Abstract
This paper develops a game theoretic model for the optimal use of information which not only has some random error, but also has error which is under the control of the other player. Signal detection theory is applied in the context of a two-sided game to show how such partially reliable and partially deceptive information can best be used. Historical examples from international relations and military affairs are presented to demonstrate the applicability of the model to problems of strategic intelligence. Specific consideration is given to additional factors which would make the model more realistic, including the use of supervised learning, standard operating procedure, and cover stories.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Allison, G.: Essence of Decision. Boston 1971.
Axelrod, R.: The Rational Timing of Surprise. World Politics 31, January 1979, 228–246.
Babington-Smith, C: Air Spy, the Story of Photo Intelligence in World War II. New York 1957.
Beiden, Th.G.: Indications, Warning, and Crisis Operations. International Studies Quarterly 21, 1977, 181–198.
Bialer, S. (ed.): Stalin and His Generals. New York 1969.
Brams, St.: Deception in 2 x 2 Games. Journal of Peace Science 2, 1977, 171–203.
Brown, A.C.: Bodyguard of Lies. New York 1975.
Brown, H.: Statement of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the Amendments to the FY 1978 Budget and FY 1979 Authorization Request. February 22, 1977.
Brown, R. V., A.S.Kahr and C.Peterson: Decision Analysis for the Manager. New York 1974.
Dayan, M.: Diary of the Sinai Campaign. Jerusalem 1965. (English tr. 1966).
Druzhinin, V.V., and D.S.Kontorov: Concept, Algorithm, Decision. Moscow 1972 (tr. 1975).
Felix, Ch.: A Short Course in the Secret War. New York 1963.
Greenwood, T.: Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control. London, Adelphi Paper number 88, 1972.
Handel, M.I.: Perception, Deception and Surprise:The Case of the Yom Kippur War. Jerusalem, number 19. 1976.
Heikal, M.: The Road to Ramadan. New York 1975.
Herzog, Ch.: The War of Atonement. London 1975.
Jervis, R.: Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton 1970.
Lee, W.: Decision Theory and Human Behavior. New York 1971.
Lefebvre, V.A.: A Formal Method of Investigating Reflection Processes. General Systems 17, 1972, 181–187.
Marchetti, V., and J.D.Marks: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York 1974.
Robinson, Th.: Game Theory and Politics: Recent Soviet Views. Studies in Soviet Thought 10, 1970, 291–315.
Singleton, R., and W.Tyndall: Games and Programs. San Francisco 1974.
Slovic, P., B.FischhoffSindS. Lichtenstein: Behavioral Decision Theory. Annual Review of Psychology 28, 1977, 1–39.
Whaley, B.: Codeword BARBAROSSA. Cambridge, Mass., 1973.
Whaley, B.: Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War. Cambridge, Mass., 1969.
Wohlstetter, R.: Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision. Stanford, Ca., 1962.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Axelrod, R. (1979). Coping with Deception. In: Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., Schwödiauer, G. (eds) Applied Game Theory. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_25
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_25
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0208-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-41501-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive