Abstract
Urban transportation systems are frequently subsidized by the governmental unit concerned. The problem of determining a fair rate of return for these systems is considered here from the point of view of the Shapley value (for non-atomic games). This allows us to obtain a “fair” rate of subsidy which can be made to depend on the particular route traveled, the number of passengers on the route, general frequency of service on that route, and physical condition of the cars used.
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References
Aumann, R.J., and L.S. Shapley. Values of Non-Atomic Games. Princeton 1974.
Billera, L.J., D.C. Heath, and J. Raanan: Internal Telephone Billing Rates: a Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory. To appear in Operations Research, 1978.
Dantzig, G.B.: Linear Programming and Extensions. Princeton 1963.
Owen, G.: Finite Mathematics. Philadelphia 1970.
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© 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Diaz, H., Owen, G. (1979). Fair Subsidies for Urban Transportation Systems. In: Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., Schwödiauer, G. (eds) Applied Game Theory. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_21
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0208-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-41501-6
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