M.938, OJ L 288/24 of 27 October 1998 – Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998D0602:EN:HTML, last accessed 12 January 2014. In this decision, the Commission emphasised that the key result of the merger was to combine the merging parties’ portfolios of products and brands (para. 39). It determined that the holder of a portfolio of leading spirit brands might enjoy a number of competitive advantages (such as enhanced market power, greater flexibility to structure prices and discounts, and greater potential for tying) that may lead to adverse effects on market competition (para. 40 et seq.).

  243. 243.

    Commission, Decision of 3 July 2001, Case No COMP/M.2220, OJ L 48/1 of 18 February 2004 – General Electric/Honeywell, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014. In order to justify its prohibition decision, the Commission invoked the theory of “foreclosure through packaged offers” and concluded that the merged entity would engage in mixed or pure bundling conduct (para. 350 et seq.); lower the prices so as to induce customers to buy GE and Honeywell products over those of competitors, which would increase the combined share of GE and Honeywell (para. 353); and finally lead to market foreclosure and elimination of competition in the relevant markets (para. 355). The CFI, although overruling the Commission’s findings with regard to the conglomerate effects of the merger, ultimately upheld the prohibition decision on other grounds; see CFI, Judgment of 14 December 2005, Case T-210/01, General Electric Company v Commission of the European Communities, [2005] ECR II-5575.

  244. 244.

    Commission, Decision of 30 October 2001, Case No COMP/M.2416, OJ L 43/13 of 13 February 2004 – Tetra Laval/Sidel, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2416_62_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014. In this case, the Commission based its prohibition decision, inter alia, on the finding that the merger would enable Tetra Laval to leverage its dominant position in the market for aseptic carton packaging to acquire a dominant position in the PET packaging equipment market, in which Sidel would, at that time, hold a leading position (para. 342). The CFI however annulled the Commission’s decision; see CFI, Judgment of 25 October 2002, Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v Commission of the European Communities, [2002] ECR II-4381.

  245. 245.

    See ABA Section of Antitrust Law (ed.), Mergers and Acquisitions, 2008, p. 480 et seq; see also Mitnick/Chen, Y./Emch, 23/3 Antitrust Magazine 53, 58 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440795&rec=1&srcabs=1439765, last accessed 12 January 2014, who argue that the theory of “monopoly leveraging” has been practically abandoned in the US. During the merger wave in the 1960s to 1970s, however, it was acknowledged that conglomerate mergers could substantially lessen competition according to the “entrenchment theory”; see FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).

  246. 246.

    See ABA Section of Antitrust Law (ed.), Mergers and Acquisitions, 2008, p. 488; see also CFI, Judgment of 25 October 2002, Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v Commission of the European Communities, [2002] ECR II-4381, para. 218 et seq.

  247. 247.

    The “Cournot effect” refers to a situation where producers of complementary goods price independently and do not take into account the positive effect of a drop in the price of their output on the sales of the other product. In such scenario, a merged firm may have a certain incentive to lower its margins if this leads to higher overall profits.

  248. 248.

    Zheng, AML: Part 3, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/12/chinas-antimonopoly-lawone-year-down-part-3-the-aml-as-a-protectionist-tool.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  249. 249.

    Patterson/Shapiro, 16/1 Antitrust Magazine 18, 18 (2001), http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/divergence.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014; Zheng, AML: Part 3, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/12/chinas-antimonopoly-lawone-year-down-part-3-the-aml-as-a-protectionist-tool.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  250. 250.

    Zhang, A., Problems in Following E.U. Competition Law, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569836, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 11.

  251. 251.

    Mulrenan, 23/3 CLP 8, 8 (2009).

  252. 252.

    Deng/Emch/Leonard, A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396968, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 9.

  253. 253.

    Likewise, not only the short-term effects of a given concentration on consumers and other business operators are to be assessed in China but also the long-term impact, NPC Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission, Office for Economic Law (ed.), Commentary on AML (in Chinese), 2007, p. 179.

  254. 254.

    See Fox, 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 457, 465 (2002), http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume23/issue3/Fox23U.Pa.J.Int’lEcon.L.457(2002).pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014 on the divergent approaches on both sides of the Atlantic in the General Electric/Honeywell case. See also OECD (ed.), Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers, Roundtables on Competition Policy, 2001, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/3/1818237.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 8, which notes that the short-term favourable effects of bundling conduct may be more easily and accurately predicted than the long-term negative effects.

  255. 255.

    CFI, Judgment of 25 October 2002, Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v Commission of the European Communities, [2002] ECR II-4381.

  256. 256.

    Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, OJ C 265/6 of 18 October 2008, para. 91 et seq.

  257. 257.

    See Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, OJ C 265/6 of 18 October 2008, para. 94. It has been held that the newly introduced requirements would likely leave only little room for interventions from the part of the Commission in conglomerate cases; see Zeise, in: Schulte (ed.), Handbuch Fusionskontrolle, 2010, para. 1462.

  258. 258.

    This has been criticised; see, for instance, Bu, IIC 2010, 202, 205; Potter/Carnabuci/Han, MOFCOM prohibits Coca-Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan, 2009, http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2009/mar09/25486.pdf, last accessed 19 August 2011, p. 2; Zhang, A., Problems in Following E.U. Competition Law, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569836, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 19; Zhang, X./Zhang, V., 6 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 477, 489 (2010).

  259. 259.

    See ACCC assessment of Coca-Cola Amatil Limited’s proposed acquisition of Berri Limited, available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=503214&nodeId=933cf0f7f72fc1bbe102c39b6243b815&fn=Coca-Cola+Amatil+Ltd’s+proposed+acquisition+of+Berri+Ltd+−+8+October+2003+−+re+carbonated+soft+drink+and+fruit+juice.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  260. 260.

    Dong/Qin, Australian sample case for Huiyuan acquisition, 2009, http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-03-26/110128621.html (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014; Johnston, 9/1 Competition Law Insight 13, 13 (2010); Wang, X./Su, in: Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, 2012, p. 379, 389.

  261. 261.

    Dong/Qin, Australian sample case for Huiyuan acquisition, 2009, http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-03-26/110128621.html (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  262. 262.

    It should be further noted that Coca-Cola’s strategy of acquiring well-known foreign brands has encountered other antitrust obstacles in the past. A proposed acquisition of Orangina was rejected by the French competition council on the ground that it would confer too much market power to Coca-Cola in the carbonated soft drink market; see Hays, Coca-Cola Bid for Orangina Rebuffed by French Court, The New York Times, 10 April 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/10/business/coca-cola-bid-for-orangina-rebuffed-by-french-court.html, last accessed 12 January 2014. In 1999, Coca-Cola had to abandon its plan to acquire the Schweppes brand in twelve EU member states (including Germany) because the merger would have significantly strengthened Coca-Cola’s dominant position in the market for carbonated soft drinks and was likely to be challenged by the respective competition authorities; see Schweppes schlucken - aber nicht in Europa, Spiegel Online, 25 May 1999, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/a-24234.html, last accessed 12 January 2014. Although these acquisitions were targeted at producers of carbonated soft drinks, and therefore constituted horizontal and not conglomerate mergers, they evidence the competition concerns that derive from concentration transactions involving Coca-Cola as a major market player in the international carbonated soft drink market.

  263. 263.

    Deng/Emch/Leonard, A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396968, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 8 et seq.; see also OECD (ed.), Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers, Roundtables on Competition Policy, 2001, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/3/1818237.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 9.

  264. 264.

    Deng/Emch/Leonard, A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396968, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 7.

  265. 265.

    See Yang, D., Report on Symposium on Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, 2009, http://cms40.legaldaily.com.cn:7001/servlet/PagePreviewServlet?siteid=4&nodeid=7574&articleid=1060323&type=1 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014, referring to Shi Jichun.

  266. 266.

    Deng/Emch/Leonard, A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396968, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 11.

  267. 267.

    Deng/Emch/Leonard, A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396968, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 13.

  268. 268.

    Deng/Emch/Leonard, A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396968, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 11 et seq; Wang, C./Ge, Case Study on Coca-Cola/Huiyuan (in Chinese), 2011, p. 200.

  269. 269.

    See, for instance, Wang, X., in: Wang, X. (ed.), Wang Xiaoye on the Antitrust Law (in Chinese), 2010, p. 348, 348 et seq.

  270. 270.

    Potter/Carnabuci/Han, MOFCOM prohibits Coca-Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan, 2009, http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2009/mar09/25486.pdf, last accessed 19 August 2011, p. 2; Wang, C./Ge, Case Study on Coca-Cola/Huiyuan (in Chinese), 2011, p. 166 et seq.

  271. 271.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 18.

  272. 272.

    Article 19 AML sets up a rebuttable presumption of market dominance if (1) the relevant market share of a business operator accounts for at least 50 percent of the relevant market, (2) the joint relevant market share of two business operators accounts for at least two-thirds of the relevant market, or (3) the joint relevant market share of three business operators accounts for at least three-fourths of the relevant market.

  273. 273.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 18; regretful is, however, that MOFCOM has not provided any evidence for its findings.

  274. 274.

    Masseli, ZChinR 2009, 18, 35.

  275. 275.

    Wang, X., in: Wang, X. (ed.), Wang Xiaoye on the Antitrust Law (in Chinese), 2010, p. 348, 349.

  276. 276.

    See Furse, 31 E.C.L.R. 98, 102 (2010).

  277. 277.

    See Mulrenan, 23/3 CLP 8, 8 (2009); Tucker, China blocks Coca-Cola bid for Huiyuan, Financial Times, 18 March 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5c645830-1391-11de-9e32-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1VsX7awyN, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  278. 278.

    See Tucker, China ban on Coke takeover criticised, Financial Times, 20 March 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/01d70c22-14f0-11de-8cd1-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1VUBzSnHK, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  279. 279.

    See ACCC assessment of Coca-Cola Amatil Limited’s proposed acquisition of Berri Limited, available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=503214&nodeId=933cf0f7f72fc1bbe102c39b6243b815&fn=Coca-Cola+Amatil+Ltd’s+proposed+acquisition+of+Berri+Ltd+−+8+October+2003+−+re+carbonated+soft+drink+and+fruit+juice.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  280. 280.

    Han, Walmart/Yihaodian, 2012, http://www.freshfields.com/en/knowledge/MOFCOM_Conditionally_Clears_Wal-Mart_Acquisition_of_Yihaodian/?LangId=2057, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 2.

  281. 281.

    MOFCOM, Wal-Mart/Yihaodian, para. 8.

  282. 282.

    MOFCOM, Wal-Mart/Yihaodian, para. 9.

  283. 283.

    MOFCOM, Wal-Mart/Yihaodian, para. 9.

  284. 284.

    Han, Walmart/Yihaodian, 2012, http://www.freshfields.com/en/knowledge/MOFCOM_Conditionally_Clears_Wal-Mart_Acquisition_of_Yihaodian/?LangId=2057, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 3.

  285. 285.

    Wang, X., RIW 2008, 417, 425.

  286. 286.

    See, for instance, Press Conference on AML Implementation Issues hosted by MOFCOM on 12 August 2010, http://www.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/201008/20100807078063.html?4245233051=4123207458 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

  287. 287.

    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, para. 8.

  288. 288.

    See, for instance, Bachrack/Huang/Modrall, 36/4 CBR 18, 26 (2009); Bu, IIC 2010, 202, 208; Beijing cans Coke’s juice takeover, Financial Times, 20 March 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bbd2f7f4-14d1-11de-8cd1-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1TQadq1yw, last accessed 12 January 2014; Ha/Ge/O’Brien, New Review Procedures for Foreign Investment, 2011, http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=10450&nid=6, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 3; Henneberry/Palmer, 7/3 asialaw 23, 24 (2009); Jiang, B., MOFCOM’s warning, People’s Daily Online, 4 May 2009, http://it.people.com.cn/GB/42891/42895/9229575.html (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014; Lin, Interaction of Competition Policy and Development Policy, 2009, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/comadd.cfm?com=IC722000&pg=2, last accessed 12 January 2014; Van Uytsel, China’s AML, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1700963, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 35; Wang, H., 8/6 Competition Law Insight 6, 7 (2009).

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    See Wang, H., 8/6 Competition Law Insight 6, 7 (2009).

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    See Bachrack/Huang/Modrall, 36/4 CBR 18, 26 (2009). Sun, J., Implementation of AML, 2009, http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=4951&cid=17, last accessed 12 January 2014, has argued that some famous domestic brands (e.g., Meijiajing, Zhonghua, Lebaishi, or Xiaohushi) would have disappeared after being acquired by foreign firms. This has however been rightly contested; see Interview with Wu Hongwei, Legal Daily, http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2009-03/25/content_1059171.htm?node=192 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Sun, S., Minister of Commerce proposes to combine FDI approval with AML review, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-12/23/c_12908883.htm (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Fairclough/Tejada, China’s Coke Decision Threatens to Chill Investment, The Wall Street Journal, 19 March 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB123742376981279233-lMyQjAxMDI5MzE3OTQxMjkzWj.html, last accessed 12 January 2014; Mulrenan, 23/3 CLP 8, 9 (2009).

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    Mulrenan, 23/3 CLP 8, 10 (2009); Tucker, China ban on Coke takeover criticised, Financial Times, 20 March 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/01d70c22-14f0-11de-8cd1-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1VUBzSnHK, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    See Zheng, AML: Part 3, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/12/chinas-antimonopoly-lawone-year-down-part-3-the-aml-as-a-protectionist-tool.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Wang, H., 8/6 Competition Law Insight 6, 6 (2009).

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    See Press Conference on AML Implementation Issues hosted by MOFCOM on 12 August 2010, http://www.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/201008/20100807078063.html?4245233051=4123207458 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 10.

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    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 28.

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    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, Q&A, para. 33.

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    See Chen, E./Miles, China not abusing antitrust law, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USPEK34831220090706, last accessed 12 January 2014, referring to William E. Kovacic, who has allegedly indicated that he “would have a high degree of confidence that the reasons for [MOFCOM’s] analysis are based on [its] neutral assessment of competitive effects”; Sun, J., Implementation of AML, 2009, http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=4951&cid=17, last accessed 12 January 2014; Wang, X./Su, in: Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, 2012, p. 379, 388; see also Yang, D., Report on Symposium on Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, 2009, http://cms40.legaldaily.com.cn:7001/servlet/PagePreviewServlet?siteid=4&nodeid=7574&articleid=1060323&type=1 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014, referring to Huang Yong, Wu Hanhong, and Shi Jichun.

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    Zhang, A., Problems in Following E.U. Competition Law, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569836, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 5.

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    Tucker, China blocks Coca-Cola bid for Huiyuan, Financial Times, 18 March 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5c645830-1391-11de-9e32-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1VsX7awyN, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Zhang, A., Problems in Following E.U. Competition Law, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569836, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 5, who thus argues that this fact indicates that the Chinese government had little interest in maintaining the domestic ownership of the Huiyuan brand.

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    See Potter/Carnabuci/Han, MOFCOM prohibits Coca-Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan, 2009, http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2009/mar09/25486.pdf, last accessed 19 August 2011, p. 2, who consider that the decision contains “no suggestion that foreign ownership of a well-known Chinese brand was a consideration that was taken into account”.

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    Wang, X., in: Wang, X. (ed.), Wang Xiaoye on the Antitrust Law (in Chinese), 2010, p. 348, 349.

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    Wu, L., 33 World Competition 477, 492 et seq. (2010).

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    Wang, C./Ge, Case Study on Coca-Cola/Huiyuan (in Chinese), 2011, p. 112 et seq.

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    Diao/Ding, Coke bid for juice maker turns sour, China Daily, 19 March 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/19/content_7593335.htm, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    See Yang, D., Report on Symposium on Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, 2009, http://cms40.legaldaily.com.cn:7001/servlet/PagePreviewServlet?siteid=4&nodeid=7574&articleid=1060323&type=1 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014, referring to Wang Xiaoye.

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    Sun, J., Implementation of AML, 2009, http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=4951&cid=17, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Wang, X., in: Wang, X. (ed.), Wang Xiaoye on the Antitrust Law (in Chinese), 2010, p. 348, 349.

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    Bush/Bo, Disentangling Industrial Policy and Competition Policy, 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/antitrust_law/feb11_bush2_23f.authcheckdam.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 13 et seq; Wu, L., 33 World Competition 477, 491 (2010).

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    Johnston, 9/1 Competition Law Insight 13, 13 (2010).

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    Zheng, AML: Part 3, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/12/chinas-antimonopoly-lawone-year-down-part-3-the-aml-as-a-protectionist-tool.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Potter/Carnabuci/Han, MOFCOM prohibits Coca-Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan, 2009, http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2009/mar09/25486.pdf, last accessed 19 August 2011, p. 2.

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    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, para. 6 et seq.

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    Zheng, AML: Part 3, 2009, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/12/chinas-antimonopoly-lawone-year-down-part-3-the-aml-as-a-protectionist-tool.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    See Diageo’s press release of 27 June 2011 at http://www.diageo.com/en-row/NewsMedia/Pages/resource.aspx?resourceid=989, last accessed 12 July 2011.

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    Brown, Diageo hopes Beijing appreciates its liking for “baijiu”, Financial Times, 9 November 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16f641ee-ec27-11df-9e11-00144feab49a.html#axzz1RuVwC6Yx, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Lucas, Diageo’s hopes rise over baijiu move, Financial Times, 2 March 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/24e95c52-44f9-11e0-80e7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1RuVwC6Yx, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Brown, Diageo hopes Beijing appreciates its liking for “baijiu”, Financial Times, 9 November 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16f641ee-ec27-11df-9e11-00144feab49a.html#axzz1RuVwC6Yx, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Lucas, Diageo’s hopes rise over baijiu move, Financial Times, 2 March 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/24e95c52-44f9-11e0-80e7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1RuVwC6Yx, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Lucas, Diageo’s hopes rise over baijiu move, Financial Times, 2 March 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/24e95c52-44f9-11e0-80e7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1RuVwC6Yx, last accessed 12 January 2014; see also Brown, Diageo hopes Beijing appreciates its liking for “baijiu”, Financial Times, 9 November 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16f641ee-ec27-11df-9e11-00144feab49a.html#axzz1RuVwC6Yx, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    See Lucas, Diageo’s hopes rise over baijiu move, Financial Times, 2 March 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/24e95c52-44f9-11e0-80e7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1RuVwC6Yx, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Brown, Diageo hopes Beijing appreciates its liking for “baijiu”, Financial Times, 9 November 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16f641ee-ec27-11df-9e11-00144feab49a.html#axzz1RuVwC6Yx, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Simonian, Nestlé targets China with Yinlu deal, Financial Times, 18 April 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1b2285f0-69d3-11e0-89db-00144feab49a.html#axzz1XNIwmPxN, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Simonian, Nestlé targets China with Yinlu deal, Financial Times, 18 April 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1b2285f0-69d3-11e0-89db-00144feab49a.html#axzz1XNIwmPxN, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    See Nestlé Bid for Stake in Yinlu Approved by Ministry of Commerce, AFX News, 5 September 2011, http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2011-09/21259294-reports-nestle-bid-for-stake-in-yinlu-approved-by-ministry-of-commerce-020.htm, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    See Yum!’s press release of 7 November 2011 at http://www.yum.com/company/pressreleases/110711.asp, last accessed 2 December 2011. MOFCOM had previously extended the Phase II review period by 60 calendar days pursuant to Article 26 AML; see Announcement by Little Sheep at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20111026/LTN20111026077.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    See Regular Press Conference of MOFCOM on 15 June 2011, http://english.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/press/201106/20110607623883.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    See Yum!’s press release of 7 November 2011 at http://www.yum.com/company/pressreleases/110711.asp, last accessed 2 December 2011.

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    See Regular Press Conference of MOFCOM on 17 May 2011, http://english.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/press/201105/20110507573980.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Hauck/Snyder, Colonel Sanders Devouring Little Sheep, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-30/colonel-sanders-devouring-little-sheep-means-69-gain-real-m-a.html, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    See Nestlé’s 60 percent acquisition of Hsu Fu Chi approved by MOFCOM, NetEase, 7 December 2011, http://money.163.com/11/1207/14/7KM66OKT002526O3.html (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Zhang, X./Zhang, V., 6 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 477, 483 (2010).

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    MOFCOM, InBev/AB, para. 4.

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    MOFCOM, InBev/AB, Press Release, para. 6.

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    See Zhang, X./Zhang, V./Chang, H., The InBev and Anheuser-Busch Merger, 2008, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1322526, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 4.

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    Market shares of China’s major beer companies in 2009, China Beer Industry Data Application Net, 19 March 2010, http://www.beermi.com/gonggongxinxi/shichangzhishu/2010-03-19/35854.html (in Chinese), last accessed 21 April 2011.

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    Horizontal Merger Guidelines, OJ C 31/5 of 5 February 2004, para. 18.

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    MOFCOM, InBev/AB, para. 4.

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    Reysen, 8/2 Competition Law Insight 8, 9 (2009); Taylor, 22/10 CLP 7, 7 (2008).

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    Bu, 31 E.C.L.R. 239, 243 (2010); Mulrenan, 23/3 CLP 8, 8 (2009); Nee, Competition Law in China, 2010, p. 328; Potter/Han/Toh, 7/2 asialaw 33, 34 (2009); Reysen, 8/2 Competition Law Insight 8, 9 (2009); Tucker, InBev ruling sparks fears for M&A in China, Financial Times, 30 November 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d7addf8e-beff-11dd-ae63-0000779fd18c.html#axzz1QaJG09nA, last accessed 12 January 2014; Wei, D., 14 J. Int. Econ. L. 807, 817 (2011); see, however, Van Uytsel, China’s AML, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1700963, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 33, who argues that it is unlikely that MOFCOM was motivated by considerations relating to the establishment of national champions since it would then have imposed structural remedies.

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    Zhang, X./Zhang, V./Chang, H., The InBev and Anheuser-Busch Merger, 2008, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1322526, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 4. Post-merger (in 2009), the above-mentioned Chinese companies ranked first, second, fourth, and seventh, respectively, with the merged entity AB InBev being third; see Market shares of China’s major beer companies in 2009, China Beer Industry Data Application Net, 19 March 2010, http://www.beermi.com/gonggongxinxi/shichangzhishu/2010-03-19/35854.html (in Chinese), last accessed 21 April 2011.

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    Pfromm, WuW 2014, 28, 40; see also Ha et al., Marubeni/Gavilon, 2013, http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/72a6c518-ad19-4e74-9b18-569f8d253642/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/645e4e9e-cd81-4ee8-8eaf-5d7ae0a33f02/130508-PRC-AntitrustCompetition-MA.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 1.

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    MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 14.

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    See Knox, 14/9 GCR 28, 28 (2011), who blames MOFCOM for having secured access to potash for Chinese companies only, without addressing any larger antitrust concerns.

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    MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 10.

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    Key agricultural products fall under the scope of the national security review pursuant to Article 1(1) National Security Notice.

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    Han/Wang, M., Uralkali/Silvinit, 2011, http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/MOFCOM%20conditionally%20clears%20Uralkali%E2%80%99s%20acquisition%20of%20Silvinit.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 3; Wang, P./Evrard/Zhang, Y., China Approves Merger between Russian Potash Producers, 2011, http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--china-approves-merger-between-russian-potash-producers-but-requires-they-continue-to-supply-the-chinese-market-06-13-2011/, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Han/Zhou, MOFCOM’s Approach to Merger Remedies, 2012, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Free/cpiasiaantitrusthan.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 3.

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    Zhu and Sun (AMB), Interview on 27 October 2011.

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    Han/Wang, M., Uralkali/Silvinit, 2011, http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/MOFCOM%20conditionally%20clears%20Uralkali%E2%80%99s%20acquisition%20of%20Silvinit.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 3.

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    See Uralkali’s press release of 4 April 2011 at http://uralkali.com/press_center/company_news/item2164/, last accessed 26 July 2011.

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    MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, paras. 14, 29, 38.

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    MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 11.

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    Commission, Decision of 22 November 2012, Case No COMP/M.6541 – Glencore/Xstrata, Press Release IP/12/1252, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1252_en.htm, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Bush/Bo, Disentangling Industrial Policy and Competition Policy, 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/antitrust_law/feb11_bush2_23f.authcheckdam.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 11.

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    On 27 March 2013, MOFCOM published a consultation draft for “Provisions on the Imposition of Restrictive Conditions to Concentrations of Business Operators”, setting out the procedural and substantive guidelines and standards for imposing remedies to merger transactions. Until December 2013, no finalised implementation rules have been adopted (except for divestiture remedies, for which finalised interim rules have been developed in 2010; see Sect. 9.3.3.2 below).

  365. 365.

    Bush/Bo, Disentangling Industrial Policy and Competition Policy, 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/antitrust_law/feb11_bush2_23f.authcheckdam.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 6; Mitnick/Chen, Y./Emch, 23/3 Antitrust Magazine 53, 58 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440795&rec=1&srcabs=1439765, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    Deng/Leonard, 22/2 Antitrust Magazine 73, 76 (2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=13 05627, last accessed 12 January 2014; Bush, 35/1 CBR 46, 50 (2008); Rabinovitch, China becomes hurdle to global mergers, Financial Times, 31 July 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2782c07a-bb41-11e0-a7c8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1xsVKSwy6, last accessed 12 January 2014; Wei, J., Recent Developments, 2009, http://www.hoganlovells.de/files/Publication/c8a94e57-6e97-49b9-857c-ce6715882b6b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e41ba66f-26e4-472e-9002-d04bc7ae5e82/Wei_Apr_09.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 8.

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    See Chen, Z., Probleme der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, 2008, p. 375, in an outlook on Chinese competition law.

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    Zhang, A., The enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1783037, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 18 et seq., has noted that MOFCOM would dispose of tremendous bargaining power during the negotiations of remedies, due to the administrative character of Chinese merger control regime, as opposed to the US judicial system.

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    See Press Conference on AML Implementation Issues hosted by MOFCOM on 12 August 2010, http://www.MOFCOM.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/201008/20100807078063.html?4245233051=4123207458 (in Chinese), last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    For instance, MOFCOM, Novartis/Alcon, para. 10; MOFCOM, GE China/Shenhua, para. 12; MOFCOM, Henkel HK/Tiande, para. 11; MOFCOM, Western Digital/Hitachi, para. 20; MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 20; MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 11; MOFCOM, Wal-Mart/Yihaodian, para. 10; MOFCOM, ARM/G&D/Gemalto, para. 9; MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 13; MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 44; MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 18; MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 18 (in the last three cases, the respective filing party had to withdraw and re-file its merger notification at the end of the extended Phase II review period since MOFCOM was not satisfied with the proposed remedy plan).

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    MOFCOM, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, para. 9.

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    Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 (“Commission Notice on Remedies”), OJ C 267/1 of 22 October 2008, para. 77 et seq., sets forth extensive formal and timing requirements regarding the submission of commitments.

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    Bachrack/Huang/Modrall, 36/4 CBR 18, 26 (2009); Fosh et al., in: Johnston (ed.), Competition Law in China and Hong Kong, 2009, pp. 97, 121.

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    See, for instance, MOFCOM, Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, para. 9 (“reduce”) and para. 10 (“eliminate”); MOFCOM, GM/Delphi, para. 11 (“eliminate”) and para. 12 (“reduce”).

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    Fosh et al., in: Johnston (ed.), Competition Law in China and Hong Kong, 2009, p. 97, 121; Mitnick/Chen, Y./Emch, 23/3 Antitrust Magazine 53, 58 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440795&rec=1&srcabs=1439765, last accessed 12 January 2014; Wu, Z., 75 Antitrust L. J. 73, 92 (2008–2009).

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    Zhu and Sun (AMB), Interview on 27 October 2011.

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    NPC Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission, Office for Economic Law (ed.), Commentary on AML (in Chinese), 2007, p. 203.

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    Wu, Z., 75 Antitrust L. J. 73, 92 (2008–2009).

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    Han/Zhou, MOFCOM’s Approach to Merger Remedies, 2012, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Free/cpiasiaantitrusthan.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 1.

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    Kwoka, Merger Control in Emerging Economies, 2011, http://acle.uva.nl/binaries/content/assets/subsites/amsterdam-center-for-law--economics/cr-meetings/2011/papers/kwoka._paper.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 24.

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    Han/Zhou, MOFCOM’s Approach to Merger Remedies, 2012, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Free/cpiasiaantitrusthan.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 1.

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    Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, issued by the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, June 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014.

  383. 383.

    US Merger Remedies Guide 2011, p. 2.

  384. 384.

    US Merger Remedies Guide 2011, p. 5.

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    Kwoka/Moss, Behavioral Merger Remedies, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1959588, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 5 et seq.

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    Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004, OJ C 267/1 of 22 October 2008.

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    Commission Notice on Remedies, OJ C 267/1 of 22 October 2008, para. 61.

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    MOFCOM, Pfizer/Wyeth, para. 13; MOFCOM, Alpha V/Savio, para. 14; MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 14.

  394. 394.

    MOFCOM, Panasonic/Sanyo, para. 19. In this decision, MOFCOM allowed the merging parties to apply for an extension of the divestiture period to another six months should they fail to comply with the divestiture obligations during the initial period.

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    MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 47.

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    Zhang, X./Zhang, V., 6 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 477, 491 (2010).

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    Ha/Hickin/O’Brien, 24/7 CLP 18, 22 (2010).

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    MOFCOM, Panasonic/Sanyo, para. 18 et seq.

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    MOFCOM, Panasonic/Sanyo, para. 29 et seq.

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    Commission, Decision of 29 September 2009, Case No COMP/M.5421, OJ C 322/13 of 30 December 2009 – Panasonic/Sanyo, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5421_20090929_20212_en.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 201 et seq.

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    MOFCOM, Alpha V/Savio, para. 13 et seq.

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    MOFCOM, Western Digital/Hitachi, para. 29.

  414. 414.

    MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 13.

  415. 415.

    MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 16.

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    MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 46 et seq.

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    MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 15.

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    Bush/Bo, Disentangling Industrial Policy and Competition Policy, 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/antitrust_law/feb11_bush2_23f.authcheckdam.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 6; Mitnick/Chen, Y./Emch, 23/3 Antitrust Magazine 53, 58 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440795&rec=1&srcabs=1439765, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    MOFCOM, InBev/AB, para. 4 et seq.

  423. 423.

    See, for instance, FTC, In the Matter of Supermarket Development Corp., et al. (Docket No. C-3224), Consent Order, 17 March 1988, available at www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-109/ftc_volume_decision_110_july_1987_-_june_1988pages_369-475.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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  425. 425.

    See Henneberry/Palmer, 7/3 asialaw 23, 24 (2009), who argue that the decision has installed a mechanism to ensure that all future acquisitions will be filed, even if they do not satisfy the notification thresholds.

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    Bu, 31 E.C.L.R. 239, 241 (2010).

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    Bush, Oracle Bones, 2009, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/09/08/Aug09-Bush8-12f.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 6; Potter/Han/Toh, 7/2 asialaw 33, 34 (2009); Wei, J., Recent Developments, 2009, http://www.hoganlovells.de/files/Publication/c8a94e57-6e97-49b9-857c-ce6715882b6b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e41ba66f-26e4-472e-9002-d04bc7ae5e82/Wei_Apr_09.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 8.

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    Potter/Han/Toh, 7/2 asialaw 33, 34 (2009).

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    MOFCOM, Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, para. 17.

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    MOFCOM, Novartis/Alcon, para. 12.

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    See Commission, Decision of 9 August 2010, Case No COMP/M.5778, OJ C 20/8 of 21 January 2011 – Novartis/Alcon, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5778_20100809_20212_1577344_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 285 et seq.

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    Wang, P./Evrard/Zhang, Y., Seagate/Samsung, 2012, http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--china-conditionally-approves-seagate-acquisition-of-samsung-hard-drive-business-01-03-2012/, last accessed 12 January 2014.

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    MOFCOM, Western Digital/Hitachi, para. 23 et seq.

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    MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 21 et seq.

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    MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 25.

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    MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 23.

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    See, for instance, MOFCOM, Novartis/Alcon, para. 12 et seq; MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 16; MOFCOM, Henkel HK/Tiande, para. 14; MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 27; MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 53; MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 26; MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 18; MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 24.

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    See, for instance, MOFCOM, Novartis/Alcon, para. 14; MOFCOM, Uralkali/Silvinit, para. 16; MOFCOM, Henkel HK/Tiande, para. 15; MOFCOM, Western Digital/Hitachi, para. 30; MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 25; MOFCOM, UTC/Goodrich, para. 17; MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 52; MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 25; MOFCOM, Baxter/Gambro, para. 17; MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 26.

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    The behavioural remedies were imposed for a period of five years; see MOFCOM, Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, para. 17.

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    One of the two remedies was imposed for a period of five years; see MOFCOM, Novartis/Alcon, para. 12.

  476. 476.

    Two out of the three remedies imposed are effective for a period of five years; see MOFCOM, Google/Motorola Mobility, para. 26.

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    The behavioural remedies were imposed for a period of eight years; see MOFCOM, ARM/G&D/Gemalto, para. 14. This was in line with the conditional clearance issued by the European Commission in the same case; see Commission, Decision of 6 November 2012, Case No COMP/M.6564 – ARM/Giesecke&Devrient/Gemalto/JV, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6564_20121106_20212_2779342_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, para. 191 et seq.

  478. 478.

    The behavioural remedies were imposed for a period of over seven years; see MOFCOM, Glencore/Xstrata, para. 2.

  479. 479.

    See ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc588.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, at section XI. D. Comment 4, p. 34.

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    Zhu and Sun (AMB), Interview on 27 October 2011.

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    The specific conditions pertained to Seagate’s obligation to maintain Samsung HDD brand as an independent competitor.

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    MOFCOM, Marubeni/Gavilon, para. 26; MOFCOM, MediaTek/MStar, para. 24.

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    For instance, the Seagate/Samsung decision required the merging parties to establish information firewalls and defined which “competitive information” should be subjected to these firewalls; see MOFCOM, Seagate/Samsung, para. 24 (“Competitive information means any information that may lead to coordination among competitors, such as information about prices, production volumes, customers, and biddings etc.”).

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    Ha/Hickin/O’Brien, Uralkali/Silvinit, 2011, http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=11105&nid=6, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 1; Han/Wang, M., Uralkali/Silvinit, 2011, http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/MOFCOM%20conditionally%20clears%20Uralkali%E2%80%99s%20acquisition%20of%20Silvinit.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014, p. 3.

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    See the original Chinese text of the AML and the translation of the AML as provided in 21/8 CLP 28–40 (2007).

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    Masseli, Chinesische Fusionskontrolle, 2011, p. 176.

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Weinreich-Zhao, T. (2015). Substantive Merger Control Test. In: Chinese Merger Control Law. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 2. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43868-8_9

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