Summary
In this paper the existence of time-consistent selectors of the subcore is considered. Necessary and sufficient conditions for time-consistency of an imputation from the subcore in multistage TU-cooperative games are determined. The imputation distribution procedure and corresponding algorithm, which lead to time-consistency of the solution of a multistage cooperative game, are presented.
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References
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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Zakharov, V.V., Dementieva, M.B. (2003). Time-Consistent Imputation Distribution Procedure for Multistage Game. In: Petrosyan, L.A., Yeung, D.W.K. (eds) ICM Millennium Lectures on Games. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05219-8_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-05618-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-05219-8
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