Is Wittgenstein’s Ethical Theory a Kind of Error Theory?

Abstract

At a Centenary Symposium whose announced topic is ‘Wittgenstein: Towards A Reevaluation’, it seems appropriate to preface the main part of my paper with a brief overview concerning the very mixed reactions which Wittgenstein’s contribution to ethics has provoked from commentators. Among those whose reactions have been very positive are R.W. Beardsmore, Ilham Dilman, H.O. Mounce, D.Z. Phillips, and Peter Winch, who tend to see themselves as interpreting and developing views which they attribute to Wittgenstein.¹ It seems fair to say, however, that the reactions of most philosophers have been strongly negative. The reasons for these negative reactions have been rather varied. Some critics, such as Robert J. Fogelin,² P.M.S. Hacker,³ and David Pears,⁴ agree in maintaining that, in some respect or other, Wittgenstein’s ethical position is not well argued. Colin Radford goes further by arguing that Wittgenstein’s entire ethical position is incoherent. In explaining the famous ‘ethical silence’ in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, Radford maintains that ethics presented the mature Wittgenstein with a problem he could not resolve. Hence, he adds, “the mature Wittgenstein could not say anything about ethics, and he (virtually) does not”.⁵ Most extreme of all is E.D. Klemke’s conclusion concerning Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Ethics’ that “it is of no worth whatever for ethical inquiry, and that the manner of philosophizing which it exhibits is despicable”.⁶