Future Impacts of Chinese and Asian Dependency upon Energy from the Middle East and Central Asia

  • Frank Umbach
Chapter

Abstract

“Energy security concerns have always been central to geopolitical interests. Throughout history, the effort to secure access to energy sources and ensure adequate transport routes has demanded technological, commercial, diplomatic and military agility.”1

Keywords

Malaysia Liquefaction Nigeria Indonesia OECD 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frank Umbach
    • 1
  1. 1.Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in BerlinGermany

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