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Institutionen und Transformation — Mögliche Politikimplikationen der Neuen Institutionenökonomik

  • Chapter
Neue Entwicklungen in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Part of the book series: Studies in Contemporary Economics ((CONTEMPORARY))

Zusammenfassung

Vertreter der verschiedenen Forschungszweige innerhalb der Neuen Institutionenökonomik teilen eine zentrale Annahme: Institutions matter. Diese zentrale Annahme wird nicht nur von Vertretern der Transaktionskostenökonomik, der Ökonomik der Eigentumsrechte sowie der Prinzipal Agent-Theorie geteilt, sondern auch von Vertretern der ökonomischen Theorie der Politik sowie der Konstitutionenökonomik.

„Politicians of all parties are great believers in institutional change as a source of economic improvement — not surprisingly, because that is the sort of change they are well placed to bring about.“ (Matthews 1986, 917)

Die Autoren danken Ivan Baron Adamovich, Thrainn Eggertsson, Chrysostomos Mantzavinos und Hansueli Stamm für Hinweise und Anregungen.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Königin-Luise-Str. 5, 14191, Berlin, Deutschland

    Hella Engerer

  2. Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen, Kahlaische Straße 19, 07745, Jena, Deutschland

    Stefan Voigt

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  1. Hella Engerer
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), Königin-Luise-Str. 5, D-14195, Berlin, Deutschland

    Klaus F. Zimmermann (Präsident, Direktor, Professor) (Präsident, Direktor, Professor)

  2. IZA (Institute for the Study of Labor) Bonn, Deutschland

    Klaus F. Zimmermann (Präsident, Direktor, Professor) (Präsident, Direktor, Professor)

  3. Universität Bonn und der Freien Universität Berlin, Deutschland

    Klaus F. Zimmermann (Präsident, Direktor, Professor) (Präsident, Direktor, Professor)

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Engerer, H., Voigt, S. (2002). Institutionen und Transformation — Mögliche Politikimplikationen der Neuen Institutionenökonomik. In: Zimmermann, K.F. (eds) Neue Entwicklungen in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Studies in Contemporary Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12571-7_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12571-7_4

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

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