Evolution and Convention: Social Contract IV

  • Ken Binmore
Chapter

Abstract

This paper may be read in two different ways. It can be seen as a contribution to the literature on the evolution of bargaining conventions. (See, for example, Young [11].) Those who are interested only in this aspect of the paper will wish to read only Section 2. However, the chief motivation for writing the paper is to round off a philosophical point about the evolution of utilitarianism raised in an earlier paper (Binmore [4]).

Keywords

Brittle Nash Shoe 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ken Binmore
    • 1
  1. 1.Economics DepartmentUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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