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Buchanan and the Virginia School

  • Roger D. Congleton
Part of the Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy book series (SEEP)

Abstract

In the second half of the 20th century, the Virginia school of political economy has emerged as an important research program that explores the boundary between law, economics and politics. Although that research program is now carried out by many prominent economists and political scientists around the world, the work and personality of James Buchanan has always played an important role in its development, and in its appeal. This paper attempts to characterize the relationship between Buchanan and the Virginia school. It is written to honor his eightieth birthday.

Keywords

Political Economy Public Choice Rational Choice Model Fellow Traveler Constitutional Political Economy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roger D. Congleton

There are no affiliations available

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