The Development of the Armed Forces in the Baltic States

Abstract

A rather basic and crude analysis of the development of the armed forces of the three Baltic States since independence in 1991 would point to three crucial factors: Russia, money and will. The legacy of Russian/Soviet occupation continues to weigh heavily on the minds of the Baltic States, and though not explicitly stated in their respective national security policy documents, Russia is still regarded as a source of potential danger. The question of money is a critical one, particularly in the coming five years. Economic resources are limited and all sectors of the developing market economies have demands. The avowed goal of a defence budget of 2 per cent of national GDP is crucial to the further development of the armed forces, and the linchpin of their preparations for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. Given the limited economic resources and the `Russian factor,’ it is not surprising that political and national consensus on the issue of developing the national armed forces is not complete. Disagreement focuses on the question of money, which derives from the question of priorities. Should the priority be membership in NATO, or good neighbourly relations (read Russia)? Further strains are evident in the way in which armed forces should be developed — what kind of defence force should they have?

The author would like to thank officials at the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia in Stockholm, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finnish Ministry of Defence, and the Danish Military Attaché to Estonia for their assistance in preparing this chapter. Additional thanks for critical comments are due to Erik Männik, former head of Plans & Policy at the Estonian MoD, Pertti Joenniemi and Olav E Knudsen.