Introduction to Volume II: “Methods, Morals and Markets”

Abstract

This volume contains contributions to the methodology of analysis of games, game-theoretic contributions to the fundamental ethical questions facing societies, and game-theoretic analyses of market environments. The analysis throughout is strictly noncooperative, in the usual sense that players are expected to abrogate an agreement unless the nature of the agreement provides incentives to comply. A recurrent theme is the importance of timing and incentives in extensive-form games. Indeed, it would not be far off the mark to consider the volume as being subtitled “On the necessity, sufficiency and predictive power of subgame-perfect equilibria.” Güth, Leininger and Stephan find that restriction to subgame-perfect equilibria and to an analogue, truncation-consistent equilibria leaves only stationary equilibria in supergames. Abreu and Pearce ask when subgame-perfection may not pay appropriate attention to whether the group wishes to deviate from plans made, that is, to renegotiate.