Abstract
Any cooperative n-person game with transferable utility has a noncooperative mode in which the players sell out of their positions to an external market of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coalitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.
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References
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© 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Young, H.P. (1979). Exploitable Surplus in N-Person Games. In: Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., Schwödiauer, G. (eds) Applied Game Theory. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_2
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0208-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-41501-6
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