Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

On Conditions Favouring the Introduction and Maintenance of Stable Monetary Regimes and of Free Constitutions

  • Chapter
Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy ((SEEP))

  • 268 Accesses

Abstract

In 1996 I presented at a Monetary Conference of the Cato Institute in Washington a paper entitled The Implementation and Maintenance of a Monetary Constitution (Bernholz 1986a/1987). I had the good luck to have James Buchanan (Buchanan 1986/1987) as my discussant. Good luck because he turned his attention not to the monetary but to the constitutional problems involved. For I had asked and at least to a certain degree answered the following questions:

  1. 1.

    Under which conditions can a monetary constitution emerge which is favourable to price stability.

  2. 2.

    Which conditions must be fulfilled so that such a monetary constitution has a good chance to be maintained for a long time.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Andreski, Stanislav (1965): On the Uses of Comparative Sociology. Berkeley and Los Angeles (University of California Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Berman, Harold J. (1983): Law and Revolution, Cambridge, MA/London (Harvard University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1966): “Economic Policies in a Democracy”, Kyklos, 19, pp. 48–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1969): “Einige Bemerkungen zur Theorie des Einflusses der Verbaende in der Demokratie”. Kyklos, 22, pp. 276–287.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1982): “Flexible Exchange Rates in Historical Perspective”, Princeton Studies in International Finance,49 (Princeton: International Finance Section, Dept. of Economics, Princeton University).

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1983): “Inflation and Monetary Constitutions in Historical Perspective”, Kyklos, 36, pp. 397–419.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1986a): “The Implementation and Maintenance of a Monetary Constitution”, Cato Journal,6, pp. 477–511. Reprinted in: Dorn, James A. and Schwartz, Anna J. (Eds.) (1987): The Search for Stable Money. Essays on Monetary Reform. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 83–117.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1986b): “Growth of Government, Economic Growth and Individual Freedom”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (Zeitschrift fiir die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft), 142, pp. 661–683.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1989): Currency Competition, Inflation, Gresham’s Law and Exchange Rate, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,145 (3): pp. 465–488. Reprinted in: Siklos, Pierre L. (Ed.) (1995): Great Inflations of the 20th Century. Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, USA (Edward Elgar), pp. 257–287.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1990): “Institutional Requirements for Stable Money in an Integrated World Economy”, Cato Journal,10 (2), pp. 485–511.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1992): “The Completion of the Internal Market: Opportunities and Dangers Seen from an Institutional Perspective”, in:Centre For Economic Policy Studies (Ed.): Papers from CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group,CEPS Paper No.42, Brussels.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1993a): “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions to End Hyperinflations”, in:Gerard Radnitzky and HardyBouillon (Eds.): Government: Servant or Master? Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 30,Rodopi, pp. 141–170. Reprinted in:Siklos, Pierre L.(Ed.)(1995): Great Inflations of the 20th Century. Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, USA (Edward Elgar), pp. 257–287.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1993b): “Necessary Conditions for Totalitarianism: Supreme Values, Power and Personal Interests”, in:Radnitzky, Gerard and Bouillon, Hardy (Eds.): Government: Servant or Master? Amsterdam and Atlanta (Rodopi), pp. 267–312.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1995a): “Supreme Values, Tolerance and the Constitution of Liberty”, in: GerardRadnitzky and HardyBouillon (Eds.): Values and the Social Order,Vol. 1, Aldershot (Avebury Ashgate), pp. 235–250.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1995b): “Efficiency, Political-Economic Organization and International Competition between States”, in: GerardRadnitzky and HardyBouillon (Eds.): Values and the Social Order,Vol. 2, Aldershot (Avebury Ash-gate), pp. 157–198..

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1996): “Currency Substitution during Hyperinflation in the Soviet Union 1922–1924”, The Journal of European Economic History, 95 (2), pp. 297–323.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1997a): “Paper Money Inflation, Prices, Gresham’s Law and Exchange Rates in Ming China”, Kredit und Kapital, 30 (1): pp. 35–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1997b): “Currency Substitution during Hyperinflation in the Soviet Union 1922–1924”, The Journal of European Economic History, 25 (2), pp. 297–323.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter (1997c): “Ideology, Sects, State and Totalitarianism: A General Theory”, Forum für osteuropäische Ideen-und Zeitgeschichte, 1 (1), pp. 51–84. Also in: Maier, Hans and Schaefer, Michael (Eds.):Totalitarismus und politische Religionen,Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich (Schoeningh), pp. 271–298.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter, Gaertner, Manfred and Heri, Erwin (1985): “Historical Experiences with Flexible Exchange Rates”, Journal of International Economics, 19, pp. 21–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bigelow, K. (1992): “A Campaign to Deter Genocide: The Baha’i Experience”, In: Fein, H. (Ed.): Genocide Watch, New Haven and London (Yale University Press), pp. 189–196.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bollen, K. A. and Jackman, R. (1985): “Economic and Non-Economic Determi- nants of Democracy in the 1960s”, Research in Political Sociology, 1, pp. 27–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Botha, D.J. Joubert (1987): “Monetary Economics of the Byzantine Empire to A.D. 1204”, Working Paper,Johannesburg (Dept. of Economics, University of Witwatersrand).

    Google Scholar 

  • Brennan, Geoffrey and Buchanan, James M. (1983): The Reason of Rules, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Brescini-Turroni, Costatino (1937): The Economics of Inflation. A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany, 1914–1923,London (George Allen and Unwin). Italian original: Le Vicende del Marco Tedesco,Universita Bocconi 1937.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, James M. (1986): “Constitutional Strategy and the Monetary Regime. Comment”, Cato Journal,6, pp. 523–517. Reprinted in: Dorn, James A. and Schwartz, Anna J. (Eds.) (1987): The Search for Stable Money. Essays on Monetary Reform,Chicago (The University of Chicago Press), 119–127.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, James M. (1991a): “Prolegomena for a Strategy of Constitutional Reform”, in: Buchanan, James M.: The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order,Ann Arbor (The Univeristy of Michigan Press), Chapter 8, pp. 89–97.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, James M. (1991b): “Achieving Economic Reform”, In: Buchanan, James M.: The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order, Ann Arbor (The University of Michigan Press), Chapter 9, pp. 89–97.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burkhart, R. E. and Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1994): “Contemporary Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis”, American Economic Review, 88, pp. 903–910.

    Google Scholar 

  • Capie, F. (1986): “Conditions under Which Very Rapid Infflation Has Appeared”, in: Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 24, Amsterdam (North-Holland), pp. 115–168.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cagan, Philipp (1956): “The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation”, in:Friedman, Milton (Ed.): Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money,Chicago (Chicago University Press), pp. 25–117.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooper, R. (1985): The Baha’is of Iran. London (Minority Rights Group).

    Google Scholar 

  • Downs, Anthony (1957): An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York (Harper and Row).

    Google Scholar 

  • Dur, Robert A. J. and Swank, Orro H. (1997): “An Explanation of Policy Reversals. Why Do Voters Vote for a Smaller Government if They Voted for a Large Government in the Past”, Unpublished Manuscript,presented at the 1997 Silvaplana Public Choice Workshop at Pontresina.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eijffinger, Sylvester D.W. and DeHaan, Jacob (1996): “The Political Economy of Central Bank Indepedence”, Special Papers in International Economics,19, Princeton University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Faber, Malte, Manstetten, Rainer and Petersen, Thomas (1997): “Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Politicus. Political Economy, Constitutional Interest and Ecological Interest”, Kyklos, 50 (49), pp. 457–483.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franke, Herbert (1949): Geld and Wirtschaft in China unter der Mongolen-Herrschaft,Leipzig (Otto Harassowitz).

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey, Bruno S. and Kirchgaessner, Gebhard (1994): Demokratische Wirtschaftspolitik,Muenchen (Vahlen).

    Google Scholar 

  • Frey, Bruno S. and Weck, Hannelore (1981): “Hat Arbeitslosigkeit den Aufstieg des Nationalsozialismus bewirkt?”, Jahrbuch fuer Nationaloekonomie and Statistik, 196 (1), pp. 1–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guggisberg, H. R. (1983): “The Defense of Religious Toleration and Religious Liberty in Early Modern Europe: Arguments, Pressures and Some Consequences”, History of European Ideas, 4 (1), pp. 35–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hamilton, Earl J. (1933): American Treasury and Price Revolution in Spain,Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanke, Steve H., Jonung, Lars and Schuler, Kurt (1993): Russian Currency and Finance: A Currency Board Approach to Reform,London (Routledge).

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, Eric L. (1981): The European Miracle,Cambridge (Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kindleberger, Charles P. (1984): A Financial History of Western Europe,London (George Allen and Unwin).

    Google Scholar 

  • Lipset, Seymour M., Scong, K. R. and Torres, J. C. (1993): “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy”, International Social Science Journal, 136, pp. 155–175.

    Google Scholar 

  • LozanneRoldan, ClaudiaDe (1990): La Crisis Espanola de Siglo XVII y su Implicacion en Algunos Aspectos de las Finanzas Reales de Nueva Espana. Mexico, D.F. (ITAM, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico).

    Google Scholar 

  • Lui, Francis T. (1983): “Cagan’s Hypothesis and the First Nationwide Inflation of Paper Money in World History”, Journal of Political Economy, 91 (6), pp. 1067–1074.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maier, Hans and Schaefer, Michael (Eds.): Totalitarismus und politische Religionen. Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich (Schoeningh), pp. 271–298..

    Google Scholar 

  • Marlow, Michael L. (1986): “Private Sector Shrinkage and the Growth of Industrialized Economies”, Public Choice, 49 (2), pp. 143–154.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meyers Konversationslexikon (1903): “Calvin”, in: vol.3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mueller, Dennis C. (1997): “Constitutional Democracy: An Interpretation”, in: Breton, Albert, Galeotti, Gianluigi, Salmon, Pierre and Wintrobe, Ronald: Understanding Democracy,Cambridge (Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • North, Douglass C. (1981): Structure and Change in Economic History,New York (W.W. Norton and Co).

    Google Scholar 

  • North, Douglass C., Robert P. Thomas (1973): The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History,Cambridge, Mass. (Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Oates, Wallace E. (1972): Fiscal Federalism,New York (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich).

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, Mancur (1965): The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, Mancur (1982): The Rise and Decline of Nations,New Haven and London (Yale University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Piekalkiewicz, Jaroslaw and Penn, Alfred W. (1995): Politics of Ideocracy,Albany (State University of New York Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Peden, Edgar A., Michael D. Bradley (1989): “Government Size, Productivity, and Economic Growth: The Post-War Experience”, Public Choice, 61, pp. 229–245.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pirenne, Henri (1951): Histoire Économique de l’Occident Médiéval,Paris (Desclée de Brouwer).

    Google Scholar 

  • Pommerehne, Werner W. (1977): “Quantitative Aspects of Federalism: A Study of Six Countries”, in: Oates, Wallace E. (Ed.): Fiscal Federalism,Lexington and Toronto (Lexington Books), pp. 275–355.

    Google Scholar 

  • Przeworski, A. (1991): Democracy and the Market,Cambridge and New York (Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Subercaseaux, Guillermo (1912): El Papel Moneda,Santiago de Chile.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi, Vito (1977): “Inflation, Lags in Collection and the Real Value of Tax Revenues”, IMF Staff Papers, 24, pp. 154–167.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi, Vito, LudgerSchuknecht (1997): “Reforming Government: An Overview of Recent Experience”, European Journal of Political Economy,13 (3), pp. 395–417.

    Google Scholar 

  • The Constitution Of The Islamic Republic Of Iran (1998), http://www. netiran.com/Htdocs/Laws/000000LAGG01.html

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, Gordon (1952): “Paper Money - A Cycle in Cathay”, The Economic History Review,Second Series 9, pp. 393–407.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vanberg, Victor and Buchanan, James M. (1988): “Rational Choice and the Social Order”, Analyse und Kritik,10, pp. 138 sq.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vaubel, Ronald (1996): “Constitutional Safeguards Against Centralization in Federal States: An International Cross-Section Analysis”, Constitutional Political Economy, 6, pp. 79–102.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weede, Erich (1986): “Catch-up, Distributional Coalitions and Governments as Determinants of Economic Growth or Decline in Industrialized Societies”, British Journal of Sociology, 37, pp. 194–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weede, Erich (1990): Wirtschaft, Staat, Gesellschaft,Tuebingen (J.C.B. Mohr). Weede, Erich (1996a): Economic Development, Social Order and World Politics, Boulder, CO (Lynne Rienner).

    Google Scholar 

  • Weingast, Barry R. (1997): “Democratic Stability as a Self-Enforcing Equilibrium”, in: Breton, Albert, Galeotti, Gianluigi, Salmon, Pierre and Wintrobe, Ronald: Understanding Democracy,Cambridge (Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Peter Bernholz
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Research School of Social Science, R889, Australian National University, Coombs Building, 0200, Canberra, ACT, Australia

    Geoffrey Brennan

  2. Fachbereich 1, Philosophie, Gerhard-Mercator-Universität-GHS, Lotharstraße 65, 47048, Duisburg, Germany

    Hartmut Kliemt

  3. School of Business, University, University of Mississippi, 38677, MS, USA

    Robert D. Tollison

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Bernholz, P. (2002). On Conditions Favouring the Introduction and Maintenance of Stable Monetary Regimes and of Free Constitutions. In: Brennan, G., Kliemt, H., Tollison, R.D. (eds) Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_23

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07551-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-04810-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation