Abstract
A game theoretic model of the decision by candidates for the U.S. Presidential nominations concerning which set of presidential primaries to contest is developed. Using the two candidate contest for the 1976 Republican nomination as a prototype, interest centers on the effects of variations in the institutional context in affecting candidate strategy. Variables studied include the dates of the primaries, their size, the rules translating votes into delegate allocations, and variations in each primary’s electorate. Dynamic elements, e.g., “momentum,” are included, a number of propositions produced, and these propositions are tested successfully against the choices made by Reagan and Ford in the 1976 Republican campaign.
1) I would like to thank Robert Axelrod, Steven Brams, John Ferejohn, Morris Fiorina, Kenneth Shepsle, and Dennis Simon for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. This research was supported with funds provided by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. SOC 76-24218. Derivations of propositions stated in the text are available from the author on request. I retain responsibility for the content of this paper.
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References
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© 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Aldrich, J. (1979). A Model of the U.S. Presidential Primary Campaign. In: Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., Schwödiauer, G. (eds) Applied Game Theory. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_6
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
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