Abstract
In most approaches (see Nash, 1950; Raiffa, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; Roth, 1979), the bargaining problem has been considered in the case of unicriterial payoffs of players, i.e. when the preferences of particular players are expressed by utility functions. In many practical applications however, players trying to balance a number of objectives might have difficulties while constructing such utility functions. Moreover, the classic literature considers mostly axiomatic models of bargaining which yield one-shot solutions and do not result in procedures describing a process of reaching a binding agreement.
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References
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Bronisz, P., Krus, L., Lopuch, B. (1989). An Experimental System Supporting Multiobjective Bargaining Problem. In: Lewandowski, A., Stanchev, I. (eds) Methodology and Software for Interactive Decision Support. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 337. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22160-0_18
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