Abstract
We show that in a finite action, atomless game, every Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution can “besymmetrized.” This yields an elementary proof of a result of Mas-Colell.
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References
Hildenbrand, W., 1974, Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Jamison, R. E., 1974, “A Quick Proof for a One-Dimensional Version of Liapunoff’s Theorem,” Amer. Math. Monthly 81, 507–508.
Khan, M. Ali, 1989, “On Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions for Games with a Non-Metrizable Action Space and Upper Semi-Continuous Payoffs,” Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 315, 126–146.
Khan, M. Ali and Sun, Y., 1990, “On a Reformation of Cournot-Nash Equilibria,” J. Math. Anal. Appl. 146, 442–460.
Mas-Colell, A., 1984, “On a Theorem of Schmeidler,” J. Math. Econ. 13, 210206.
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Khan, M.A., Sun, Y.N. (1991). On Symmetric Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions in a Finite-Action, Atomless Game. In: Khan, M.A., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07071-0_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07071-0_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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