Abstract
Wittgenstein is generally considered to be a decisive philosopher, but a great many of what have always been looked upon as main philosophical problems (like the questions of the meaning of life, of the nature of being, or of the destiny of humanity) are passed over in silence by his later philosophy1, so that it is not immediately clear in which sense Wittgenstein has to be considered as decisive. The enigma consists in the fact that it seems that there is no satisfactory explanation for this silence.2 On the one hand, in fact, we cannot believe that a thought which has nothing to do with such subjects can have the last word in philosophy. Moreover, if we think both of some themes present in Wittgenstein’s works (not only in the Tractatus, but also in following writings, like Culture and Value) and of his way of living, we are led to think that throughout his whole life such questions were the core of his existence and of his consideration. On the other hand, every attempt to show in which sense Wittgenstein’s philosophical silence can be seen as an answer to those questions seems to fail in its object.3
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Notes
Apart from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus (London, 1961) and the Notebooks 1914-(Oxford, 19792) we can find a direct treatment of questions of this kind only in “A Lecture on Ethics”, in Philosophical Review,74 (1965), pp. 3–12. There are, indeed, other writings that contain important remarks apropos of those subjects; such are, in particular, “Bemerkungen über Frazers `The Golden Bough”’, Synthese,16 (1967), pp. 233–253, and Culture and Value,ed. G.H. von Wright (Oxford, 1980). However these remarks are quantitatively not very considerable and above all it is difficult to think of them as belon ging to the core of Wittgenstein’s actual philosophical investigations. Similar considerations can be done apropos of some interesting hints present in writings like Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief,ed. C. Barrett (Oxford, 1966), or F. Waismann, “ Notes on Talks with Wittgenstein ”, Philosophical Review,64 (1969), pp. 12–16.
For a deeper treatment of the questions touched on in this paper and for the discussion of the concerned literature see L.Tarca, Il linguaggio sub specie aeterni. La filosofia di L. Wittgenstein come attività razionale ed esperienza mistica (Abano-Padova, 1986), where the here suggested interpretation of Wittgenstein’s whole philosophy is widely discussed and supplied with textual evidence.
On the question of ethical silence in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy see in particular C. Radford, “Wittgenstein on Ethics”, in Wittgenstein in Focus, eds. B. McGuinness/R. Haller (Amsterdam-Atlanta, 1989 ), pp. 85–114.
Compare this point to I.Valent, La forma del linguaggio (Abano - Padova, 1983).
On the question of the `positive’ or `negative’ sense of Wittgenstein’s thought see S. Borutti, “Wittgenstein e le figure del silenzio”, Il piccolo Hans,42 (1984), pp. 79–99.
L. Wittgenstein, The Blue Book,in The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford, 19692), p. 1.
Cf. NB,p. 74e; cf.: “[chrw(133)]the world is independent of my will” (TLP,6.373).
Cf.: “The way to solve the problem you see in life is to live in a way that will make what is problematic disappear (das Problemhafte zum Verschwinden bringt).” (CV,p. 27).
Cf. Waismann (1969), p. 14.: “Für mich hat die Theorie keinen Wert. Eine Theorie gibt mir nichts”.
Cf.: “[chrw(133)]we must be able to understand a proposition without knowing if it is true or false.” (Notes on Logic,in NB,pp. 93–106, p. 98. (cf. TLP,4.0621). Cf. “[chrw(133)]propositions have a sense which is independent of their truth or falsehood” (ibid.,p. 97).
On this point see in particular On Certainty (Oxford, 1969).
For the importance of ethical attitude regarding Wittgenstein’s philosophy see A.G. Gargani’s interpretation, in particular “ Wittgensteins ethische Einstellung ”, in B. McGuinness /R. Haller (1989), pp. 67–84.
Cf. “It seems clear that what we MEAN must always be ”sharp“.”(NB, p.68e). Cf. NB, pp. 60–71; cf. TLP, 2.0211, 2.0212, 3.23, 3.251, 5.156.
L.Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, 1953); L.Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford, 19783).
See S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford, 1982); cf. S. Holtzman/ C. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (London, 1981 ).
the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.“ (PI,133).
See in particular PI, RFM, Philosophische Bemerkungen (Oxford, 1964), Philosophische Grammatik (Oxford, 1969 ).
Apropos of this point see the question raised by M. O’C. Drury (“Have I seen that the Philosophische Bemerkungen could have been inscribed `to the glory of God’ ? Or that the problems discussed in the Philosophical Investigations are being seen from a religious point of view ?”) in “Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. R. Rhees (Oxford, 1984), pp. 76–96, p. 79.
On this point see A. Kenny, “Wittgenstein on the Nature of Philosophy”, in A. Kenny, The Legacy of Wittgenstein (Oxford, 1984), cap. 4, especially the final part.
For a reading of Wittgenstein’s thought led on the basis of a radical philosophical questioning, see C. Sini, Wittgenstein e l’immagine, in C. Sini, I segni dell’anima (Roma-Bari, 1989 ), pp. 213–263.
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Tarca, L. (1990). Silence in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy: An Enigma. In: Haller, R., Brandl, J. (eds) Wittgenstein — Eine Neubewertung / Wittgenstein — Towards a Re-Evaluation. Schriftenreihe der Wittgenstein-Gesellschaft, vol 19/1. J.F. Bergmann-Verlag, Munich. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-30086-2_30
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