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Nash Equilibrium

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Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 442))

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Abstract

Games and Aggregative Games. Characterization of Games with Strategic Substitutes (Proposition 1.1). Existence (Proposition 1.2), Uniqueness (Proposition 1.3), Inefficiency (Proposition 1.4) and Stability (Propositions 1.5–6) of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games with Strategic Substitutes. Characterization of Games with Strategic Complements (Proposition 1.7). Existence (Proposition 1.8), Uniqueness (Proposition 1.9), Inefficiency (Proposition 1.10) and Stability (Proposition 1.11) of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complements. Appendix: Further Results on the Stability of Equilibrium (Propositions 1.12–14).

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  1. Dept. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, University of Alicante, Ap. Correus 99, 03071, Alicante, Spain

    Prof. Luis Corchón

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  1. Prof. Luis Corchón
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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Corchón, L. (1996). Nash Equilibrium. In: Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 442. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_2

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61553-8

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