A Noncooperative Model of Bargaining in Simple Spatial Games

  • James D. Laing


The bargaining problem facing players who must reach a collective decision can be modeled precisely as a noncooperative game. This essay uses a noncooperative game-th oretic approach to analyze bargaining in a class of games without sidepayments in which a point from a Euclidean set of decision alternatives is to be selected in accordance with a simple collective decision rule (Laing, Nakabayashi, and Slotznick, 1983), such as any weighted or unweighted majority rule. It builds from foundations established in Selten’s (1981) noncooperative analysis of bargaining in zero-normalized, one-stage characteristic function games. It models simple spatial bargaining games, and characterizes noncooperative stationary equilibrium strategies and their relation to demand equilibria (Albers, 1975, 1987).*


Global Strategy Local Strategy Stationary Strategy Bargaining Game Winning Coalition 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991

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  • James D. Laing

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