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The Transformation of Economic Systems

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Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy ((SEEP))

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Abstract

This paper deals with transformation issues along the lines of constitutional economics. Transformation is considered to be a mix of top-down and bottom-up developments. Given such a mix, what is preferable, a rapid transformation of a former socialist economy into a free market economy — or a more gradual one? This question is first discussed by use of the social network concept. Elementary desiderata of system transformations are developed. They are illustrated by the West German currency reform of 1948 and German reunification of 1990. The concept of human network capital is introduced and it is argued that the main impediments to rapid or big-bang transformation are the difficulties or impossibility of transforming human network capital. This is the time consuming part of any system transformation

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Authors
  1. Rudolf Richter
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Research School of Social Science, R889, Australian National University, Coombs Building, 0200, Canberra, ACT, Australia

    Geoffrey Brennan

  2. Fachbereich 1, Philosophie, Gerhard-Mercator-Universität-GHS, Lotharstraße 65, 47048, Duisburg, Germany

    Hartmut Kliemt

  3. School of Business, University, University of Mississippi, 38677, MS, USA

    Robert D. Tollison

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Richter, R. (2002). The Transformation of Economic Systems. In: Brennan, G., Kliemt, H., Tollison, R.D. (eds) Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_20

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07551-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-04810-8

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