Incidence of an Emission Tax

  • Horst Siebert


In part II we analyze optimal environmental allocation and suggest different approaches in order to determine the optimal environmental solution. Environmental allocation is placed into the context of static optimization models, the economics of public goods and the theory of property rights. In chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10, our interest shifts to environmental policy instruments. In chapter 7, we analyze how firms react to an emission tax, and what the overall incidence of an emission tax will be on environmental quality, emissions, the allocation of resources in production and abatement and sectoral structure. We thus analyze the incidence problem in detail for a specific instrument. In chapter 8, we survey the environmental policy instruments available looking at their relative advantages and disadvantages. In chapter 9, we analyze to what extent different policy instruments have to be used in different environmental problems. In chapter 10, we study some institutional conditions in which policy instruments are chosen and the influence of the institutional setting on environmental policy.


Propen Income Dition Abate Monopoly 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Horst Siebert
    • 1
  1. 1.Kiel Institute of World EconomicsKielGermany

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