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Fee Games: (N)TU-Games with Incomplete Information

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
Chapter

Abstract

A fee-game is a special version of an NTU-game with incomplete information exhibiting certain side payment properties. We analyze the structure of the set of incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms and, based on this analysis, we propose a further axiom for a value for (N)TU-games with incomplete information.

Keywords

Incomplete Information Individually Rational Cooperative Game Side Payment True Type 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joachim Rosenmüller
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung (IMW)Universität BielefeldBielefeld 1Germany

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