Abstract
A revelation (or delegation) game is Nash incentives compatible if and only if it is perfectly incentives compatible whenever the types of the players are personal (independently drawn with private valuations of actions). An outcome in a personal-types Bayesian environment is perfectly implementable, if and only if it is Nash implementable. These observations are shown to be immediate consequences of a general types decomposition theorem regarding the perfect equilibria of Bayesian games.
This research was partly sponsored by a grant from the U.S. National Science Foundation, NSF No. SES-9011790. An earlier version of the paper, entitled “Are Bayesian-Nash Incentives and Implementations Perfect?” appeared as Discussion Paper No. 680 in the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1986.
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Kalai, E., Samet, D. (1992). Types Decomposition and Perfect Implementations. In: Selten, R. (eds) Rational Interaction. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_8
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