Abstract
In the tradition of folk theorems, this paper shows that nearly anything can be a bargaining outcome of the proposal-making model.
I would like to thank the other members of the research group on Game Theory at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of Bielefeld, especially James Friedman and Reinhard Selten, for their comments. I would also like to thank William Zame for his extensive comments. I am grateful to the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of Bielefeld for its support and hospitality and to Franz Weissing for his care and attention. This research was also supported, in part, by the National Science Foundation grant SES-8706631.
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References
Bennett, E., “Three Approaches to Bargaining in NTU games”, to appear in this volume, 1990.
Selten, R., “A Non-cooperative Model of Characteristic Function Bargaining”, in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern V. Boehm and H. Nachtkamp (eds.), Wissenschaftsverlag Bibliographisches Institut Mannheim, Wien–Zurich, 131–151, 1981.
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bennett, E. (1991). Folk Theorems for the Proposal-Making Model. In: Selten, R. (eds) Game Equilibrium Models III. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_6
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