Abstract
This paper describes the position of scientific realism and presents the basic lines of argument for the position. Simply put, scientific realism is the view that the aim of science is knowledge of the truth about observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent, objective reality. Scientific realism is supported by several distinct lines of argument. It derives from a non-anthropocentric conception of our place in the natural world, and it is grounded in the epistemology and metaphysics of common sense. Further, the success of science entitles us to infer both the approximate truth of mature scientific theories and the truth-conduciveness of the methods of science.
Reappears courtesy of the Editors of Theoria.
Acknowledgements: This paper was presented at seminars at the University of Melbourne and the Welt und Wissen workshop, Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, University of Bielefeld. I am grateful for comments to Stephen Barker, Mara Beller, Martin Carrier, John Clendinnen, Keith Hutchison, Tim Lyons, Graeme Marshall, Felix Mühlhölzer, Trevor Pinch, Graham Priest, Stathis Psillos, Robert Nola and Jay Rosenberg.
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Sankey, H. (2004). Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defence. In: Carrier, M., Roggenhofer, J., Küppers, G., Blanchard, P. (eds) Knowledge and the World: Challenges Beyond the Science Wars. The Frontiers Collection. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-08129-7_3
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