A fee-game is a special version of an NTU-game with incomplete information exhibiting certain side payment properties. We analyze the structure of the set of incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms and, based on this analysis, we propose a further axiom for a value for (N)TU-games with incomplete information.
KeywordsCovariance Expense Hull Nash Nism
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