Summary
We examine a multistage model of an R&D race where players have multiple projects. We also develop perturbation methods for general dynamic games that can be expressed as analytic operators in a Banach space. We apply these perturbation methods to solve races with a small prize. We compute second-order asymptotically valid solutions for equilibrium and socially optimal decisions to determine qualitative properties of equilibrium. We find that innovators invest relatively too much on risky projects. Strategic reactions are ambiguous in general; in particular, a player may increase expenditures as his opponent moves ahead of him.
This is the final version of Judd (1985). The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of anonymous referees, Paul Milgrom, seminar participants at Northwestern University, the University of Chicago, the 1984 Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, and Yale University, and the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-8409786, SES-8606581)
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Judd, K.L. (2004). Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race. In: Aliprantis, C.D., Arrow, K.J., Hammond, P., Kubler, F., Wu, HM., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 18. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05858-9_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05858-9_30
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