Abstract
Computer enumeration techniques are used to find the range of weights for weighted scoring rules on three candidates that will maximize Condoreet efficiency for odd numbers of voters, up to 31. Voters’ preference rankings on candidates are generated from a Pólya-Eggenberger urn model. Results suggest that widely held notions regarding the overall superiority of Borda Rule, particularly regarding Condorcet efficiency, are highly dependent on an assumption of independence of voters’ preferences. With relatively low measures of dependence between voters’ preferences, reflecting social homogeneity, plurality rule is more Condoreet efficient than Borda Rule. Results contradict theoretical findings in Van Newenhizen (1992).
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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gehrlein, W.V. (2003). Weighted Scoring Rules That Maximize Condorcet Efficiency. In: Sertel, M.R., Koray, S. (eds) Advances in Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05611-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05611-0_3
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