Coalition Structural Games and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

  • Göksel Aşan
  • M. Remzi Sanver
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)


We consider an economy with a single private good and a single pure public good where the public good is produced by the voluntary contributions of the agents. Agents may form clubs where each club produces and consumes its own public good, outsiders being excluded from the consumption. Allowing only individual moves, we show that the only stable coalition structure is the grand coalition which is also the unique efficient partition.


Public Good Coalition Formation Allocation Rule Coalition Structure Grand Coalition 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economicsİstanbul Bilgi UniversityKuştepe, İstanbulTurkey

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