Abstract
Whenever information is decentralized, efficient collective decisions have to rely on the pieces of information that each individual privately controls. Incentives have to be provided to guarantee proper revelation of these private informations. The literature on mechanism design under incomplete information addresses the question.1
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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d’Aspremont, C., Gérard-Varet, LA. (1992). Non-Transferable Utility and Bayesian Incentives. In: Selten, R. (eds) Rational Interaction. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_10
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