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Welfare and Cournot Competition

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Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 442))

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Abstract

Cournot and optimal outputs (Proposition 3.1). A Mechanism with efficient outcomes (Proposition 3.2). Entry and social welfare (Propositions 3.3–4). Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry (CEFE) and Walrasian Equilibrium (Proposition 3.5). Relationship between CEFE and optimal allocations (Propositions 3.6–7). A reduction in the active number of firms in CEFE increases social welfare (Propositions 3.8–9). Number of firms and profits in CEFE (Propositions 3.10–11). Cournot equilibrium and Constrained Efficiency (Proposition 3.12). Appendix: Optimal trade policy (Propositions 3.13–17).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, University of Alicante, Ap. Correus 99, 03071, Alicante, Spain

    Prof. Luis Corchón

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  1. Prof. Luis Corchón
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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Corchón, L. (1996). Welfare and Cournot Competition. In: Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 442. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61553-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-22531-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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