Summary
This paper studies how communication or exchange of opinions influences correlation of beliefs. The paper focuses on a situation in which agents communicate with each other infinitely many times without observing data. It is an extension to the ‘Expert Problem’ in Bayesian theory, where the informational flow is asymmetric. Moreover, this paper generalizes the existing literature of communication that employs the common prior assumption (CPA) by allowing for heterogeneous beliefs. Some basic convergence results are shown in contrast with the results obtained under the CPA. Furthermore, several economic implications of the basic results are provided.
The results presented in this paper are taken from my Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University. I gratefully acknowledge the inspiration obtained from innumerable discussions with Mordecai Kurz about this subject. Also, I appreciate comments from Kenneth J. Arrow, Peter J. Hammond, Maurizio Motolese, Carsten K. Nielsen, Ho-Mou Wu and the anonymous referee.
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Nakata, H. (2004). Modelling exchange of probabilistic opinions. In: Aliprantis, C.D., Arrow, K.J., Hammond, P., Kubler, F., Wu, HM., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 18. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05858-9_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05858-9_31
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