Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 1)
On Symmetric Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions in a Finite-Action, Atomless Game
We show that in a finite action, atomless game, every Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution can “besymmetrized.” This yields an elementary proof of a result of Mas-Colell.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Measurable Subset Borel Probability Measure Infinite Dimensional Space Infinite Dimensional
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991