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Discretization of Information Collecting Situations and Continuity of Compensation Rules

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Summary

A canonical procedure is described which associates to each infinite information collecting situation a related information collecting situation with finite state and action spaces, in such a way that the two corresponding IC-games are near to each other. Compensations for informants are then shown to be also near to each other in the two IC-situations, provided that they are based on continuous compensation rules.

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Brânzei, R., Scotti, F., Tijs, S., Torre, A. (2003). Discretization of Information Collecting Situations and Continuity of Compensation Rules. In: Petrosyan, L.A., Yeung, D.W.K. (eds) ICM Millennium Lectures on Games. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-05618-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-05219-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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