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Bureaucracy and the Shadow Economy: A Macro-Approach

  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Hannelore Weck

Abstract

In recent years, the growth of public bureaucracy was one of the topics receiving most attention within political economy. Many theories have been developed dealing with the relationship of public bureaucracy with the political sector, in particular the models of Niskanen (1971, 1975) and Migué, Bélanger (1974), studying the behavior of individual bureaus vis à vis parliament.

Keywords

Public Choice Wage Rate Public Employee Shadow Economy Median Voter Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Hannelore Weck

There are no affiliations available

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