Fisheries Reserve Model

  • Bruce Hannon
  • Matthias Ruth


In the part on “Ecological Models,” we modeled the fate of a common property resource, and in the previous chapter of we dealt with the optimal use of a renewable resource. Let us now discuss the management of common-property renewable resources. A typical example of such a resource is fisheries. Anybody who has access to oceans and shorelines may engage in fishing activities. As long as profits can be made from fisheries there is the incentive to increase fishing effort. As a result, pressure on the fish population increases, potentially leading to the collapse of the resource. Standard approaches to dealing with the tragedy of the commons include licensing of fishing boats and gear, restrictions of fishing seasons, and limitations on the harvestable size of fish. Regulations and control measures affecting the fishing industries are frequently difficult to enforce, particularly on the oceans, and are therefore not likely to be very effective.


Fishing Effort Marine Reserve Common Property Resource Reserve Size Harvestable Size 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruce Hannon
    • 1
  • Matthias Ruth
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of GeographyUniversity of IllinoisUrbanaUSA
  2. 2.Center for Energy and Environmental StudiesBoston UniversityBostonUSA

Personalised recommendations