Abstract
This paper may be read in two different ways. It can be seen as a contribution to the literature on the evolution of bargaining conventions. (See, for example, Young [11].) Those who are interested only in this aspect of the paper will wish to read only Section 2. However, the chief motivation for writing the paper is to round off a philosophical point about the evolution of utilitarianism raised in an earlier paper (Binmore [4]).
Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho’ they have never given promises to each other.
Hume [1739, p.490)
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Binmore, K. (1992). Evolution and Convention: Social Contract IV. In: Selten, R. (eds) Rational Interaction. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_18
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