Abstract
Sovereign debt management issues include the policy and operational management of capital borrowings by a sovereign state from bilateral and multilateral financial institutions, and of state guaranteed external borrowings by private entities. These borrowings often form an important source of credit for economic activities, including tiding over financial crises from time to time in developing countries. Sovereign debt influences the economy directly through the availability of additional resources under various debt contracts. In this chapter, we examine important implications of various debt management mechanisms.
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Rao, P.K. (2003). Sovereign Debt Management. In: Development Finance. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-06570-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-06570-9_6
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