Abstract
Cournot and optimal outputs (Proposition 3.1). A Mechanism with efficient outcomes (Proposition 3.2). Entry and social welfare (Propositions 3.3–4). Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry (CEFE) and Walrasian Equilibrium (Proposition 3.5). Relationship between CEFE and optimal allocations (Propositions 3.6–7). A reduction in the active number of firms in CEFE increases social welfare (Propositions 3.8–9). Number of firms and profits in CEFE (Propositions 3.10–11). Cournot equilibrium and Constrained Efficiency (Proposition 3.12). Appendix: Optimal trade policy (Propositions 3.13–17).
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
BARON, D.P. (1989) “Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions” in R. Schmalansee & R. Willig (eds) Handbook of Industrial Organization, chp. 24. North Holland.
BEATO, P., MAS-COLELL, A. (1985). “On Marginal Cost Pricing with Given Tax-Subsidy Rules”. Journal of Economic Theory, 37, pp. 356–365.
BRANDER, J.A. and KRUGMAN, P.R. (1983). “A ”Reciprocal Dumping“ Model of International Trade”. Journal of International Economics, 15, November, pp. 313–323.
BULOW, J., GEANAKOPLOS, J. and KLEMPERER, P. (1985). “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements”, Journal of Political Economy, June, pp. 488–511.
CORCHON, L. (1986). “What Competition Does?. Investigaciones Económicas, Supl. pp. 37–48
CORCHON, L., GONZALEZ-MAESTRE, M. (1991) “The Importance of Fixed Costs in the Design of Trade Policies: An Exercise in the Theory of Second Best”. Working Paper, U. de Alicante. Revised (1995).
CORCHON, L. and FRADERA, I. (1996). “Comparative Statics in Free Entry Cournot Equilibrium”. Working Paper, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona.
CORCHON, L., URBANO, A. (1996). A Theory of Second-Best or Why the Market is Sometimes Not That Bad Even Under Imperfect Competition or Externalities“ Mimeo, U. of Alicante.
COWLING, K. and WATERSON, M. (1976). “Price-cost Margins and Market Structure”. Economica, 43 (August), pp. 267–74.
DASGUPTA, P. and USHIO, Y. (1981). “On the Rate of Convergence of Oligopoly Equilibria in Large Markets: An Example”.Economic Letters, 8, pp. 13–17.
FARRELL, J. and SHAPIRO, C. (1990). “Asset Ownership and Market Structure in Oligopoly”, Rand Journal of Economics 21, pp. 275–292.
FRAUMENI, B. M. and JORGENSON, D. (1980) “Rates of Return by the Industrial sector in the United States 1948–1976”. American Economic Review, 70 (May), pp. 326–330.
FRAYSSE, J. and MOREAUX, M. (1981) “Cournot Equilibrium in Large Markets under Increasing Returns”. Economic Letters, 8, pp. 217–220.
GRADSTEIN, M. (1995). “Implementation of Social Optimum in Oligopoly”. Economic Design, vol. 1 n. 3 pp. 319–326.
GROSSMAN, G.M. (1992) Imperfect Competition and International Trade. MIT Press.
GUESNERIE, R and LAFFONT, J.J. (1978) “Taxing Price Makers”. Journal of Economic Theory vol. 19 pp. 423–455.
GUESNERIE, R. and HART, O. (1985). “Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition”. International Economic Review, vol. 26, n° 3 pp. 525–545.
HART, O. (1980) “Perfect Competition and Optimum Product Differentiation”. Journal of Economic Theory, 22 pp. 279–312.
HARRINGTON, J.E. (1991). “The Joint Profit Maximum as a Free-Entry equilibrium Outcome”. European Economic Review, vol. 35 (5), pp. 1087–1101.
HARRIS, R. (1981). “Price and Entry Regulations with Large Fixed Costs”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 95 pp. 643–655.
HART, O. (1979). “Monopolistic Competition in Large Economies with Differentiated Products”, Review of Economic Studies, 1979, vol. XLVI, pp. 1–30.
HELPMAN, E. (1984) “Increasing Returns, Imperfect Markets and Trade Theory” in R.W. Jones and P.B. Kenan (eds.) Handbook of International Economics. North Holland.
HELPMAN, E, KRUGMAN, P.R. (1989) Trade Policy and Market Structure. The MIT Press.
KIERZKOWSKI, H. (1984) (ed.). Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford University Press.
KRUGMAN, P.R. (1990) “Industrial Organization and International Trade”, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 2 Ch. 20. R. Schmalensee & R. Willing (eds.) North Holland.
LAHIRI, S. and ONO, Y. (1988). “Helping Minor Firms Reduces Welfare”. Economic Journal, December pp. 1199–1203.
LOEB, M and MAGATH, W.A. (1979). “A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation”. Journal of Law and Economics vol. 22. pp. 399–404.
MAKOWSKI, L. (1980). “Perfect Competition, the Profit Criterion and the Organization of the Economic Activity”. Journal of Economic Theory, 22, pp. 222–241.
MANKIW, N.G. and WHINSTON, M.D. (1986). “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency”. Rand Journal of Economy, vol. 17, n2 1 pp. 48–58.
MARTIN, S. (1993). Advanced Industrial Economics. Blackwell, Oxford.
MAS-COLELL, A. (1987) Lecciones sobre la Teoria del Equilibrio con Rendimientos Crecientes. Cololecció D’Economia ( Generalitat Valenciana ). Valencia.
MOULIN, H. (1988). Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Econometric Society Monographs n. 15, Cambridge University Press.
NOVSHEK, W. (1980). “Cournot Equilibria with Free Entry”. Review of Economic Studies, 47 pp. 473–486.
PERRY, M.K. (1984). “Scale Economies, Imperfect Competition and Public Policy”. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 32, August, pp. 313–333.
ROBERTS, K. (1980). “The Limit Points of Monopolistic Competition”. Journal of Economic Theory, 22, pp. 256–278.
ROMANO, R.E. (1988). “A Monopolist Should Always Be Subsidizes No Matter How High the Excess Burden”. Canadian Journal of Economics, XXI n. 4, pp. 871–873.
SAPPINGTON, D. and SIBLEY, D. (1988). “Regulating without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus Subsidy Scheme”. International Economic Review, 29, n. 2, May pp. 297–306.
SCHMALENSEE, R. (1976). “Is More Competition Necessarily Good?”. Industrial Organization Review, vol. 4, ri 2.
SHESHINSKI, E. (1976). “Price, Quality and Quantity Regulation in Monopoly Situations”. Economica, 43, pp. 127–137.
SIBLEY, D. (1989). “Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Price-Cap Regulation”. Rand Journal of Economics, Autumn 1989 pp. 392–404.
SUZIJMURA, K. and KIYONO, K. (1987). “Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 54 pp. 157–167.
VON WEIZÄCKER, C.C. (1980). “A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry”, Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 11 pp. 399–420.
YARROW, G.K. (1985). “Welfare Losses in Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol XXXIII, No 4, pp. 515–529.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Corchón, L. (1996). Welfare and Cournot Competition. In: Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 442. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61553-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-22531-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive