Characterization of Competitive Allocations and the Nash Bargaining Problem
The paper deals with the characterization problem of competitive allocations in economic equilibrium models. We introduce an abstract social choice problem in a convex compact set, given a status-quo point, agents’ preferences and their bargaining powers. A competitive allocation is a point whose image in the supporting linear utilities is just the Nash bargaining solution. Next, we give axiomatic characterizations. At the end a simple price-allocation Maskin mechanism is constructed for the Nash implementation of the Walrasian rule.
KeywordsExpense Dition Nash Librium Rium
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