On Symmetric Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions in a Finite-Action, Atomless Game

  • M. Ali Khan
  • Ye Neng Sun
Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 1)


We show that in a finite action, atomless game, every Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution can “besymmetrized.” This yields an elementary proof of a result of Mas-Colell.


Nash Equilibrium Measurable Subset Borel Probability Measure Infinite Dimensional Space Infinite Dimensional 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Ali Khan
  • Ye Neng Sun

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