Determinacy and Rational Choice

  • Russell Hardin
Chapter

Abstract

Suppose we have a fully determinate rational choice theory that will tell each of us what to do in a particular interactive choice context and suppose each of us knows the positions of all the others. From our theory I can calculate not only what I ought to do but also what each other agent in the interaction ought rationally to do. Given knowledge of what each other agent should do, I can check whether I could in fact do better by not following the theory. If that theory yields determinate solutions, in the sense that it tells each of us explicitly what to do, these solutions must be in equilibrium for rational players who have full knowledge of the payoff structure, who have this theory, and who assume that their co-players are rational and have this theory.

Keywords

Nash Cute Oligopoly 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Russell Hardin
    • 1
  1. 1.Departments of Political Science and PhilosophyUniversity of ChicagoChicagoUSA

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