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Constitutional Economics and Ethics — On the Relation Between Self-Interest and Morality

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Book cover Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy ((SEEP))

Abstract

Fundamental to the economic approach to human behavior is the notion that people are motivated by self-interest in the sense that, if faced with a choice among alternative courses of action, they do what, in their view, best serves their own interests. Ethics, on the other hand, is based on the idea that there exist rules of moral conduct, and that people are not permitted simply to pursue their own interests, but are obliged to conform to these rules.

This paper was originally written in German. A translation draft was prepared by Linda O’Riordan at the Institute for Advanced Study Berlin and revised by the author. I am grateful to her and to the Institute for its support of this project.

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Vanberg, V.J. (2002). Constitutional Economics and Ethics — On the Relation Between Self-Interest and Morality. In: Brennan, G., Kliemt, H., Tollison, R.D. (eds) Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_29

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07551-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-04810-8

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