Abstract
A model of campaign resource allocation in a two candidate race is developed under the assumption that the candidates wish to maximize their probability of winning the election. If the candidates have equal budgets it is locally optimal for them to allocate in proportion to the Banzhaf power index of each voter in the electorate. When this result is applied to the United States Electoral College, it is seen that the disparity in the power between voters in small and large states induces presidential candidates to spend a disproportionately large amount of their funds in the large states.
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© 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Lake, M. (1979). A New Campaign Resource Allocation Model. In: Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., Schwödiauer, G. (eds) Applied Game Theory. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_7
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0208-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-41501-6
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