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Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets pp 41–60Cite as

Comparative Statics in Oligopolistic Markets

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 442))

Abstract

The problem of comparative statics. Aggregative games with strategic substitution: The effect of entry of a new player on the strategies played in a N.E. (Proposition 2.1) and on the payoffs obtained in a N.E. (Propositions 2.2 and 2.3). Idiosyncratic vs. Generalized shocks. Effects of an idiosyncratic shock on the strategies played in a N.E. (Proposition 2.4) and on payoffs obtained in a N.E. (Proposition 2.5). Effects of a generalized shock (Proposition 2.6). Effect of an increase in the marginal cost on equilibrium price in Oligopoly and Perfect Competition (Propositions 2.7 and 2.8). Games with Strategic Complements: Effects of a shock on the strategies played in a N.E. (Proposition 2.9) and on payoffs obtained in a N.E. (Proposition 2.10). The effect of entry of a new player on the strategies played in a N.E. (Proposition 2.11) and on the payoffs obtained in a N.E. (Proposition 2.12)

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, University of Alicante, Ap. Correus 99, 03071, Alicante, Spain

    Prof. Luis Corchón

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  1. Prof. Luis Corchón
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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Corchón, L. (1996). Comparative Statics in Oligopolistic Markets. In: Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 442. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61553-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-22531-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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