Summary
We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition.
The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students — Luis Cabrai, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang — for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.
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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Aoki, R. (2004). Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition. In: Aliprantis, C.D., Arrow, K.J., Hammond, P., Kubler, F., Wu, HM., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 18. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05858-9_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05858-9_28
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