Heinrich Hertz was the first to introduce the concept of a symbol to characterize physical knowledge. He invoked this concept to highlight the fact that physical theories are not mere copies of nature. They contain a considerable constructive element. As it will turn out the use of idealizations sustains Hertz’s claim.
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